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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is structured to research on a financial derivative asset 
known as a credit default swap (CDS). A CDS is a contract in which the buyer 
of protection makes a series of payments (often referred to as CDS spreads) to 
the protection seller and, in exchange, receives a payoff if a default event 
occurs. A default event can be defined in several ways, including failure to pay, 
restructuring or rescheduling of debt, credit event repudiation, moratorium and 
acceleration.  
The main motivation of my PhD thesis is to investigate the 
determinants of the changes of CDS spreads and to model the evolution of 
spreads. Two widely traded types are corporate and sovereign CDS contracts, 
the first has as its underlying asset a corporate bond and, hence, hedges against 
the default risk of a company; the second type hedges against the default risk 
of a sovereign country. The two contract types have different risk profiles; for 
example, it is known that liquidity premium with different maturity varies 
significantly for a corporate CDS but less so for a sovereign CDS because, in 
contrast with the corporate markets where a majority of the trading volume is 
concentrated on the 5-year CDS, the sovereign market has a more uniform 
trading volume across maturities.  
In light of the difference, this thesis is divided into four parts. Part A 
introduces the motivation and research questions of this thesis, followed by 
literature review on debt valuation, with emphasis on default and liquidity 
spreads modelling. Part B aims at the role liquidity risk plays in explaining the 
changes in corporate CDS spreads. Part C models sovereign CDS spreads with 
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macro and latent factors in a no-arbitrage framework. Part D concludes this 
thesis with a list of limitations and further research direction. 
Keywords: credit default swap; credit risk; liquidity risk; regime switching; 
sovereign risk; spillover; term structure; macroeconomic factors; principal 
component analysis; Kalman Filter 
JEL classification: C13, E42, E44, G12, G01, G12, G15 
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Abstract A 
 
In this chapter I propose the research questions and the motivation of 
this thesis. In order to find its contributions I then review the current literature 
on valuation of debt assets considering credit risk, liquidity risk or both. Pros 
and cons of selected papers are analysed. The purpose of this section is to 
summarize different pricing models under several assumptions of the dynamics 
of pricing factors and, therefore, to link the empirical studies in Chapters B and 
C to the existing literature. 
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Chapter A1. Introduction 
 Pioneered by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), research on 
default has grown extensively in the last three decades. Black and Scholes 
(1973) is undoubtedly one of the most influential papers in the financial 
economics world, attempting to pricing options and corporate liabilities. 
Merton (1974) assesses the crediWULVNRIDFRPSDQ\E\WUHDWLQJWKHFRPSDQ\¶V
HTXLW\DVDFDOORSWLRQRQLWVDVVHWVDQGWKHFRPSDQ\¶VFUHGLWULVNFDQWKHQEH
measured by the value of a put option. Since then, researchers have been 
working hard to improve the modelling on default, to produce more accurate 
results and to explain default spreads more realistically. For instance, searching 
WKH NH\ZRUGV ³GHIDXOW ULVN´ LQ*RRJOH VFKRODU UHWXUQV  DUWLFOHV VLQFH
2005. 
 Yet much remains to be done, default risk in financial markets has 
changed dramatically over the last few years, especially since the beginning of 
the financial crisis in 2007. A report in Moody (2011) shows the average credit 
loss rate has increased exponentially from 0.17% in 2007 to 3.41% in 2009, the 
highest in last 20 years. To be specific, I list several major recent credit events 
as follows (Guillen, 2012): 
February 7, 2007: HSBC announces losses linked to US subprime mortgages; 
April 3, 2007: New Century Financial, which specializes in sub-prime 
mortgages, files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and cuts half of its 
workforce; 
June 2007: Two Bear Stearns-run hedge funds with large holdings of 
subprime mortgages run into large losses and are forced to dump assets; 
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August 28, 2007: German Sachsen Landesbank faces collapse after investing 
in the sub-prime market; 
September 14, 2007: Depositors withdraw £1bn from Northern Rock in what 
is the biggest run on a British bank for more than a century; 
March 16, 2008: Bear Stearns is bought by J.P. Morgan Chase; 
September 7, 2008: Mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
rescued by the US government in one of the largest bailouts in US history; 
September 15, 2008: Bank of America agrees to a $50 billion rescue package 
for Merrill Lynch. Lehman files for bankruptcy; 
1 April 2009: Unemployment across the Eurozone rose to its highest level. 
 All the events above indicate the strong impacts of default risk on the 
financial world, on the other hand, researchers realize a large fraction of the 
variation in default spreads remains unexplained by existing models (see 
Huang and Huang, 2002, Ericsson, et al., 2009). Therefore the main objective 
of this thesis is to extend existing models and to improve our understanding on 
default risk. It is acknowledged in the literature that CDS (credit default swap) 
spreads are superior to bond spreads for default research through more accurate 
data and higher trading frequency. Two widely traded CDS types are corporate 
and sovereign CDS, the first has as its underlying asset a corporate bond and, 
hence, hedges against the default risk of a company; the second type hedges 
against the default risk of a sovereign country. In this thesis I focus on the 
analysis on CDS contracts by asking the research questions: 
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x How can existing models explain default spreads using more recent 
data? The financial crisis has changed the risk profile of the financial 
PDUNHW DQ H[DPLQDWLRQ RIPRGHOV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH EHIRUH DQG DIWHU WKH
beginning of financial crisis is therefore necessary. 
x Can I find other determinants implied by conventional models of 
default to explain corporate default spreads more accurately? 
Specifically, the increasing significance of liquidity risk for the 
valuation of equity and corporate bond has been investigated (Liu, 
2006, Chen et al., 2007), I will aim to examine the role of liquidity for 
CDS valuation. 
x Can I propose an accurate pricing model for sovereign default spreads 
by incorporating macro and latent factors? There is extensive literature 
on modelling credit risk by either macro factors (Hilscher and 
Nosbusch, 2010, Longstaff et al., 2011) or latent factors (Duffie, et al., 
2003, Houweling and Vorst, 2005, Pan and Singleton, 2008). I will 
combine these factors, take the advantages of each approach and 
compare the performance of my model. 
Answering those research questions will allow me to make both 
empirical and methodological contributions. Before presenting my empirical 
results and possible gaps this thesis has filled, I review the literature on 
valuation of debt assets considering credit risk, liquidity risk or both. In 
Chapter A2 I review the models on interest rate, credit and liquidity spread. 
Chapter A3 summarizes the methodology commonly applied in default 
research, and Chapter A4 reviews the popular models for CDS valuation, given 
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the focus of this thesis is on CDS contracts. Finally Chapter A5 concludes this 
chapter by providing a link to the empirical studies in Chapter B and C. 
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Chapter A2. Model Review 
 Bearing in mind to fill the gap of default research, in this section, I 
summarize influential papers relevant to the pricing of a defaultable corporate 
bond and some associated derivative asset, such as a convertible bond, bond 
with embedded options, CDS, with emphasis on credit and liquidity spread 
modelling. 
 
A2.1 The interest rate model 
Let the dynamics of risk-free interest rate be given by the following 
diffusion process: 
ZY dtrdttrudr ),(),(   
where Z  is a Wiener process, u and Y  are the time dependent expected rate of 
return and volatility of the spot interest rate. In selecting the specific form of 
interest rate model for valuation, note that Brennan and Schwartz (1980) and 
Ammann et al. (2008) find a rather small effect of stochastic interest rate 
models on a convertible bond fair price. Cox et al. (1985), and Mallier and 
Deakin (2002) choose a general affine model, the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR), 
model by assuming the dynamics of interest rate follows a square root process1 
)( rbau   and 2/1rrVY   
This ensures a mean reversion of the interest rate towards the long run value b, 
with speed of adjustment governed by the strictly positive parameter a ; the 
standard deviation factor 2/1rrV  avoids the possibility of negative interest rates 
                                                          
1
 I suppress the time dependence to keep the notation light. 
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for all nonnegative values of a and b. Duffee (1999), Duffie and Singleton 
(1997), and Jarrow et al. (2010) use a two-factor affine model for the spot 
interest rate r,  
ttt ssr ,2,1  D  
:KHUHĮ LV DFRQVWDQW DQG WKH WZRVWDWHYDULDEOHV tt ss ,2,1 ,  represent the slope 
and level of the interest rate yield curve, respectively, with each one following 
an independent square root process. 
 
A2.2 The credit spread model 
The most influential and representative papers on credit risk are the 
following.  Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) draw an analogy between credit spread 
and foreign exchange rate, where a zero-coupon corporate bond can be 
converted into a zero-coupon government bond by the spot exchange rate 
derived on the condition of no prior default. Further, they assume the 
probability of default is independent of the constant recovery rate as well as the 
risk-free interest rate process, despite the fact that they are known to be 
correlated from empirical studies, such as Bakshi et al. (2006). Jarrow et al. 
(1997) extend and refine this model by assuming that the bankruptcy process 
follows a discrete state space and there exists a time-homogeneous Markov 
chain in credit ratings. In Duffie and Singleton (1999), when recovery rate is 
defined as a fraction of the market value rather than the face value or Treasury 
value in earlier reduced-form research, the credit spread y can be expressed as 
y(t) = h(t)(1-ȦLQDQHTXLYDOHQWPDUWLQJDOHPHDVXUHZKHUHKWLVWKHKD]DUG
UDWHDQGȦLVWKHUHFRYHU\UDWHLQWKHULVN-neutral world. In doing so, they can 
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conveniently accommodate the default-adjusted short term rate (i.e. the sum of 
risk-free short rate and credit spread) with any desired risk-free term structure 
model. However, their method makes it difficult to decompose a credit spread 
into a hazard rate and a recovery rate and to model them separately. In order to 
overcome this problem, Bakshi et al. (2006) present a framework for studying 
the role of recovery rate on defaultable debt prices for a wide class of 
processes describing the recovery rates and default probability. These debt 
models have the ability to differentiate the impact of recovery rate and default 
probability on debt prices, and can be employed to infer the market expectation 
of recovery rates implicit in market prices. They are, therefore, able to model 
separately the recovery and hazard rate and allow a negative correlation 
between the two rates, which is found by their empirical work. In addition, 
Bakshi et al. (2006) find that the recovery specification relying on discounted 
face value provides a better fit to the data, when their defaultable debt models 
are tested using a sample of BBB-rated bonds.  
Campbell and Taksler (2003) explore the effect of equity volatility on 
corporate bond yields. Panel data for the late 1990s show that idiosyncratic 
firm-level volatility can explain as much cross-sectional variation in yields as 
credit ratings. This finding supports Madan and Unal (1998), in which the 
authors decompose default risk into timing and recovery risks, and 
demonstrate that the default intensity process and, thus, the probability of 
default, is a function of the discounted equity value. Later Madan and Unal 
(2000) extend the process to a two-factor model including both non-interest 
sensitive asset value and risk-free interest rate processes. Their model allows 
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stochastic interest rates to impact current asset values as well as their evolution, 
and generates credit spreads consistent with empirical observations.  
Jarrow et al. (2010) develop a reduced-form approach for valuing 
callable corporate bonds by characterizing the call probability via an intensity 
process. Their approach extends the reduced-form model of Duffie and 
Singleton (1999) for defaultable bonds to callable bonds and captures some 
important differences between call and default decisions. A comprehensive 
empirical analysis of callable bonds shows that the reduced-form model by 
Jarrow et al. (2010) fits callable bond prices well and outperforms the 
traditional American option approach by Duffie and Singleton (1999) both in- 
and out-of-sample. Analogous to Duffie and Singleton (1999), Jarrow et al. 
(2010) jointly estimate the recovery rate and default intensity, and allow them 
to be correlated with the risk-free interest rate only. Tsiveriotis and Fernandes 
(1998) value a convertible bond with credit by separating it into two securities: 
a cash-only part of convertible bond (COCB) and an equity-like part 
convertible bond (ELCB). The holder of a COCB is entitled to all cash flows 
but no equity flows and, therefore, is subject to default, discounted at a risky 
rate (risk free + credit spread); conversely, the ELCB is default-free and 
discounted at a risk free rate. Since both parts are derivative securities with the 
same underlying stock, the COCB price and ELCB price can be calculated 
under the Black Scholes framework. However, the whole explanation on loss 
and recovery processes in case of default is missing from Tsiveriotis and 
Fernandes (1998), which does not say what actually happens to the convertible 
bond if default occurs. Takahashi et al. (2001) characterize default risk 
exogenously based on Duffie and Singleton (1999) and assume equity value 
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itself is subject to default risk. They model the hazard rate as a decreasing 
function of stock price, hence naturally incorporating a negative relation 
between the probability of default and the level of stock price, and providing a 
consistent and practical reduced-form approach for relative pricing of 
securities including convertible and non-convertible corporate bonds and 
equities by treating the recovery rate as a constant. Ayache et al. (2002) argue 
that recovery to market value when default happens is not an optimal policy for 
the holders of convertible bonds, since the holders have the right to change the 
bonds to shares of stock - and, indeed, the model of Tsiveriotis and Fernandes 
(1998) is a special case of their optimal model. 
 
A2.3 The liquidity spread model 
Despite the large effort on credit risk modelling, little has been done for 
liquidity risk, which has gained increasing attention since the beginning of the 
2007/2008 financial crisis in the credit markets. Aleksandrov and Hambly 
(2010) conclude that, along with credit risk, liquidity risk is very important and 
should not be underestimated. Longstaff et al. (2005) use the information in 
credit default swaps to obtain direct measures of the size of the default and 
non-default components in corporate spreads. They find that the majority of 
the corporate spread is due to default risk. This result holds for all rating 
categories and is robust to the definition of the risk-free rate curve. They also 
find that the non-default component is time varying, mean-reverting and 
strongly related to measures of bond-specific illiquidity as well as to 
macroeconomic measures of bond market liquidity. Furthermore, they only 
find weak evidence that the non-default component is related to the differential 
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state tax treatment given to Treasury and corporate bonds. In their paper, 
Longstaff et al. (2005) specify the risk-neutral dynamics of the intensity 
process as square root and of the liquidity process as Gaussian; they assume 
the recovery rate is constant and there is an independence among risk free 
interest rate, default intensity and liquidity yield; and, finally, they derive a 
closed-form solution for corporate bonds, although they note that the in-sample 
correlations shows that these variables are not independent. Kempf and Uhrig-
Homburg (2000) propose a theoretical continuous-time model to analyze the 
impact of liquidity on bond prices. This model values illiquid bonds relative to 
liquid bonds and provides a testable theory of illiquidity-induced price 
discounts. The empirical findings suggest that bond prices not only depend on 
the dynamics of interest rates but also on the liquidity of bonds. Thus, bond 
liquidity should be used as an additional pricing factor. The findings of the out-
of-sample test demonstrate the superiority of the model over traditional pricing 
models without a liquidity factor. The authors use the square root dynamics for 
both risk free interest rate and liquidity discount, and solve the partial 
differential equation numerically after assuming a zero instantaneous 
correlation between them, similar to Longstaff et al. (2005). Kempf and Uhrig-
Homburg (2000) also find from their empirical analysis that the correlation 
between the changes in the interest rate and changes in liquidity spread is 
significantly different from zero. Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) present an easily 
applicable option-theoretical approach to quantify liquidity spreads of 
corporate bonds. They describe the value of liquidity as that of multiple 
lookback options. After valuing these lookback options in a framework with 
uncertain interest rate, Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) find a liquidity factor is 
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able to explain to a large part the empirically observed spreads, while credit 
risk has nearly no explanatory power for the bond prices. This is contradictory 
to what we usually find in the literature and explained by the authors thus: it is 
not easy to define those non-trading dates for illiquid bonds and the choice of 
those dates is important for the performance of their pricing model. 
Aleksandrov and Hambly (2010) suggest a framework for valuing defaultable 
bonds that allows for capturing not only the default risk but also the liquidity 
risk by expanding a credit intensity model. They then investigate defaultable 
bonds empirically and extract their liquidity risk within this model. Based on 
the dozens of corporate bonds in the finance industry, they observe a regime 
shift at the beginning of the credit crisis for the liquidity risk of a range of 
defaultable bonds. They also note that liquidity spread is very significant and is, 
in some cases, even larger than credit spread. Unfortunately, the authors ignore 
the dependence structure among risk free interest rate, default intensity and 
liquidity yield and also specify the dynamics of them as square root processes, 
hence eliminating the possibility of negative liquidity spread, which is found in 
Longstaff et al. (2005). 
Empirical research supports the argument that a liquidity factor is 
significant in corporate bond pricing. A number of recent studies indicate that 
neither levels nor changes in the yield spread of corporate bonds over Treasury 
bonds can be fully explained by credit risk. For example, Chen et al. (2007) 
find that liquidity is priced in corporate yield spreads. Using a battery of 
liquidity measures covering over 4,000 corporate bonds and spanning both 
investment grade and speculative categories, they find that more illiquid bonds 
earn higher yield spreads and an improvement in liquidity causes a significant 
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reduction in yield spreads. They find that liquidity is a key determinant in yield 
spread, explaining as much as half of the cross-sectional variation in yield 
spread levels and as much as twice the cross-sectional variation in yield spread 
changes than is explained by credit rating effects alone. Their findings justify 
the concern in the default risk literature that neither the level nor the dynamics 
of yield spreads can be fully explained by default risk determinants. Li et al. 
(2009) provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects of liquidity 
and information risks on expected returns of Treasury bonds. They document a 
strong positive relation between expected Treasury returns and liquidity and 
information risks, controlling for the effects of other systematic risk factors 
and bond characteristics. This relation is robust to many empirical 
specifications and a wide variety of traditional liquidity and informed trading 
proxies. 
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Chapter A3. Methodology Review 
In this section, I review the valuation models on different assumptions 
of the dynamics of pricing factors: risk free interest rate, default intensity and 
liquidity yield. Unless otherwise defined, a general debt asset is maturing in 
time T, paying a principal B at maturity if still alive on that date, paying a 
fixed coupon amount c at times ti. It may be callable by the issuer at a price Bc 
at any time after the call date Tc, convertible at any time after the conversion 
date Tcv to k shares of stock with price S, and the spot interest rate is denoted 
by r. 
 
A3.1 Simple independent world 
 Kempf and Uhrig-Homburg (2000) model the dynamics of interest rate 
and liquidity yield as square root processes, Aleksandrov. and Hambly (2010) 
define the dynamics of interest rate, default intensity and liquidity yield as 
square root, which avoids negative values and is a good choice for interest rate 
and default intensity modelling. However, as noted by Longstaff et al. (2005) 
and Fernandez (2005), liquidity spread can sometimes be negative; one 
possible reason is that investors prefer to hold long term bonds even if their 
returns are low. Longstaff et al. (2005) therefore assume that the risk-neutral 
dynamics of the liquidity process tJ  as 
JKJ dZd   
Where K  is a positive constant and JZ  is a standard Brownian motion. These 
dynamics allow the liquidity process to take on both positive and negative 
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values. The authors also explore alternative specifications for that allow for a 
mean-reverting drift but these specifications generally do not perform better. 
In addition, the risk-neutral dynamics of the intensity process tO  is 
OOVEODO dZdtd  )(  
HereD , E  and V  are positive constant, and OZ  is another Brownian motion. 
These dynamics allow for both mean reversion and conditional 
heteroskedasticity in corporate spreads, and guarantee that the default intensity 
process is always nonnegative. Define the value of a riskless zero-coupon 
bond D(T) with maturity T by  
»¼
º«¬
ª
¹¸
·
©¨
§( ³T tdtrTD 0exp)(  
A bondholder recovers a fraction 1-w of the par value of the bond in the event 
of default. The value of a corporate bond is given by a closed form solution 
under the independence assumption: 
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 For callable corporate bonds, Duffie and Singleton (1999) propose 
valuing them as American options written on otherwise identical non-callable 
bonds values using a reduced-form approach. This assumes that the firm calls 
the bond to minimize the market value of the particular bond under analysis; 
however, as argued by Jarrow et al. (2010)WKLVDVVXPSWLRQLJQRUHVWKHERQG¶V
LPSDFW RQ WKH ILUPV¶ UHPDLQLQJ OLDELOLWLHV DQG, hence, shareholders¶ HTXLW\
might not be maximized. Alternatively, Jarrow et al. (2010) develop a 
reduced-form approach for valuing callable corporate bonds by characterizing 
the call probability via an intensity process, analogous to that of default 
intensity.  
),,()1(
,2,1,, tttcctc sschk IDO    
Where k is the ratio of recovery to the market value of the bond when call 
action occurs, tc,O  is the call intensity, cD  is a constant to permit a non-zero 
call spread even for firms with close-to-zero call risk, tt ss ,2,1 ,  represent the 
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slope and level of the Treasury yield curve, respectively, the systematic 
component ),,(
,2,1 tt sscI  captures the portion of the standard call spread, and 
the idiosyncratic component tch ,  captures the extra part that cannot be 
explained by the standard call spread. By carefully choosing parsimonious 
representations for the systematic and idiosyncratic component, the authors are 
able to derive a closed-form approximation for callable bond prices. 
Specifically  
t
ctctt
s
c
ssssc
,2
21,11,2,1 )(),,( EEI   
where c is the coupon rate of the callable bond and 1s  is the average of slope 
factor of the Treasury yield curve. This specification captures the idea that, all 
else equal, a high-coupon bond is more likely to be called than a low-coupon 
bond and all callable bonds are more likely to be called when interest rates are 
low. Moreover, the nonlinear functional form of 
ts ,2
1
 captures the nonlinear 
dependence of the call spread on interest rates. The idiosyncratic component 
follows an independent square root process, 
tctcctccctc dZhdthdh ,,,, )( VTN   
The authors find the liquidity premium is insignificant after adding a liquidity 
spread to their pricing model and specifying the liquidity process as another 
independent square root process, although they note that the liquidity process 
is mean reverting and there is a negative risk premium associated with 
liquidity risk. 
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A3.2 Advanced correlated world 
 Duffee (1999), Jarrow et al. (2010) use a two-factor affine model for 
the spot risk-free interest rate         
ttrt ssr ,2,1  D  
where rD  is a constant, tt ss ,2,1 ,  represent the slope and level of the Treasury 
yield curve, respectively. The dynamics for each of the two factors follow a 
square root process 
titiitiiiti dZsdtsds ,,,, )( VTN  , for i=1, 2 
Here tiZ ,  is an independent standard Brownian motion. Jarrow et al. (2010) 
then model the default spread by the following representation: 
)()()1( 2,221,11,, ssssh tdtdtddtd   EEDOG  
and 
tdtddtdddtd dZhdthdh ,,,, )( VTN   
Where tdZ ,  is independent of tiZ , . By this setting, default spread is naturally 
connected with Treasury rate and so is the call spread. In their empirical 
analysis of the importance of a liquidity premium, the authors ignore the 
influence of default intensity and Treasury rate on the liquidity process by 
letting the liquidity spread tl  follow another independent square-root process 
tltltllt dZldtldl ,)( VTN   
Part A                                                                                 Chapter A3. Methodology Review 
20 
 
 Following Lando (1998), Duffie and Singleton (1999), Jarrow et al. 
(2010), the price of a zero-coupon corporate bond CB(c,w,T) can be expressed 
as2 
»¼
º«¬
ª
¹¸
·
©¨
§ ( ³T ttt dtwrTwcCB 0 ))1((exp),,( JO  
There are two potential methods to impose a dependence structure on 
the dynamics of interest rate, default intensity and liquidity processes. One 
method is to relax the independence assumption, and specify their dynamics as 
rrrr dZrdtrdr VED  )(  
OOOO OVOEDO dZdtd  )(  
JJVJ dZd   
Where 0),(,0),(
,,,,,,
z z lrtltrdrtdtr dZdZdZdZ UUUU , and 
0),(
,,,
z ldtltd dZdZ UU . 
 
 AÏT-Sahalia (2008) provides closed-form expansions for the log-
likelihood function of multivariate diffusions sampled at discrete time intervals. 
The coefficients of the expansion are calculated explicitly by exploiting the 
special structure afforded by the diffusion model. After achieving an 
                                                          
2
 It is straightforward to value a coupon bond given the price of a zero-coupon 
bond by treating a coupon bond as a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds. 
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approximated transition function )(~
,,
tpr JO , we can value the corporate bond 
with a closed-form solution.  
 The other method is, analogous to Jarrow et al. (2010), to model the 
default spread and liquidity spread as functions of Treasury rate. Specifically, 
spot interest rate is modelled as 
ttrt ssr ,2,1  D  
where 
titiitiiiti dZsdtsds ,,,, )( VTN  , for i=1, 2. 
Here, tiZ ,  is an independent standard Brownian motion. Default spread is 
)()()1( 2,221,11, sssshw tdtdtddt   EEDO  
and 
tdtddtdddtd dZhdthdh ,,,, )( VTN   
where tdZ ,  is independent of tiZ , . Finally liquidity spread is 
)()( 2,221,11, ssssh tltltllt  EEDO  
and 
tlltllltl dZdthdh ,,, )( VTN   
where tlZ ,  is independent of tiZ ,  and tdZ , . Here, systematic factors in the 
liquidity process are included and the liquidity process is simple Gaussian for 
Part A                                                                                 Chapter A3. Methodology Review 
22 
 
two reasons. First, empirical research has found that the change of Treasury 
rate and that of liquidity spread are correlated - see Kempf and Uhrig-
Homburg (2000), and Longstaff et al. (2005). By the above specifications, 
default spread and liquidity spread are connected exogenously. Second, 
liquidity spreads are mean-reverting and can take on both positive values and 
negative values by following the Ornstein±Uhlenbeck process. A closed form 
solution can, therefore, be derived since tlZ , , tiZ ,  (i=1,2) and tdZ ,  are 
independent given the affine model structure.   
 The same argument can be applied to convertible bonds, Takahashi et 
al. (2001) explicitly take default risk into consideration based on Duffie and 
Singleton (1999), and provide a consistent and practical method for 
convertible bonds pricing. An associated partial differential equation is derived 
as 
0)()),()(()),(),((
2
1 22   tcVtSwtrVSVtStSVS tSss OODV  
where c is the coupon. 
In sum, numerous empirical studies have found the following 
phenomena: 
x  Equity volatility helps to explain default spread, see Campbell and 
Taksler (2003); 
x  Recovery rates are negatively associated with default probability, 
see Bakshi et al. (2006); 
x  Hazard rate should be a decreasing function of stock price, the 
probability of default is negatively related with the level of stock 
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price, see Takahashi et al. (2001). 
x  Treasury rate, default intensity and liquidity premium are 
correlated, see Longstaff et al. (2005). 
For example, to capture the negative correlation between recovery rate and 
default probability, Bakshi et al. (2006) assume that the recovery rate is related 
to the hazard rate as 
)(
10)( tewwtw O  
And hazard rate is linear in the short interest rate  
)()( 10 trt // O  
Here, the change of r follows a square-root process. To capture the decreasing 
relation between hazard rate and stock price, Takahashi et al. (2001) take the 
function   
b
t
t S
cS  TO )(  
Therefore, an ideal model should (i) reflect those findings listed above, and (ii) 
allow a tractable solution, such as a closed or semi-closed form approximation, 
or have a fast convergence rate if numerical methods apply.  
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Chapter A4. CDS Valuation Review 
Given the critical role of CDS contracts in this thesis, it is necessary to 
summarize influential approaches in the literature on valuation of CDSs and 
how these take into account the relationship between default and liquidity 
components. Three research branches existing in the current literature are 
briefly summarized in this chapter and more detailed review will be 
undertaken in Chapter B and C separately. 
x Reduced form. Longstaff et al. (2005) assume a premium is paid 
continuously. By setting the values of the premium leg and protection 
leg equal to each other, they are able to value CDS spreads in a closed 
form solution. Pan and Singleton (2008) apply a reduced form model to 
Mexico, Turkey, and Korea sovereign CDSs, showing that a single-
factor model for default spread following a lognormal process captures 
most of the variation in the term structures of spreads. Nashikkar et al. 
(2011) assume a constant default process and calculate CDS par yield 
in a reduced-form framework. Chen et al. (2008) assume risk-free rates 
and default rates are correlated and solve the CDS pricing model using 
a reduced-form model. Lin et al. (2011) value corporate bonds and 
CDSs simultaneously using a reduced form model, for CDS part, the 
authors assume there are both default and non-default part, and solve 
the model by assuming the two parts are independent. Jankowitsch et al. 
(2008) attribute the difference between corporate bond yields and CDS 
premium to one covenant of a CDS: cheapest-to-deliver option, and 
solve the covenant by relating it to recovery rate. Their empirical 
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analysis does not support a liquidity premium. Carr and Wu (2010) 
propose a dynamically consistent framework that allows joint valuation 
and estimation of stock options and credit default swaps written on the 
same reference company. By assuming the stock price follows a jump-
diffusion process with stochastic volatility and that the instantaneous 
default rate and variance rate follow a bivariate continuous process, the 
authors solve the reduced form model analytically. Brigo and Alfonsi 
(2005) introduce a two-dimensional correlated square-root diffusion 
(SSRD) model for interest-rate and default process, then value a CDS 
via Monte Carlo simulation. Zhang (2008) uses a three-factor model, 
namely interest rates, firm-specific distress variable, and hazard rate. 
He is able to link hazard rate with interest rate by assuming the former 
is a function of the latter, and then he solves the model analytically and 
applies it to Argentina sovereign CDSs. 
x Structural model. The pioneering research on the structural model of 
default comes from Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976) and is 
summarized by RiskMetrics (2002). Zhong et al. (2010) argue a CDS 
is similar to out-of-the-money put options in that both offer low cost 
and effective protection against downside risk. They conclude that the 
put option implied volatility is an important determinant of CDS 
spreads. Bedendo et al. (2009) use an extended version of RiskMetrics 
(2002) to find that the gap between the model CDS premium and 
market premium is time-varying and widens substantially in times of 
financial turbulence. The authors note that CDS liquidity shows a 
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significant impact on the gap and should, therefore, be included when 
pricing CDS contracts. 
x CAPM framework. Valuation of CDS spreads under the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) framework is rather new and developing. It 
was pioneered by Bongaerts et al. (2011)  and these authors imply that 
the equilibrium expected returns on the hedge assets can be 
decomposed into several components: priced exposure to the non-
hedged asset returns, hedging demand effects, an expected illiquidity 
component, liquidity risk premium and hedging transaction costs. They 
then estimate CDS spread under market equilibrium. 
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Chapter A5. Conclusion  
The financial crisis beginning in 2007 inspires new research on default 
risk, how to reflect the reality before and after the financial crisis more 
accurately is challenging and increasingly important. In this chapter I 
introduce the motivation of this thesis under such a volatile financial market, 
the research questions of this thesis and why they are important. To fill the 
literature gap, I then review the models and methodologies widely applied for 
default research, with a concentration on CDS valuation. 
In summary, two widely traded CDS contract types are corporate and 
sovereign CDS, the first hedges against the default risk of a company and the 
second type hedges against the default risk of a sovereign country. Generally 
the research on CDS valuation can be classified into three dimensions: reduced 
form model, structural form model and CAPM framework model. A detailed 
overview is undertaken by Brigo et al., (2012). So the Chapter B examines the 
determinants of corporate CDS spreads from a structural form model point of 
view, with a concentration on the role of liquidity risk; and the Chapter C 
investigates the determinants of sovereign CDS spreads mostly from a reduced 
form point of view. The research using a CAPM framework will be beyond the 
scope of this thesis and will be my future research. 
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Part B: Regime Dependent Liquidity 
Determinants of Credit Default Swap Spread 
Changes 
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Abstract B 
In this section I construct a liquidity measure for Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS) and investigate the relationship between the changes in CDS spreads 
and the determinants implied by structural models of default, including firm 
leverage, volatility, risk-free interest rate, and liquidity. Using a dummy-
variable pooling regression and a Markov regime switching model, I find 
strong evidence that these determinants, especially the liquidity determinant, 
are significant and time-varying. Among the four determinants, the effects of 
liquidity shock on CDS spreads differ significantly across rating groups when 
the CDS market is tranquil but when it is turbulent the effects become similar, 
regardless of credit rating. 
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Chapter B1. Introduction 
A credit default swap (CDS) is a contract in which the buyer of 
protection makes a series of payments, often referred to as CDS spreads, to the 
protection seller and, in exchange, receives a payoff if a default event occurs. 
CDSs have existed since the early 1990s and the market increased greatly from 
2003, such that by the end of 2007 the outstanding notional amounts were 
$62.2 trillion, falling to $30.4 trillion by the end of 2009. The corresponding 
amounts for total equity derivatives were $10.0 trillion and $6.8 trillion (ISDA 
Market Survey, 2010). Understanding the variation of CDS spreads has 
become important for investors, given the large market size and the hedging 
function of CDSs against default. 
In this chapter I investigate the relationship between the changes in 
CDS spreads and the determinants implied by structural models of default. It is 
acknowledged in the literature that CDS spreads are superior to corporate bond 
spreads for default research through more accurate data and higher trading 
frequency. Empirical studies focus on analyzing three determinants suggested 
by the pioneering model of Merton (1974), namely leverage ratio, volatility 
and risk-free rate (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Campbell and Taksler, 2003; 
Zhang, 2008; Zhang et al., 2009; Ericsson et al.. 2009; Zhong et al., 2010). 
Recent research provides both a theoretical foundation and evidence that 
liquidity is priced in CDS spreads (Ericsson and Renault, 2006; Bedendo et al., 
2011; Bongaerts et al., 2011; Bhanot and Guo, 2012; Pu et al., 2011). In 
particular, Ericsson and Renault (2006) develop a structural model for both 
liquidity and credit risk, and Bongaerts et al. (2011) derive an equilibrium asset 
pricing model incorporating liquidity. Their results are important since they 
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demonstrate how a model with a fourth determinant, liquidity, could improve 
the understanding of the nature of CDS spreads. 
The financial crisis that began in 2007 has changed financial markets 
dramatically. For example, Figure 1 plots the average CDS spreads in my 
sample - clearly spreads behave differently after June, 2007, when the financial 
crisis began. Underlying determinants of CDS spreads may differ in their 
effects when the CDS market is in either tranquil or turbulent circumstances. 
Therefore, I am motivated to examine the four determinants both 
unconditionally and conditionally by using recent US corporate CDS data. 
Proxies for the leverage ratio, volatility and risk-free rate are standard and I 
construct a liquidity measure for CDS at a market level analogous to the 
measure for corporate bond proposed by Bao, et al. (2011). I then conduct tests 
on the significance and time-varying magnitude of these determinants by a 
dummy-variable pooling regression and a Markov regime switching model, 
with emphasis on the liquidity determinant. 
Two main results emerge from the analysis. First, unconditionally, by 
regressing the daily changes in 5-year senior unsecured debt CDS spreads from 
January 2004 to June 2010 on the changes in leverage ratio, volatility, risk-free 
rate and liquidity, I find the coefficients for all four determinants are 
statistically significant. These findings hold after controlling for other 
explanatory variables implied by extended structural models of default such as 
the changes in treasury yield curve slopes, jump magnitudes, business climate, 
and nonlinear effects of Treasury yields. Second, conditionally, both the 
dummy-variable pooling regression and the standard Hamilton (1989) Markov 
two-regime switching model indicate that these determinants are indeed time-
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varying. The crisis dummy variable is strongly significant for all CDSs, 
suggesting that the crisis shifts the level of the change in CDS spreads. In 
addition, the significant interaction terms between the crisis dummy variable 
and the four determinants indicate the slope sensitivities change dramatically 
during the crisis. 
Figure 1. The Average of All CDS spreads (%)  
 
Note: Y axis is CDS spreads (%) and X axis is date. 
Furthermore, the regime switching model finds that the effect of 
liquidity is more pronounced in crisis regime than in normal regime; 
specifically, the coefficient for liquidity determinant represented by my 
liquidity measure in crisis regime is 17.07 times as large as that in normal 
regime, compared with the 3.22, 2.73, and 3.56 times for leverage ratio, 
volatility and risk-free rate, respectively. A t-test strongly rejects the 
coefficients of the determinants being equal between regimes. The intuition of 
applying a regime switching model is that, due to the financial crisis, 
determinants may change in their shocks to CDS spreads. We may ask whether 
the statistical significance of these determinants is robust under different 
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circumstances. From an economic perspective, it is reasonable to believe that 
the effect of liquidity on default spreads can be small when the financial 
market is healthy and can be high when the market is in danger. As an 
illustration, Figure 1 clearly shows spreads behave differently after the 
financial crisis began. 
My work is most closely related to Pu et al. (2011) and Alexander and 
Kaeck (2008). Pu et al. (2011) find evidence that liquidity is priced in CDSs 
unconditionally; however, the sample is restricted to monthly data from 
January 2001 to December 2007 and so does not fully cover the financial crisis, 
which restricts conducting a conditional analysis. Alexander and Kaeck (2008) 
employ a similar Markov regime switching model for the iTraxx Europe CDS 
index from June 2004 to June 2007 and so they are unable to distinguish the 
influences on different credit rating classes of reference entities; moreover, 
they do not explicitly take a liquidity determinant into account. 
The structure of the Chapter is as follows. Chapter B2 reviews 
literature on the developments of the determinants of corporate CDS, with 
emphasis on liquidity determinant. Chapter B3 presents the regression models 
including standard univariate and multivariate ordinary least square regressions 
(OLS), dummy variable regression and Markov regime switching regression. 
Chapter B4 reports the data set and summary statistics. The empirical results 
and discussion are presented in Chapter B5, in which I explain the results I 
find, discuss their economic meaning, and conduct robustness tests, followed 
by conclusions in Chapter B6. 
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Chapter B2. Literature Review 
 Pioneered by Merton (1974), the basic structural model of default and 
its extensions have become a standard for default spread analysis. While these 
models have their own theoretical variables or functional forms, typically they 
have common variables that are central to determine the changes of default 
spreads. Merton (1974) values a defaultable risky asset as a risk-free asset less 
DSXWRSWLRQRQWKHLVVXLQJILUP¶VYDOXHDVDUHVXOWWKUHHFRUHGHWHUPLQDQWVDUH
leverage ratio, risk free rate, and volatility. Leverage ratio measures the 
GLVWDQFH WR WKH VWULNHSULFH WKH LVVXLQJ ILUP¶VYDOXHRI DSXWRSWLRQDQG WKH
likelihood of triggering default; risk free rate decides the value of a risk free 
asset; and volatility determines the value of a put option. Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein et al. (2001) regress the changes of corporate bond yield spreads on 
variables that should determine credit spread changes in the theory of structural 
models of default, including leverage ratio, volatility, and risk free rate. They 
find those variables are statistically significant. Using similar variables but 
with the change of CDS spreads instead of the change of corporate bond yields 
spreads as a dependent variable, Ericsson, Jacobs et al. (2009) draw an 
identical conclusion that the variables suggested by the basic structural model 
pioneered by Merton (1974) are crucial to explain the changes of CDS spreads, 
even after controlling for extra variables of extended structural models. Boss 
and Scheicher (2002) investigate the determinants of credit spread changes in 
the euro area and conclude leverage, volatility and risk-free rate are important 
factors. Avramov, et al. (2007) provide further evidence that a parsimonious 
set of common factors including leverage, volatility and spot rate are able to 
explain more than 54% of the variance in credit spread changes.  
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Among the three core determinants, leverage ratio has long been an 
important determinant for debt research. All else equal, the higher leverage 
ratio is, the higher is the risk of default and the larger is default spread. 
Therefore, credit spread should increase as the leverage ratio increases. For 
example, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) propose a structural model of 
default that captures the change of debt levels in response to changes in firm 
value; furthermore, their model generates mean-reverting leverage ratios. They 
find the credit spreads their model generates are more consistent with empirical 
findings, which suggests a critical role of leverage ratio in explaining credit 
spread. Both Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein et al. (2001) and Ericsson, Jacobs et 
al. (2009) find that credit spread is an increasing function of leverage ratio via 
a regression. Cesare and Guazzarotti (2010) analyse the determinants of credit 
default swap spread changes between Janauary 2002 and March 2009. They 
document that the spreads have become much more sensitive to the level of 
leverage since the breakout of the financial crisis.   
All else equal, the higher volatility is, the higher is the risk of default 
and, thus, the larger is default spread. Therefore, credit spread should increase 
as volatility increases. Campbell and Taksler (2003) explore the effect of 
equity volatility on corporate bond yields and find equity volatility is a 
significant factor in explaining the cross-sectional variation in yields. Benkert 
(2004) investigates the effects of equity volatility on credit default swap 
premia and finds evidence that option-implied volatility is an important factor 
in explaining variation in CDS spreads, using panel data of CDS on 120 
international firms from 1999 to mid-2002. Zhang et al. (2009) explain CDS 
spreads by volatility and jump risk of equity prices. Zhong et al. (2010) argue 
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that a CDS is similar to an out-of-the-money put option in that both offer a 
protection against downside risk, their result indicates the put option implied 
volatility is an important determinant of CDS spreads. Again, both Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein et al. (2001) and Ericsson, Jacobs et al. (2009) find, via 
regression, that credit spread is an increasing function of volatility. 
All else equal, the higher risk-free rate is, the lower is the risk of 
default and, thus, the smaller is default spread. Therefore, the credit spread 
should decrease as risk-free rate increase. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) argue 
that an increase in risk-IUHH UDWH LQFUHDVHV D FRPSDQ\¶VYDOXHZKLFK, in turn, 
decreases the probability that the value of the company will fall below the 
default threshold and, consequently, reduces the default risk and leads to a 
smaller credit spread. Based on that argument, they test empirically the 
negative relationship between risk-free rates and credit spreads. Duffee (1998) 
provides further evidence that changes in credit spreads and interest rates are 
negatively related by testing a sample of non-callable bonds. 
Besides the three core determinants, other variables are found to be 
significant in explaining credit spreads by an extended structural model of 
default. For instance, Fama and French (1989) argue that an increase in the 
yield-curve slope suggests an improvement of economy, which leads to higher 
recovery rates and lower credit spreads. Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) find 
that an increase in the slope also increases the expected future spot rate, and 
then a steeper slope leads to a decrease in credit spreads. Altman and Kishore 
(1996) argue that an improving economy narrows credit spreads. Zhang (2008) 
finds that the default risk premium in a CDS is affected by business cycle, 
credit conditions and the overall strength of economy. Collin-Dufresne, 
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Goldstein et al. (2001) and Ericsson, Jacobs et al. (2009) investigate jumps in 
firm value and square of risk-free rate as extra determinants of credit spreads. 
They argue that a larger jump in firm value increases the probability of default 
and leads to a higher credit spread, while adding the square of risk-free rate 
controls the possible nonlinear relationship between credit spread and risk-free 
rate. 
All the above mentioned papers do not explicitly consider liquidity as a 
determinant. However, researchers started to realize that liquidity is significant 
for CDS valuation. Longstaff et al. (2005) find that non-default components in 
corporate bond credit spreads are strongly related to liquidity measures. Tang 
and Yan (2007) present an empirical study of the pricing effect of liquidity in 
the CDS market and find evidence that liquidity risk is priced in CDS spreads. 
Buhler and Trapp (2006, 2008) explicitly incorporate a liquidity intensity rate 
process into their reduced form models. Pan and Singleton (2008) examine the 
term structure of sovereign CDS spreads and claim that a second principal 
component (possibly related to the liquidity spread) is needed to explain the 
severe mispricing of one-year contracts. More recently, Bhanot and Guo (2011) 
show that the deviations between the CDS spread and corporate bond spread 
can be explained by funding liquidity and asset-specific liquidity. Bedendo, 
Cathcart et al. (20011) demonstrate that liquidity in the CDS market should be 
taken into account when pricing CDS contracts. Bongaerts, de Jong et al. 
(2011) derive an equilibrium asset pricing model incorporating liquidity and 
find an economically small but significant effect of liquidity for CDS market. 
Ericsson and Renault (2006) develop a structural model for both liquidity and 
credit risk, and find evidence of a liquidity component of yield spreads. 
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Annaert et al. (2013) decompose the CDS spread changes of 32 listed Euro 
area banks and find evidence that liquidity-related variables complement 
credit-related variables in explaining credit spread changes. All else equal, the 
higher illiquidity is, the higher is the risk of default and, thus, the higher is 
default spread. Therefore, the credit spread should increase as liquidity 
becomes worse. 
Table 1 summarizes the predicted sign of the correlation between 
changes in credit spreads and changes in the main determinants I investigate in 
this work. 
Table 1. Expected Sign between Changes in Credit Spreads and Determinants 
Determinant Predicted sign 
Leverage ratio + 
Volatility + 
Risk-free rate - 
illiquidity + 
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Chapter B3. Theoretical Determinants of Spread Changes and 
Regression Models 
Following the structural model of default of Merton (1974), in default 
spread analysis three core determinants are used: leverage ratio, risk-free rate 
and volatility. Huang and Huang (2002) show that credit risk accounts for only 
a small fraction of the observed yield spreads by calibrating a wide class of 
structural models to historical default loss data. Detailed empirical testing of 
five structural models is undertaken by Eom et al. (2004) using a sample of 
182 bond prices from 1986-1997, in which the authors find that all five models 
have substantial spread prediction errors. In light of the shortcomings of 
existing structural models, Ericsson and Renault (2006) develop a new 
structural model to capture simultaneously liquidity and credit risk, and they 
find evidence of a correlation between the liquidity and default components of 
yield spreads. Hence, my ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression 
model with a liquidity determinant is 
 ?  ܵ?ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/ ?൅ ߝ ?               (1) 
where ߙ is an intercept, ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ? represents the change in 
CDS spread, leverage ratio, risk-free rate, volatility and liquidity, respectively, 
at t.  
 To take into account the shortcomings of the standard structural model, 
I control for several additional variables implied by extended structural models. 
I estimate the full regression model suggested by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) 
and Ericsson et al. (2009), 
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               ?  ܵ?ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ? ?൅ߚ ? ?VORSH ?൅ ߚ ? ?6	3 ?൅ ߚ ? ?MXPS ?൅ ߝ ?      (2)                              
where the square of risk-free rate, ݎ ? ? is included to capture the nonlinear 
relationship between default spreads and risk-free rates; VORSH ? represents the 
difference between the long-term (10-year) and short-term (2-year) risk-free 
rate in order to estimate the instantaneous short rate;  ?6	3 ? is the return of the 
S&P 500 to reflect the overall state of the economy; MXPS ? is a proxy for jumps 
in firm value to control for the effect of probability and magnitude of a jump 
RQFUHGLWVSUHDG6LQFHZHFDQ¶WREVHUYHGLUHFWO\DMXPSYDULDEOHIRUDOOHQWLWLHV
I approximate it as the slope of the smirk3 of implied volatilities ߪ of European 
put options on the S&P 500 index. Define moneyness mi= ቀ ?೔ ?ቁ Ȁඥ  ܶ?, where 
Ki is the strike price, S is the S&P 500 index value, Ti is the time to maturity of 
                                                          
3
 In the early option pricing models, a constant volatility is assumed as an input 
for the underlying asset. However, empirically, when price is used as an input 
DQG YRODWLOLW\ DV DQ RXWSXW WKLV ³LPSOLHG YRODWLOLW\´ LV XVXDOO\ QRW FRQVWDQW
Plots of implied volatility versus distance in or out of the money (where 
FXUUHQWXQGHUO\LQJSULFHHTXDOWRWKHRSWLRQ¶VH[HUFLVHSULFHLV³DWWKHPRQH\´
may be U-shaped ± D³VPLOH´± or somewhat less regular ± D³VPLUN´ 7KLV
reflects the probability of extreme moves. The slope measures the steepness of 
volatility smirk and is an indicator of jump magnitude of an asset, the larger 
the slope is, the steeper the smirk and the higher probability of a jump in an 
DVVHW¶VYDOXHZLOOEH 
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a European option i on date t. The slope of the smirk b for date t is then 
estimated via an ordinary linear regression4 ߪሺ݉ ?ሻ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ݉ ?൅ ߝ. 
I adopt two models to examine the time-varying sensitivities of 
determinants. The first is a dummy-variable pooling regression method. I run 
the following pooling regression for the whole sample or for each credit rating 
class subsample: 
 ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?ܮ ?൅ ߜ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?ݎ ?ܥ ൅ߜ ? ?92/ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?/(9 ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?ܮ ?ܥ ൅ ߝ ?                                                         (3) 
where C is a dummy variable for crisis, with C=1 for sample dates during 
crisis, and C=0 otherwise. Whether the intercept shifts, and whether the slope 
sensitivities change during the crisis can, therefore, be examined by testing the 
significance of Ɂ ? for the dummy variable and Ɂ ?ǡ  א ሺ ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ሻ for the 
interaction terms via a standard partial F-test. Similarly, I can also test the 
effects of credit rating by running a pooling regression for the sample during or 
outside of crisis: 
 ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?ܮ ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ܮ ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ? ?ܮ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ܮ ?ܴ ?൅ ߝ ?            (4) 
with R1, R2 and R3 indicating credit rating dummy for credit rating classes 
obtained from the S&P credit rating agency: R1=1 for any AA- ~ AAA rated 
                                                          
4
 A similar estimation method is applied by Ericsson et al. (2009) and 
Christoffersen et al. (2009). 
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CDS, R2=1 for any A- ~ A+ rated CDS, R3=1 for any BBB- ~ BBB+ rated 
CDS, and zero otherwise5. 
The second candidate is a Hamilton (1989) Markov two-regime 
switching model 6 , allowing the intercept, the coefficients estimates for all 
explanatory variables, and the residual volatility to vary between the two 
regimes. The Markov regime switching regression model becomes 
 ?  ܵ?ൌ ߙ ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?/ ?൅ ߝ ?ǡ ?                   (5) 
where iא{1, 2} represents 2 regimes. A state variable st determines which 
regime it is at time t, and the probability of a transition or a stay in the same 
regime at time t+1 is only decided by the state at time t. I denote the Markov 
switching probability as: 
ܲሺݏ ?ൌ  ?ȁݏ ? ? ?ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ݌ ? ? 
      ܲሺݏ ?ൌ  ?ȁݏ ? ? ?ൌ  ?ሻ ൌ ݌ ? ?                                     (6) 
then I am able to run a standard Markov regime switching model under the 
assumption of Gaussian ߝ ?ǡ ? for both regimes. The Appendix B.A describes the 
steps. 
 
                                                          
5
 It is a common practice in default research field to divide rating into four 
classes as AA- ~ AAA, A- ~ A+, BBB- ~ BBB+ and below BBB-. 
6
 An N-regime switching model could have been used but interpretation is 
more natural for my purposes via a two-regime model and follows other 
literature, particularly, Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Acharya et al. (2012). 
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Chapter B4. Data Description 
B4.1 CDS data 
I obtain daily 5-year senior unsecured single-name CDS spreads data 
from CMA via Datastream, from 05 January, 2004 to 30 June, 2010. CMA is 
WKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJVRXUFHRILQGHSHQGHQWGDWDRQWKH27&PDUNHWV I use 5-
year mid-market CDS quotes because the 5-year CDS is widely believed to be 
more frequently traded compared with CDSs of other maturity.  I include those 
CDSs in my sample by further imposing the following screening criteria: 
a) Its reference entity must have data in CRSP and COMPUSTAT; 
b) Its reference entity is not in the utilities or financial industries; 
c) It must have at least one year of trading data; 
d) Its spreads must change at least once out of 20 reported trading days 
(roughly one month) on average. 
Criterion a) enables me to calculate explanatory variables such as the leverage 
ratios for regression; b) excludes CDSs of those companies in utilities and 
financial industries, since they have different corporate structures; c) excludes 
any CDS that disappears soon after listing or is of recent issue; d) removes any 
extremely inactive CDSs. This screening generates 311,545 CDS quotes issued 
by 242 reference entities. I then obtain the S&P credit rating for each entity 
from CRSP and compute the averaged rating for any entity with multiple rating 
records7.  
 
                                                          
7
 In doing so, analogous to Pu et al. (2011), I allocate a number to each rating 
and calculate the average. 
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Table 2. Description of CDS Spreads 
Panel A: Whole period AA- ~ AAA 
A- ~ 
A+ 
BBB- ~ 
BBB+ 
Below 
BBB- All 
NumOb 1483.47 1360.48 1258.76 1209.39 1287.38 
NumCompany 15.00 66.00 97.00 64.00 242.00 
Mean (%) 0.28 0.55 1.04 5.17 1.87 
Stdev (%) 0.27 0.80 1.30 7.05 4.11 
5th Pctl (%) 0.05 0.13 0.24 0.79 0.13 
95th Pctl (%) 0.85 1.68 3.25 16.77 6.90 
Panel B: Normal 
period 
AA- ~ 
AAA 
A- ~ 
A+ 
BBB- ~ 
BBB+ 
Below 
BBB- All 
NumOb 1110.47 1007.68 914.43 862.94 938.40 
NumCompany 15.00 66.00 97.00 64.00 242.00 
Mean (%) 0.18 0.35 0.72 3.56 1.26 
Stdev (%) 0.14 0.39 0.78 3.67 2.30 
5th Pctl (%) 0.05 0.12 0.22 0.68 0.12 
95th Pctl (%) 0.48 0.83 1.85 9.73 4.88 
Panel C: Crisis period AA- ~ AAA 
A- ~ 
A+ 
BBB- ~ 
BBB+ 
Below 
BBB- All 
NumOb 373.00 363.83 367.03 363.49 365.60 
NumCompany 15.00 64.00 91.00 61.00 231.00 
Mean (%) 0.58 1.14 1.90 9.17 3.51 
Stdev (%) 0.32 1.25 1.88 10.85 6.66 
5th Pctl (%) 0.20 0.31 0.42 1.70 0.35 
95th Pctl (%) 1.25 3.42 5.22 28.24 13.26 
Note: NumOb, NumCompany, Mean, Stdev, 5th Pctl, 95th Pctl represents the 
average number of observations per CDS in that category, the total number of 
reference entities, mean CDS spreads, standard deviation of spreads, the 5th 
and 95th percentile of spreads in percentage, respectively. Panel A, B, and C 
present the statistics for the whole, normal and crisis period separately.    
Table 2 reports a short description of the CDS spreads in my sample. 
The average number of observations per entity is close across credit rating, the 
average number of observations for the whole sample is 1287, indicating an 
entity has over five years CDS quotes history on average. Both the mean 
spreads and the standard deviation of spreads increase with lower credit rating; 
for example, the mean CDS spread for AA- ~ AAA entities is 28 basis points 
(bps) with a standard deviation of 27 bps, compared with the 517 bps mean 
spread and 705 bps standard deviation for below BBB- entities. Figure 2 
illustrates these differences for each rating class. CDS spreads are lower and 
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stable before the beginning of 2007, become volatile after the end of 2007 and 
reach their maximum around 2009, regardless of credit rating.   
Figure 2. The Average CDS Spreads for Each Credit Rating Class (%) 
 
 
Note: Graphs from top-left to bottom-right are the average CDS spreads for 
entities with credit rating AA- ~ AAA, A- ~ A+, BBB- ~ BBB+, and below 
BBB-, respectively. Y axis is CDS spreads (%) and X axis is date. 
 I collect data for the explanatory variables as follows: the market value 
of equity from CRSP, the book value of debt and of preferred equity from 
COMPUSTAT to calculate the leverage ratio; the VIX data from the Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE); both 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields 
from the Federal Reserve Bank; both the S&P 500 index levels and returns 
from CRSP; the volatility surface data for S&P 500 option from Option 
Metrics; and the 3-month Libor rates from Datastream.  
 
B4.2 Determinants proxies 
A good proxy for liquidity in my context should have the following 
characteristics: first, it is better if available at a daily frequency; second, it can 
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be estimated from the CDS data8 . In light of this, I construct a liquidity 
measure ߛ similar to the gamma measure for corporate bonds proposed by Bao, 
et al. (2011),  ߛ ൌ FRYሺ ?  ܵ?ǡ  ?  ܵ? ? ?ሻ ߛ measures the covariance between consecutive CDS spread changes9. I use 
positive covariance instead of the negative sign in Bao et al. (2011) since, by 
definition, CDS spread is approximately the difference between bond yield and 
risk-free rate and its change is, therefore, negatively correlated with corporate 
bond price return. Higher ߛ indicates stronger illiquidity. I first calculate ߛ for 
each CDS and then use the cross-sectional median ߛ  as the aggregate ߛ 
liquidity measure for the CDS market, analagous to Bao, et al. (2011). 
                                                          
8 CDS is an over-the-counter contract and its trading volume is unavailable 
from the data source, restricting the use of liquidity measures by Amihud 
(2002) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), both widely used in literature. 
9
 Based on the model in Bao, et al. (2011)DQDVVHW¶VUHWXUQ ?݌ consists of two 
components  ?݌ ?ൌ  ? ?൅  ? ?, where the first component  ? represents the 
fundamental value without any friction and follows a random walk, the second 
component  ? is a transitory term uncorrelated with  ? and represents the 
impact of illiquidity. The covariance ሺ ?݌ ?ǡ  ?݌ ? ? ?ሻ thus depends only on the 
transitory component and captures its magnitude. 
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The proxy for the risk-free rate is the 10-year Treasury bond yield and 
for volatility I use the VIX, a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 
index options10. I define the leverage ratio as  
%RRNYDOXHRIGHEW%RRNYDOXHRISUHIHUUHGHTXLW\
0DUNHWYDOXHRIHTXLW\%RRNYDOXHRIGHEW%RRNYDOXHRISUHIHUUHGHTXLW\ 
which is a standard definition in asset default research, see Collin-Dufresne et 
al. (2001) and Ericsson et al. (2009). I linearly interpolate quarterly book 
values of debt and preferred equity in order to estimate daily leverage ratios11, 
as all other variables are at a daily frequency. 
 Table 3 shows the summary statistics of those explanatory variables for 
my regression.  The 2-year yields have a smaller mean value and a larger 
standard deviation than the 10-year yields. The spreads between 10-year and 2-
year yields are mainly positive, their -0.11% 5th percentile shows there are 
                                                          
10
 Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) use VIX data; Ericsson et al. (2009) use the 
LQGLYLGXDOILUP¶VH[SRQHQWLDOO\ZHLJKWHGPRYLQJDYHUDJHGKLVWRULFDOYRODWLOLW\
Zhong et al. (2010) ILQGWKDWWKHLQGLYLGXDOILUP¶VLPSOLHGYRODWLOLW\GRPLQDWHV
historical volatility in explaining the time-series variation in CDS spreads. 
Since not all individual firm option data are available to me, in this chapter I 
use VIX data to proxy the volatility determinant.  
11
 Instead of linearly interpolating the leverage ratios, I only interpolate 
quarterly book values of debt and preferred equity, then estimate the daily 
leverage ratio together with the daily market values of equity. Such an 
approximation allows the daily change of leverage ratio to be varied without 
suffering strong serial autocorrelation. 
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periods when short term yields become higher than long term yields. The 
leverage ratios, VIX, and S&P 500 index values have rather larger standard 
deviations than other variables, especially than the jumps, which are centred 
around the mean value. The last column reports the average of estimated time 
series correlation between CDS spreads and each explanatory variable across 
all entities. On average, CDS spreads are positively correlated with the 
leverage ratios, VIX, yield spreads, and ߛ, and are negatively correlated with 
the 2-year, 10-year yields, S&P 500 levels and returns, and jumps. CDS 
spreads have the highest positive correlation with the VIX, and the highest 
negative correlation with the 10-year yields, suggesting the importance of these 
two explanatory variables. Figure 3 plots the time series of the averaged CDS 
spreads against that of the leverage ratios, VIX, 10-year yields and ߛ12. CDS 
spreads moved closer with the VIX than with the leverage ratios around the 
break of credit crisis, since the VIX is more timely than the leverage ratios. It 
is obvious from the plots that CDS spreads are negatively related with 10-year 
yields and positively with ߛ. ߛ is stable before the end of 2007 and increases 
considerably after 2008, reflecting the illiquid market due to the financial crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 I multiple ɀ by 108 to make the variable more pronounced. 
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Table 3. Description of All Explanatory Variables in Sample 
  Mean Stdev 5th pctl 95th pctl time series corr 
Leverage (%) 28.56 19.98 4.75 70.10 0.62 
10-year yield (%) 4.12 0.64 2.87 5.07 -0.71 
VIX (%) 21.15 11.91 10.87 46.67 0.75 
Yield slope (%) 1.09 1.00 -0.11 2.72 0.52 
2-year yield (%) 3.02 1.54 0.85 4.97 -0.64 
S&P 500 1221.46 194.96 851.92 1511.04 -0.62 
S&P 500 return (%) 0.00 1.44 -2.26 1.91 -0.01 
Jump -0.24 0.04 -0.30 -0.18 -0.17 
Gamma 1.60 2.97 -0.40 8.16 0.63 
Credit rating 3.87 1.07 2.00 6.00   
Note: Mean, Stdev, 5th Pctl, and 95th Pctl represents the mean values, the 
standard deviation, the 5th and 95th percentile of each variable, respectively. 
Variables in the first column include the leverage ratios, 10-year Treasury 
yields, VIX, spreads between 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields, 2-year 
Treasury yields, S&P 500 index values, S&P 500 returns, jumps in issuing 
ILUP¶VYDOXHJDPPDߛ), and credit ratings of reference entities. Credit ratings 
UDQJHIURPWRZLWKIRU³$$$´IRU³$$- a$$´IRU³$- a$´
IRU³%%%- a%%%´IRU³%%- a%%´IRU³%- a%´IRU³&a&&&´
DQG  IRU ³'´ and any rating else. The last column reports the average 
correlation between CDS spreads and the values of each explanatory variable 
across reference entities. 
 
Figure 3. Time Series Plot of CDS Spreads Against Four Determinants 
 
Note: For both graphs the left axis is for CDS spreads, the right axis is for the 
leverage ratios, VIX, 10-year treasury yields, and ߛ respectively from top-left 
to bottom-right. 
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Chapter B5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
B5.1 OLS regression results 
I run regression (1) and (2) for the changes in CDS spreads of each 
entity, then I calculate the averages of the regression results for all entities in 
the whole sample or in a credit rating class.  
Panel A in table 4 presents the results of the multivariate regression (1). 
The t-statistic is computed based on the method in Collin-Dufresne et al. 
(2001)13  in order to capture the cross-sectional variation in the time-series 
regression coefficient estimates. The leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year yield and ߛ 
remain statistically significant and, as expected, all coefficients estimates for 
the leverage ratio, VIX, ߛ are positive, and are negative for the 10-year yield. ߛ 
is strongly significant for all rating entities and its positive coefficients are 
consistent with the belief that decreasing market liquidity leads to an increase 
of CDS spread. The coefficient estimates become larger when the rating of 
entities is lower; for instance, on average a 1% increase in ߛ increases the CDS 
spread by approximately 0.21 bps for the AA- ~ AAA entities but by 5.81 bps 
for the entities below BBB-.  
Panel B further reports the results of the multivariate regression (2) 
controlling for several additional variables. Sign, significance level, and 
magnitude of coefficient estimates for the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year yield, 
and ߛ are similar to the results in regression (1). Jump in issuing firm value 
                                                          
13
 The t-statistic is calculated by dividing each averaged coefficient value by 
the standard deviation of the N estimates and multiplying  ?ܰ , where N is the 
number of reference entities. 
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seems to have no impact on the changes in CDS spreads, its coefficients are 
insignificant. S&P 500 return is insignificant for all entities except A- ~ A+. 
Both the square of 10-year yield and the yield spread between 10-year and 2-
year are insignificant at 5% significance level. 
In summary, I find that these determinants, namely leverage ratio, 
volatility, risk-free rate and liquidity, are statistically significant in explaining 
the change in CDS spreads 14 . Adding a liquidity determinant helps in 
understanding the variation of CDS spreads. The change in CDS spreads is 
larger when the change in liquidity becomes bigger, and vice versa. The 
significance of the liquidity determinant is robust to controlling for other 
variables implied by extended structural models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 The reported adjusted R2 is slightly low, which is mainly because I use daily 
data for analysis as daily data is acknowledged to be noisier than monthly data. 
The adjusted R2 for the whole sample becomes 31.09% when monthly data is 
applied; however, monthly data restricts the time-varying analysis due to its 
short sample size, wKLFK LV WKHPDLQ SXUSRVH RI WKLV FKDSWHU¶V UHVHDUFK The 
strong significance of the explanatory variables, together with the high 
adjusted R2 for CDS level regression, indicates their good explanatory power. 
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Table 4. Multivariate OLS Regression 
 
AA- ~ AAA A- ~ A+ BBB- ~ BBB+ 
Below BBB- 
(Non-investment) Investment All 
NumOb 1483.47 1360.48 1258.76 1209.39 1367.57 1287.38 
Panel A 
      
Coefficients 
      
Constant 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0007*** 0.0026** 0.0004*** 0.0010*** 
 
(7.7172) (4.5011) (3.7094) (1.8152) (4.4489) (2.6107) 
Leverage 0.0001 0.0120*** 0.0144*** 0.0593*** 0.0123*** 0.0247*** 
 
(0.0128) (5.8902) (7.9781) (4.5847) (9.3744) (6.5500) 
VIX 0.0011*** 0.0024*** 0.0036*** 0.0178*** 0.0029*** 0.0069*** 
 
(6.0077) (8.3151) (9.9947) (4.6740) (12.7306) (6.2442) 
10-year yield -0.0198*** -0.0399*** -0.0702*** -0.1384** -0.0547*** -0.0769*** 
 
(-9.0420) (-6.3843) (-12.4112) (-1.9970) (-13.4347) (-4.1282) 
Gamma 0.0021* 0.0059*** 0.0211*** 0.0581** 0.0139*** 0.0256*** 
 
(1.7287) (2.8469) (2.4721) (2.0240) (2.9250) (3.0416) 
AdjR2 0.0365 0.0716 0.0848 0.0697 0.0759 0.0742 
Panel B: controlling 
variables       
Coefficients 
      
Constant 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0006*** 0.0026** 0.0004*** 0.0010*** 
 
(6.6338) (3.9384) (3.3077) (1.7013) (3.9441) (2.3866) 
Leverage 0.0010 0.0118*** 0.0141*** 0.0577*** 0.0121*** 0.0242*** 
 
(0.2218) (4.7756) (7.7725) (4.9146) (8.5818) (6.8973) 
VIX 0.0012*** 0.0026*** 0.0032*** 0.0139*** 0.0028*** 0.0057*** 
 
(6.7059) (8.0878) (7.6483) (3.0473) (10.7825) (4.5638) 
10-year yield -0.0926*** -0.1670*** -0.1635*** -0.2706 -0.159*** -0.1884** 
 
(-5.0564) (-4.2578) (-4.2130) (-0.7390) (-6.1861) (-1.9189) 
Jump 0.0152 -0.0174 0.0224 -0.0311 0.0071 -0.0030 
 
(1.2841) (-1.2826) (1.1394) (-0.2228) (0.5903) (-0.0804) 
Gamma 0.0022** 0.0055*** 0.0218*** 0.0586** 0.0141*** 0.0258*** 
 
(1.8638) (2.6464) (2.5206) (1.9964) (2.9319) (3.0128) 
S&P 500 return 0.0003 0.0009* -0.0006 -0.0058 0.0000 -0.0015 
 
(0.7386) (1.5578) (-1.0998) (-0.6818) (0.0761) (-0.6707) 
10-year yield square 0.0091*** 0.0161*** 0.0121*** 0.0213 0.0134*** 0.0155* 
 
(3.9893) (3.6138) (2.5150) (0.5214) (4.3001) (1.4075) 
Yield spread 0.0152** 0.0174*** 0.0439*** 0.0526*** 0.0316*** 0.0372* 
 
(1.8204) (2.8853) (7.3383) (4.3017) (7.6921) (1.3024) 
AdjR2 0.0424 0.0765 0.0889 0.0759 0.0804 0.0792 
Note: NumOb represents the average number of observations. Panel A reports 
the coefficients and summary statistics for the regression   ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/ ?൅ ߝ ?, and panel B is for regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ? ?൅ ߚ ? ?VORSH ?൅ߚ ? ?6	3 ?൅ ߚ ? ?MXPS ?൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept,  ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ?, ݎ ? ?, VORSH ?,  ?6	3 ?, MXPS ? represents the change in CDS spread, 
leverage ratio, risk-free rate, volatility and liquidity, the difference between the 
long-term (10-year) and short-term (2-year) risk-free rate; the return of the 
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S&P 500 and the proxy for jumps in firm value, respectively, at t. Explanatory 
variables in the first column of panel A are the change in the leverage ratio, 
VIX, 10-year Treasury yield, andߛ ; and in panel B are the change in the 
leverage ratio, VIX, 10-\HDU WUHDVXU\ \LHOG MXPS RI LVVXLQJ ILUP¶V YDOXHߛ, 
S&P 500 index return, square of 10-year yield and spread between 10-year and 
2-year yield. The reported coefficients are averages using all entities in a given 
rating class. The t-statistics in brackets are computed based on the method in 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) ³´ ³´ ³´ UHSUHVHQW   DQG 
significance level, respectively. The last row of each panel reports the adjusted 
R2.  
 
B5.2 Dummy-variable pooling regression results 
The financial crisis provides a unique opportunity to investigate 
whether the determinants of the changes in CDS spreads are regime dependent. 
Since the CDS market has performed quite differently before and after the 
beginning of crisis, it is a concern whether these determinants, especially the 
liquidity determinant, are time-varying and are consistently significant. For 
example, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) note that liquidity risk is more 
pronounced for less liquid securities and in illiquid periods. 
 I first test the effects of the crisis on determinants by running regression 
(3), with crisis=1 for the sample from December, 2007 to June, 2009, the 
recession periods indicated by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), and zero otherwise15. Table 5 reports the estimates and associated 
partial F-statistics for each rating class and the whole sample. There are several 
important findings. First, the crisis dummy variable is strongly significant at 1% 
significance level for all pooling samples, suggesting that the intercept of  ?  ܵ
shifts during a crisis; second, the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year yield and ߛ all 
                                                          
15
 I choose to use NBER recession periods because there is no clear definition 
of when the crisis starts and ends. 
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remain statistically significant, indicating their importance to explain CDS 
spreads regardless of the crisis; third, the interaction terms are strongly 
significant when the whole sample is used, demonstrating that the four 
determinants are indeed time-varying, the sensitivities of CDS spreads on these 
determinants change pronouncedly during the crisis; fourth, among the 
interaction terms, the term with ߛ is the only one being significant for all rating 
classes, suggesting the universal shock of liquidity on CDS spreads when a 
crisis occurs.   
 Given the finding that the determinants are time-varying caused by 
crisis, I run regression (4) to further examine how the slope coefficients of the 
determinants change across credit ratings. Specifically, I test the effect of 
credit rating on the time-varying determinants during crisis and out of crisis, 
for instance, testing the interaction effect of credit rating on ߛ is equivalent to 
test the hypothesis ߜ ? ?ൌ ߜ ? ?ൌ ߜ ? ?ൌ  ?.  
Table 6 reports the results. Interestingly, the credit rating dummy 
variable is strongly significant both in and out of crisis, showing that each 
credit rating class has different  ?  ܵlevel. Moreover, the interaction terms with 
the leverage ratio, VIX, and 10-year yield are significant for both sample 
periods, while the interaction term with ߛ becomes insignificant during crisis, 
which suggests that although the shock of liquidity on the change of different 
UDWHG&'6 VSUHDGV GLIIHUV VLJQLILFDQWO\ZKHQ WKH&'6PDUNHW LV µQRUPDO¶ LW
may not be so divergent during crisis. This finding is consistent with the result 
in Table 4 that the liquidity shock is universal during the crisis. 
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Table 5. Pooling Regression with Crisis as a Dummy Variable 
 
AA- ~ AAA 
 
A- ~ A+ 
 
BBB- ~ BBB+ 
 
Below BBB- (Non-investment) Investment 
 
All 
 
 
Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) 
Constant 0.0000 
 
-0.0001 
 
0.0000 
 
-0.0019 
 
0.0000 
 
-0.0003 
 
Leverage 0.0032*** 0.0002 0.0098*** 0.0000 0.0126*** 0.0000 0.0483*** 0.0000 0.0115*** 0.0000 0.0279*** 0.0000 
VIX 0.0006*** 0.0000 0.0012*** 0.0000 0.0031*** 0.0000 0.0107*** 0.0000 0.0021*** 0.0000 0.0038*** 0.0000 
10-year yield -0.0138*** 0.0000 -0.0286*** 0.0000 -0.0583*** 0.0000 -0.2434*** 0.0000 -0.0426*** 0.0000 -0.0858*** 0.0000 
Gamma 0.0012*** 0.0003 0.0015*** 0.0000 0.0042*** 0.0000 0.0368*** 0.0000 0.0029*** 0.0000 0.0091*** 0.0000 
Crisis 0.0006*** 0.0063 0.0006*** 0.0022 0.0012*** 0.0000 0.0132*** 0.0000 0.0008*** 0.0000 0.0023*** 0.0000 
Leverage*Crisis -0.0017 0.1745 0.0001 0.8480 0.0007 0.2473 -0.0122*** 0.0000 0.0010** 0.0112 -0.0044*** 0.0000 
VIX*Crisis 0.0005*** 0.0003 0.0008*** 0.0000 -0.0001 0.3771 0.0005 0.6822 0.0002** 0.0313 -0.0006*** 0.0035 
10-year yield*Crisis -0.0057* 0.0578 -0.0049 0.1041 -0.0014 0.7300 0.0441 0.1583 -0.0029 0.2202 0.0221*** 0.0000 
Gamma*Crisis 0.0019* 0.0893 0.0022** 0.0446 0.0032** 0.0284 -0.0232** 0.0388 0.0024*** 0.0056 -0.0054*** 0.0031 
AdjR2 0.0321 
 
0.0635 
 
0.0776 
 
0.0370 
 
0.0689 
 
0.0491 
 
Note: Coefficients and associated partial F-test statistics for the regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ? ?൅ ߜ ?ܥ ൅ߜ ? ?ݎ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?92/ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?/(9 ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ? ?ܥ ൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept,  ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ? represents the change in CDS 
spread, leverage ratio, risk-free rate, volatility and liquidity, respectively. C is a dummy variable for crisis, with C=1 for sample dates during the 
crisis, and C=0 otherwise. Explanatory variables in the first column are the change in the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year treasury yield, ߛ, crisis 
dummy, its interaction with the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year treasury yield and ߛ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHO
respectively. The last row reports the adjusted R2. 
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Table 6. Pooling Regression with Credit Rating as a Dummy Variable 
  
Crisis period   Normal period   
  
Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) 
Constant 0.0118 
 
-0.0017 
 
Leverage 0.0322*** 0.0000 0.0274*** 0.0000 
VIX 0.0104*** 0.0000 0.0098*** 0.0000 
10-year yield -0.1681*** 0.0000 -0.1488*** 0.0000 
Gamma 0.0022*** 0.0024 0.0151*** 0.0000 
AA -0.0110*** 0.0000 0.0016*** 0.0000 
A -0.0111 
 
0.0015 
 
BBB -0.0103 
 
0.0017 
 
Leverage*AA -0.0280*** 0.0001 -0.0244*** 0.0000 
Leverage*A -0.0088 
 
-0.0147 
 
Leverage*BBB -0.0068 
 
-0.0132 
 
VIX*AA -0.0093*** 0.0000 -0.0092*** 0.0000 
VIX*A -0.0083 
 
-0.0086 
 
VIX*BBB -0.0075 
 
-0.0067 
 
10-year yield*AA 0.1420*** 0.0000 0.1355*** 0.0000 
10-year yield*A 0.1223 
 
0.1184 
 
10-year yield*BBB 0.1059 
 
0.0836 
 
Gamma*AA 0.0000 0.3822 -0.0138*** 0.0000 
Gamma*A 0.0130 
 
-0.0131 
 
Gamma*BBB 0.0068 
 
-0.0095 
 
AdjR2 0.0434   0.0638   
Note: Coefficients and associated partial F-test statistics for the regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ? ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept,  ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ? represents the change in CDS spread, leverage ratio, risk-free rate, 
volatility and liquidity, respectively. R1, R2 and R3 indicating credit rating 
dummy for credit rating classes: R1=1 for any AA- ~ AAA rated CDS, R2=1 
for any A- ~ A+ rated CDS, R3=1 for any BBB- ~ BBB+ rated CDS, and zero 
otherwise. Explanatory variables in the first column are the change in the 
leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year treasury yield, ߛ, credit rating dummy variables, 
their interaction with the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year treasury yield and ߛ. The 
null hypothesis for the interaction term is the dummy variable does not change 
the explanatory variable significantly. ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQG
1% significance level, respectively. The last row reports the adjusted R2. 
 
B5.3 Regime dependent determinants 
Another method to test the time-varying determinants is via a Markov 
regime switching model. Hamilton (1989) proposes an approach to model 
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changes in regime and investigates the different behaviour of US GDP growth. 
Alexander and Kaeck (2008) use a Markov regime switching model for iTraxx 
Europe CDS indices and conclude that the determinants of CDS spreads are 
time-varying. Acharya et al. (2012) use a similar methodology to study the 
exposure of corporate bond returns to liquidity risk; they find the evidence of 
time-varying liquidity risk and episodes of flight to liquidity. 
In this section I employ the same Markov regime switching model for 
my CDS spreads data in order to answer two questions: first, are the 
determinants significant in every regime? Second, are the coefficients of 
determinants between regimes statistically different? If yes, how large are the 
differences?     
 Table 7 presents the estimates and associated t-statistics, Panel A is for 
crisis regime and Panel B is for normal regime. Sigma measures the standard 
deviation of residuals; it is 6.28 times larger in the crisis regime than that in the 
normal regime. The value is larger than in Alexander and Kaeck (2008), which 
may be due to the individual CDS sample I use instead of their CDS index. I 
summarize the findings as follows: 
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Table 7. Markov Regime Switching Regression Model for Four Determinants 
 
AA- ~ 
AAA A- ~ A+ 
BBB- ~ 
BBB+ 
Below BBB- (Non-
investment) Investment All 
NumOb 1483.47 1360.48 1258.76 1209.39 1367.57 1287.38 
Panel A: crisis regime 
      
Coefficients 
      
Constant 0.0007 0.0000 0.0015*** 0.0083* 0.0009*** 0.0028** 
 
(1.1022) (0.0591) (2.8048) (1.6126) (2.8611) (2.0469) 
Leverage 0.0015* 0.0079** 0.0113*** 0.0618*** 0.0092*** 0.0231*** 
 
(1.5346) (2.3660) (9.3709) (3.6306) (6.5096) (4.7861) 
VIX 0.0010*** 0.0017*** 0.0029*** 0.0194** 0.0023*** 0.0068*** 
 
(5.4502) (6.1042) (5.6435) (2.3072) (7.5699) (2.9967) 
10-year yield -0.0186*** -0.0465*** -0.0736*** -0.2169*** -0.0589*** -0.1007*** 
 
(-6.8125) (-9.6712) (-9.3299) (-5.5067) (-12.1947) (-8.5098) 
Gamma 0.0024** 0.0008 0.0334** 0.0515 0.0187** 0.0274** 
 
(2.0926) (0.4998) (2.1219) (1.2563) (2.1583) (2.1808) 
sigma 0.0168 0.0355 0.0572 0.3498 0.0458 0.1262 
Panel B: normal 
regime       
Coefficients 
      
Constant 0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 
(1.0751) (-4.6496) (-3.0038) (-0.5607) (-3.9253) (-2.5689) 
Leverage 0.0014** 0.0022*** 0.0035*** 0.0193*** 0.0028*** 0.0072*** 
 
(2.0522) (3.1525) (7.0062) (4.5598) (7.4410) (5.8034) 
VIX 0.0001** 0.0006*** 0.0016*** 0.0063*** 0.0011*** 0.0025*** 
 
(2.0446) (5.8034) (6.4225) (7.6479) (7.4908) (8.7633) 
10-year yield -0.0022** -0.0083*** -0.0204*** -0.0670*** -0.0144*** -0.0283*** 
 
(-2.5495) (-6.5536) (-8.4123) (-5.1468) (-9.6445) (-7.2696) 
Gamma 0.0027 0.0051** 0.0063** -0.0093 0.0055*** 0.0016 
 
(0.9385) (2.1563) (2.1436) (-0.9391) (3.0217) (0.5431) 
sigma 0.0034 0.0065 0.0123 0.0499 0.0094 0.0201 
Note: Estimates of a Markov regime switching model (5) for explanatory 
variables including the change in the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year yield and ߛ,  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?ǡ ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?/ ?൅ ߝ ?ǡ ?, where iא{1,2} 
represents 2 regimes. I allow the intercept, the coefficients estimates for all 
explanatory variables, and the residual volatility to vary between the two 
regimes. NumOb represents the average number of observations. Panel A is 
the results for the crisis regime and Panel B is for the normal regime. The 
associated t-statistics are shown in brackets. Sigma measures the standard 
GHYLDWLRQ RI UHVLGXDOV ³´ ³´ ³´ UHSUHVHQW   DQG 
significance level, respectively. 
  
a) All explanatory variables are statistically significant for both regimes 
when considering all entities except ߛ in normal regime. The changes 
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in CDS spreads of AA- ~ AAA entities are not sensitive to the changes 
in ߛ in normal regime, when the CDS market is stable, but are strongly 
sensitive in crisis regime, when the CDS market is turbulent.  
b) All signs of significant coefficients are the same as those of normal 
multivariate regressions in Table 4. A positive change in leverage ratio, 
VIX, and ߛ causes a positive change in CDS spread; a negative change 
in 10-year yield increases CDS spread, and vice versa. The magnitude 
of coefficients has generally the same trend as in Table 4, as their sizes 
increase the lower the rating. 
c) The sizes of coefficients in a crisis regime are substantially larger than 
those in normal a regime. Specifically, the estimates of leverage ratio, 
VIX, 10-year yield, and ߛ are 3.22, 2.73, 3.56 and 17.07 times larger in 
crisis regime than in a normal regime. A Welch's t-test16 is conducted 
with the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal in mean between 
crisis regime and normal regime, and the results are reported in Table 8. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at 5% significance level for all variables 
when using the whole sample, indicating their distinct performance 
between the two regimes. This finding is largely consistent with the 
pooling regression results in Table 5 that the determinants behave 
differently during volatile periods. 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Welch's t-test instead of normal student t-test is used because the two 
samples have unequal variance. 
Part B                                                              Chapter B5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
60 
 
Table 8. Testing of Equal Means between Regimes 
 
AA- ~ AAA A- ~ A+ BBB- ~ BBB+ Below BBB-  All 
NumOb 1483.47 1360.48 1258.76 1209.39 1287.38 
T-statistics 
     
Constant 1.0393 0.9064 3.2990*** 1.6374* 2.1843** 
Leverage 0.1521 1.6831** 5.9526*** 2.4237*** 3.1952*** 
VIX 4.6951*** 3.6642*** 2.2140** 1.5468* 1.8827** 
10-year yield -5.7451*** -7.6872*** -6.4455*** -3.6149*** -5.8140*** 
Gamma -0.0918 -1.5173* 1.6952** 1.4414* 1.9984** 
P-value 
     
Constant 0.1581 0.1839 0.0007 0.0533 0.0150 
Leverage 0.4402 0.0484 0.0000 0.0090 0.0008 
VIX 0.0001 0.0002 0.0142 0.0634 0.0305 
10-year yield 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 
Gamma 0.4639 0.0660 0.0465 0.0770 0.0233 
Note: A Welch's t-test for differences in coefficients with the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of determinants are equal between the crisis and normal 
regimes. Welch's t-test defines t-statistics as ൌ  ?തభ ? ?തమඨೄభమಿభ ?ೄమమಿమ , where തܺ ?ǡ ܵ ? ? and  ܰ? 
are the sample mean, sample variance, and sample size for regime i, 
respectively. NumOb represents the average number of observations. The 
degree of freedom is approximated as ݒ ൌ ሺೄభమಿభ ?ೄమమಿమሻమೄభరಿభమൈሺಿభషభሻ ? ೄమరಿమమൈሺಿమషభሻ³´³´³´
represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
Overall, I conclude from both the dummy-variable pooling regression 
and Markov regime switching model that all four determinants are significant 
and time-varying. Liquidity especially is an informative determinant of the 
changes in CDS spreads, and the sensitivity of the change in CDS spreads to 
liquidity is much stronger in a crisis regime than in a normal regime. The 
effects of a liquidity shock on CDS spreads differ significantly across rating 
groups when the CDS market is tranquil but when it is turbulent the effects 
become similar, regardless of credit rating. In other words, the impact of the 
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OLTXLGLW\GHWHUPLQDQWRQWKHPRYHPHQWRIWKH&'6VSUHDGIRU³VDIH´VHFXULWLHV
LVDVVWURQJDVWKDWIRU³GDQJHURXV´VHFXULWLHVGXULQJYRODWLOHSHULRGV 
 
B5.4 Discussion 
B5.4.1 The BBB- ~ BBB+ group case study 
In this section I pick only those CDSs rated as BBB- ~ BBB+ for a case 
study because during volatile periods they could behave like CDSs on junk 
bonds, which makes tests more insightful. 
 Appendix Figure 6 plots the aggregate ߛ liquidity measure constructed 
with only BBB- ~ BBB+ rated CDS. Compared with the ߛ in Figure 3, it has a 
similar shape but is slightly bigger. Panel A of Appendix Table 27 reports the 
results for the multiple OLS regression (1) using the newly constructed ߛ for 
both the change in CDS spreads and CDS spread levels. All determinants are 
strongly significant. Panel B presents the results for the pooling regression (3), 
as expected, the significant crisis dummy variable indicates the shifted slope, 
and the only significant interaction term with ߛ suggests the dramatic change 
of liquidity shock on the BBB- ~ BBB+ rated CDS spreads, due to crisis. 
 
B5.4.2 Can the explanatory variables explain CDS spreads levels? 
I have so far tested the determinants of the changes in CDS spreads 
because I am more interested in the variation of spreads than the spreads 
themselves although differences are harder to explain than levels due to the 
presence of noise in the data and, therefore, a regression in differences 
provides a more stringent test. In order to provide more insight into the 
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performance of my regressors, I repeat all regression tests and report the results 
on CDS spreads levels from Appendix Table 28 to 3017. The 79.39% adjusted 
R2 of the multiple OLS regression for the whole sample suggests that those 
explanatory variables are sufficient to explain the levels of CDS spreads. In 
addition, the determinants exhibit even stronger time-varying characteristics 
than for the changes of CDS spreads. 
 
B5.4.3 Is the regime switching model accurate? 
It may be a concern that the accuracy of my conclusion from the 
Markov regime switching model is biased due to model error and so, to relieve 
this concern, I also regress the averaged filtered probability of being in crisis 
regime18 RQ WKH6W/RXLV )HGHUDO5HVHUYH¶V)LQDQFLDO6WUHVV ,QGH[ 67/)6,
or its one-week lag in order to check whether the latter is able to reflect and 
predict the former. STLFSI is an index published by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis and is constructed using principal components analysis on 18 
weekly data series including interest rates, yield spreads, and other equity, 
                                                          
17
 Accordingly, explanatory variables are levels instead of differences. 
18
 The probability of being in crisis regime is calculated as the sum of the 
product of the transition probability from normal regime to crisis regime with 
the probability of being in normal regime at time t-1, and the product of the 
transition probability from crisis regime to crisis regime with the probability of 
being in crisis regime at time t-1, the sum is then multiplied by the ratio of the 
density for crisis regime to the conditional density at t. See Appendix A and 
Hamilton (1994) for details. 
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bond, and volatility indices19. Higher values of the STLFSI indicate a greater 
degree of financial stress in the economy. I match my results with the reporting 
date of STLFSI to a weekly frequency, and apply a standard logit 
transformation  ൤  ?మǡ೟ ? ? ?మǡ೟൨  to the averaged filtered probability p2,t. Table 9 
presents the univariate regression results. The STLFSI or its lag is strongly 
significant at 1% significance level; its positive coefficient shows that a greater 
degree of financial stress in the economy leads to a higher probability of being 
in a volatility regime of the CDS market. The above 63% adjusted R2, together 
with the 81.11% correlation between the transformed filtered probability and 
the stress index, supports the outcome from my regime switching model.  
 For a better illustration, Figure 4 plots the time series of the averaged 
filtered probability of being in the volatility regime, highlighted by several 
major events occurred during the sample periods. The volatility regime 
successfully picks up those big market movements such as the take-over of 
Bear Stearns, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the 2010 Flash Crash. 
The overall probability during the NBER recession periods is higher than in 
other periods. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 Detailed information regarding the construction of the STLFSI is available 
online at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/net/NETJan2010Appendix.pdf. 
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Table 9. Univariate Regression of Averaged Probability of Being in Crisis 
Regime on STLFSI 
Coefficients     
Constant -0.2519*** -0.2481*** 
  (-6.6560) (-6.3730) 
STFLI(t) 0.6140*** 
 
  (24.8810) 
 
STFLI(t-1) 
 
0.6056*** 
  
 
(23.8880) 
AdjR2 0.6568 0.6389 
Correlation 0.8111   
Note: The coefficients estimates and associated t-statistics for a univariate 
regression of the logit transformation of the averaged probability of being in 
WKH FULVLV UHJLPH RQ WKH 6W /RXLV )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH¶V )LQDQFLDO 6WUHVV ,QGH[
(STLFSI) or its one-week lag. STLFSI is constructed using principal 
components analysis on 18 weekly data series including interest rates, yield 
spreads, and other equity, bond, and volatility indices. Higher values of the 
STLFSI indicate a greater degree of financial stress in the economy. Adjusted 
R2 and the correlation between the transformed probability and the STLFSI 
YDOXHDUHDOVRVKRZQ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFH
level, respectively. 
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Figure 4. Time Series Plot of Averaged Probability of Volatile Regime 
 
Note: Major events occurred during the sample periods: 
A: June 7, 2007. Bear Stearns suspends redemption rights invested in the 
subprime debt market because of liquidity problems. 
% -XO\   6WDQGDUG DQG 3RRU¶V SODFHV  VHFXULWLHV EDFNHG E\
subprime residential mortgages on a credit watch. 
C: July 31, 2007. Two Bear Sterns hedge funds filed for Chapter 15 
bankruptcy. 
D: December, 2007 ~ June 2009. Recession periods indicated by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
E: March, 2008. Bear Stearns was taken over by JPMorgan Chase. 
F: September, 2008. The federal government took over Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, Merrill Lynch was bought by Bank of America and Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy. 
G: May 6, 2010. United States stock market flash crash happened, the biggest 
one-day point decline on an intraday basis in Dow Jones Industrial Average 
history. 
 
B5.4.4 Alternative liquidity proxy 
I construct an aggregate liquidity measure for CDS analogous to that of 
Bao et al. (2011). Researchers have used several other proxies; for example, 
Bhanot and Guo (2012) use the spread between 3-month Libor and 3-month 
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Treasury Bill yield (Libor-Tbill); Pu et al. (2011) apply the change in the 
monthly flow into money market mutual funds, total dollar volume of 
corporate debt issued, and the difference of the on-the-run and off-the-run 
Treasury Bond yield. To match my daily frequency CDS data, I test an 
alternative liquidity proxy as the 3-month Libor-Tbill spread and run the same 
regressions. I report the main regression results in Table 10 ~ 14. My findings 
remain consistent, and the liquidity determinant has an even stronger time-
varying pattern. 
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Table 10. Multivariate Regression Using Determinants with Alternative 
Liquidity Proxy 
  
AA- ~ 
AAA A- ~ A+ 
BBB- ~ 
BBB+ 
Below 
BBB- All 
NumOb 1483.47 1360.48 1258.76 1209.39 1287.38 
Panel A 
     
Coefficients 
     
Constant 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0007*** 0.0028** 0.0011*** 
Leverage 0.0002 0.0124*** 0.0145*** 0.0596*** 0.0250*** 
VIX 0.0010*** 0.0022*** 0.0034*** 0.0174*** 0.0066*** 
10-year yield -0.0191*** -0.038*** -0.0669*** -0.1393** -0.0751*** 
Libor-Tbill 0.0060*** 0.0218*** 0.0314*** 0.1403*** 0.0560*** 
t-statistics 
     
Constant 8.0710 5.1467 3.8178 1.9086 2.7114 
Leverage 0.0513 6.1432 7.8854 4.3968 6.3560 
VIX 5.7605 8.3765 9.6381 4.5169 5.9828 
10-year yield -8.2589 -6.3878 -11.9878 -1.9796 -3.9744 
Libor-Tbill 3.2320 5.1977 7.6541 4.0230 5.6338 
AdjR2 0.0356 0.0726 0.0858 0.0696 0.0748 
Panel B: controlling 
variables      
Coefficients 
     
Constant 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0007*** 0.0030** 0.0011*** 
Leverage 0.0011 0.0119*** 0.0141*** 0.0588*** 0.0245*** 
VIX 0.0011*** 0.0025*** 0.0030*** 0.0134*** 0.0055*** 
10-year yield -0.0910*** -0.159*** -0.1547*** -0.2482 -0.1769** 
Jump 0.0152 -0.0165 0.0248 -0.0364 -0.0032 
Libor-Tbill 0.0053*** 0.0226*** 0.0296*** 0.1445*** 0.0566*** 
S&P 500 return 0.0003 0.0008* -0.0007 -0.0061 -0.0017 
10-year yield square 0.0091*** 0.0161*** 0.0121*** 0.0233 0.0160* 
Yield spread 0.0113 0.0010 0.0219*** -0.0637*** -0.0071 
t-statistics 
     
Constant 7.1526 4.8751 3.6493 1.9218 2.6490 
Leverage 0.2422 4.8407 7.6436 4.7907 6.7302 
VIX 6.6016 7.9194 7.4585 2.9911 4.4707 
10-year yield -4.9744 -4.1857 -4.2117 -0.7264 -1.9296 
Jump 1.2979 -1.2370 1.2507 -0.2575 -0.0841 
Libor-Tbill 2.8385 6.0998 6.9593 5.0678 6.6765 
S&P 500 return 0.7015 1.3819 -1.3678 -0.7262 -0.7503 
10-year yield square 3.9969 3.6485 2.6072 0.6128 1.5556 
Yield spread 1.2915 0.1606 3.5730 -5.1896 -0.2460 
AdjR2 0.0412 0.0768 0.0892 0.0771 0.0796 
Note: NumOb represents the average number of observations. Panel A reports 
the coefficients and summary statistics for the regression (1), and panel B is for 
regression (2). Explanatory variables in the first column of panel A are the 
change in the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year Treasury yield, and Libor-Tbill 
spread; and in panel B are the change in the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year 
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TUHDVXU\ \LHOG MXPS RI LVVXLQJ ILUP¶V YDOXH /LERU-Tbill spread, S&P 500 
index return, square of 10-year yield and spread between 10-year and 2-year 
yield. The reported coefficients are averages using all entities in a given rating 
class. The t-statistics are computed based on the method in Collin-Dufresne et 
al. (2001) ³´ ³´ ³´ UHSUHVHQW   DQG  VLJQLILFDQFH OHYHO
respectively. The last row of each panel reports the adjusted R2.  
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Table 11. Pooling Regression with Crisis as a Dummy Variable with Alternative Liquidity Proxy 
  
AA- ~ AAA   A- ~ A+   BBB- ~ BBB+   Below BBB-   All   
  Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) 
Constant -0.0001 
 
-0.0002 
 
0.0000 
 
-0.0023 
 
-0.0004 
 
Leverage 0.0032*** 0.0001 0.0098*** 0.0000 0.0126*** 0.0000 0.0484*** 0.0000 0.0279*** 0.0000 
VIX 0.0006*** 0.0000 0.0012*** 0.0000 0.0031*** 0.0000 0.0105*** 0.0000 0.0038*** 0.0000 
10-year yield -0.0135*** 0.0000 -0.0281*** 0.0000 -0.0554*** 0.0000 -0.2226*** 0.0000 -0.0800*** 0.0000 
Libor-Tbill 0.0013*** 0.0000 0.0024*** 0.0000 0.0141*** 0.0000 0.0917*** 0.0000 0.0273*** 0.0000 
Crisis 0.0007*** 0.0021 0.0008*** 0.0002 0.0015*** 0.0000 0.0143*** 0.0000 0.0026*** 0.0000 
Leverage*Crisis -0.0015 0.2192 0.0003 0.6365 0.0010* 0.0624 -0.0122*** 0.0000 -0.0042*** 0.0000 
VIX*Crisis 0.0004*** 0.0025 0.0006*** 0.0000 -0.0005*** 0.0037 -0.0005 0.6577 -0.0010*** 0.0000 
10-year yield*Crisis -0.0058* 0.0541 -0.0033 0.2655 -0.0016 0.6982 0.0383 0.2222 0.0213*** 0.0000 
Libor-Tbill*Crisis 0.0075*** 0.0015 0.0219*** 0.0000 0.0241*** 0.0000 0.0523** 0.0242 0.0206*** 0.0000 
AdjR2 0.0331   0.0663   0.0806   0.0383   0.0505   
Note: Coefficients and associated partial F-test statistics for the regression (3). Explanatory variables in the first column are the change in the 
leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year Treasury yield, Libor-Tbill spread, crisis dummy, its interaction with the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year treasury yield 
and Libor-7ELOO³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\7KHODVWURZUHSRUWVWKHDGMXVWHG52. 
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Table 12. Pooling Regression with Credit Rating as a Dummy Variable with 
Alternative Liquidity Proxy 
  
Crisis period   Normal period   
  
Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) 
Constant 0.0123 
 
-0.0019 
 
Leverage 0.0322*** 0.0000 0.0274*** 0.0000 
VIX 0.0093*** 0.0000 0.0097*** 0.0000 
10-year yield -0.1516*** 0.0000 -0.1357*** 0.0000 
Libor-Tbill 0.1284*** 0.0000 0.0622*** 0.0000 
AA -0.0114*** 0.0000 0.0018*** 0.0000 
A -0.0112 
 
0.0017 
 
BBB -0.0105 
 
0.0018 
 
Leverage*AA -0.0278*** 0.0003 -0.0244*** 0.0000 
Leverage*A -0.0083 
 
-0.0146 
 
Leverage*BBB -0.0062 
 
-0.0132 
 
VIX*AA -0.0083*** 0.0000 -0.0091*** 0.0000 
VIX*A -0.0075 
 
-0.0084 
 
VIX*BBB -0.0069 
 
-0.0066 
 
10-year yield*AA 0.1258*** 0.0000 0.1225*** 0.0000 
10-year yield*A 0.1050 
 
0.1058 
 
10-year yield*BBB 0.0924 
 
0.0734 
 
Libor-Tbill*AA -0.1196 0.0000 -0.0618*** 0.0000 
Libor-Tbill*A -0.0958 
 
-0.0604 
 
Libor-Tbill*BBB -0.0804 
 
-0.0493 
 
AdjR2 0.0456   0.0647   
Note: Coefficients and associated partial F-test statistics for the regression (4). 
Explanatory variables in the first column are the change in the leverage ratio, VIX, 
10-year Treasury yield, Libor-Tbill spread, credit rating dummy variables, their 
interaction with the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year Treasury yield and Libor-Tbill 
spreDG³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\
The last row reports the adjusted R2. 
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Table 13. Markov Regime Switching Regression Model for Four Determinants with 
Alternative Liquidity Proxy 
  AA- ~ AAA A- ~ A+ BBB- ~ BBB+ Below BBB- All 
NumOb 1483.47 1360.48 1258.76 1209.39 1287.38 
Panel A: crisis regime 
     
Coefficients 
     
Constant 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0019*** 0.0116* 0.0038** 
Leverage 0.0004 0.0154*** 0.0124*** 0.0648*** 0.0263*** 
VIX 0.0014* 0.0018*** 0.0034*** 0.0113*** 0.0049*** 
10-year yield -0.0203*** -0.0417*** -0.0662*** -0.2099*** -0.0947*** 
Libor-Tbill 0.0272*** 0.0270*** 0.0409*** 0.1867*** 0.0748*** 
sigma 0.0844 0.0535 0.0589 0.3551 0.1373 
t-statistics 
     
Constant 0.5449 -0.2123 2.7002 1.7466 2.1178 
Leverage 0.1332 6.6769 9.8220 3.8064 5.4963 
VIX 1.7626 3.2073 8.1491 5.0491 7.2414 
10-year yield -2.2672 -5.4404 -5.9947 -4.4095 -6.6733 
Libor-Tbill 3.6569 4.0902 5.5229 4.6349 6.2528 
Panel B: normal regime 
     
Coefficients 
     
Constant 0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0002 -0.0003*** 
Leverage 0.0005 0.0028*** 0.0035*** 0.0195*** 0.0074*** 
VIX 0.0001 0.0008*** 0.0018*** 0.0062*** 0.0026*** 
10-year yield -0.0067*** -0.0139*** -0.0249*** -0.0642*** -0.0312*** 
Libor-Tbill 0.0017 0.0047** 0.0068*** 0.0373*** 0.0140*** 
sigma 0.0068 0.0087 0.0130 0.0507 0.0214 
t-statistics 
     
Constant 1.0824 -3.4415 -3.3677 -0.9904 -3.6509 
Leverage 0.4466 2.6501 6.8286 4.7335 5.9717 
VIX 0.6570 5.9280 7.0784 7.6313 9.1948 
10-year yield -2.8229 -6.0370 -7.6028 -5.1110 -8.1085 
Libor-Tbill 1.3287 2.2889 3.0846 3.5370 4.5158 
Note: Estimates of a Markov regime switching model (5) for explanatory variables 
including the change in the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year yield and Libor-Tbill spread,  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߙ ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ? ?/,4 ?൅ ߝ ?ǡ ?, where i א {1,2} 
represents 2 regimes. NumOb represents the average number of observations. I allow 
the intercept, the coefficients estimates for all explanatory variables, and the residual 
volatility to vary between the two regimes. Panel A is the results for crisis regime and 
Panel B is for normal regime. Sigma measures the standard deviation of UHVLGXDOV³´
³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\ 
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Table 14. Testing of Equal Means between Regimes with Alternative Liquidity Proxy 
  
AA- ~ AAA A- ~ A+ BBB- ~ BBB+ Below BBB- All 
NumOb 1483.47 1360.48 1258.76 1209.39 1287.38 
Coefficients 
     
Constant 0.3046 0.4822 3.1332*** 1.7781** 2.2681** 
Leverage -0.0565 4.9729*** 6.4870*** 2.5873*** 3.8337*** 
VIX 1.5856* 1.8177** 3.3020*** 2.1415** 3.2068*** 
10-year yield -1.4673* -3.4716*** -3.5822*** -2.9598*** -4.3197*** 
Libor-Tbill 3.3825*** 3.2190*** 4.4076*** 3.5886*** 4.9212*** 
P-value 
     
Constant 0.3824 0.3156 0.0011 0.0401 0.0121 
Leverage 0.4778 0.0000 0.0000 0.0059 0.0001 
VIX 0.0666 0.0366 0.0006 0.0176 0.0007 
10-year yield 0.0809 0.0004 0.0003 0.0021 0.0000 
Libor-Tbill 0.0021 0.0009 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 
Note: A Welch's t-test for differences in coefficients with the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of determinants are equal between crisis regime and normal regime. 
Associated p-value is given. Welch's t-test defines t-statistics as ൌ  ?തభ ? ?തమඨೄభమಿభ ?ೄమమಿమ , where തܺ ?ǡ ܵ ? ? and  ܰ? are the sample mean, sample variance, and sample size for regime i, 
respectively. NumOb represents the average number of observations. The degree of 
freedom is approximated as ݒ ൌ ሺೄభమಿభ ?ೄమమಿమሻమೄభరಿభమൈሺಿభషభሻ ? ೄమరಿమమൈሺಿమషభሻ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQW
5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
B5.4.5 Alternative risk-free rate proxy 
 Analogous to Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Ericsson et al. (2009), I 
approximate risk-free rate with the 10-year Treasury yield. As the CDS contracts are 
for five years, another appropriate risk-free rate would be 5-year Treasury rate or 5-
year swap rate. Blanco, et al. (2005) and Zhu (2006) show that CDS markets use swap 
rates instead of Treasury rates. Longstaff et al. (2005) reach similar conclusions by 
representing the risk-free rate with the Treasury, Refcorp, and swap rates. 
 In this section I conduct a robustness test by using the 5-year Treasury rate and 
5-year swap rate and obtain similar results. Indeed, as shown in Table 15, the rates are 
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highly correlated in my sample periods. I present my core tables for the 5-year swap 
rates in Table 16 ~ 18. The results are very similar to the case for the 10-year 
Treasury rate, and do not change my conclusion. I further find my model performance 
becomes improved with a larger adjusted R2 when using the 5-year swap rates for the 
risk-free rate. 
 
Table 15. Correlation Matrix of Proxies for Risk-free Rates 
Correlation 5-year swap 5-year Treasury 10-year Treasury 
5-year swap 1.0000 0.9793 0.9275 
5-year Treasury 0.9275 0.9570 1.0000 
10-year Treasury 0.9793 1.0000 0.9570 
Note: sample correlation matrix from January, 2004 to June, 2010. 
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Table 16. Multivariate OLS Regression with Alternative Risk-free Rate Proxy 
 
AA- ~ AAA A- ~ A+ BBB- ~ BBB+ Below BBB- (Non-investment) Investment All 
NumOb 1483.47 1360.48 1258.76 1209.39 1367.57 1287.38 
Panel A 
      
Coefficients 
      
Constant 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0006*** 0.0024** 0.0004*** 0.0009*** 
 
(7.7130) (4.0796) (3.4371) (1.6203) (4.0738) (2.3512) 
Leverage 0.0004 0.0122*** 0.0147*** 0.0596*** 0.0125*** 0.0250*** 
 
(0.0967) (5.9646) (8.1522) (4.6574) (9.5872) (6.6692) 
VIX 0.0011*** 0.0025*** 0.0038*** 0.0179*** 0.0031*** 0.0070*** 
 
(6.2221) (8.5710) (10.2761) (4.7989) (13.0335) (6.4881) 
5-year swap -0.0209*** -0.0436*** -0.0690*** -0.1940*** -0.0556*** -0.0922*** 
 
(-10.1342) (-9.6649) (-12.4579) (-3.9101) (-15.2284) (-6.6374) 
Gamma 0.0020* 0.0057*** 0.0211*** 0.0551** 0.0138*** 0.0247*** 
 
(1.6298) (2.7259) (2.4481) (1.9655) (2.8771) (2.9924) 
AdjR2 0.0389 0.0743 0.0869 0.0716 0.0782 0.0765 
Panel B: controlling variables 
      
Coefficients 
      
Constant 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0006*** 0.0025** 0.0004*** 0.0009*** 
 
(6.5773) (3.4356) (3.1884) (1.6718) (3.7355) (2.3192) 
Leverage 0.0012 0.0118*** 0.0141*** 0.0570*** 0.0122*** 0.0240*** 
 
(0.2917) (4.8014) (7.8452) (4.8276) (8.6833) (6.8477) 
VIX 0.0012*** 0.0026*** 0.0031*** 0.0139*** 0.0028*** 0.0057*** 
 
(6.8475) (8.1232) (7.4461) (3.0517) (10.6296) (4.5486) 
5-year swap -0.0430*** -0.0875*** -0.0287*** 0.0437 -0.0517** -0.0265 
 
(-6.0666) (-4.4576) (-0.6349) 0.2020 (-2.0103) (-0.4408) 
Jump 0.0137 -0.0218 0.0156 -0.0578 0.0016 -0.0141 
 
(1.1863) (-1.6185) (0.8075) (-0.4242) (0.1372) (-0.3822) 
Gamma 0.0021** 0.0054*** 0.0225*** 0.0547** 0.0144*** 0.0250*** 
 
(1.7624) (2.5896) (2.6103) (1.9563) (3.0085) (3.0451) 
S&P 500 return 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0009* -0.0067 -0.0002 -0.0020 
 
(0.4931) (1.2418) (-1.7353) (-0.7971) (-0.6923) (-0.8728) 
5-year swap square 0.0023*** 0.0049*** -0.0056 -0.0273 -0.0010 -0.0080 
 
(2.6956) (2.3739) (-1.1781) (-1.4088) (-0.3824) (-1.4452) 
Yield spread 0.0100 0.0133*** 0.0352*** -0.0155 0.0250*** 0.0143 
 
(1.1273) (2.2323) (5.8173) (-1.2761) (6.0119) (0.5558) 
AdjR2 0.0422 0.0780 0.0910 0.0772 0.0820 0.0808 
Note: NumOb represents the average number of observations. Panel A reports the 
coefficients and summary statistics for the regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/ ?൅ ߝ ?, and panel B is for regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ? ?൅ ߚ ? ?VORSH ?൅ ߚ ? ?6	3 ?൅ߚ ? ?MXPS ?൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept, ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ?, ݎ ? ?, VORSH ?,  ?6	3 ?, MXPS ? represents the change in CDS spread, leverage ratio, risk-free rate, 
volatility and liquidity, the difference between the long-term (10-year) and short-term 
(2-year) risk-free rate; the return of the S&P 500 and the proxy for jumps in firm 
value, respectively, at t. Explanatory variables in the first column of panel A are the 
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change in the leverage ratio, VIX, 5-year swap rate, andߛ; and in panel B are the 
change in the leverage ratio, VIX, 5-\HDUVZDSUDWHMXPSRILVVXLQJILUP¶VYDOXHߛ, 
S&P 500 index return, square of 10-year yield and spread between 10-year and 2-year 
yield.  The reported coefficients are averages using all entities in a given rating class. 
The t-statistics in brackets are computed based on the method in Collin-Dufresne et al. 
(2001)³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\
The last row of each panel reports the adjusted R2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part B                                                              Chapter B5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
76 
 
Table 17. Pooling Regression with Crisis as a Dummy Variable and Alternative Risk-free Rate Proxy 
 
AA- ~ AAA 
 
A- ~ A+ 
 
BBB- ~ BBB+ 
 
Below BBB- (Non-investment) 
 
Investment 
 
All 
 
 
Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) 
Constant 0.0000 
 
-0.0001 
 
0.0000 
 
-0.0020 
 
0.0000 
 
-0.0003 
 
Leverage 0.0031*** 0.0001 0.0097*** 0.0000 0.0125*** 0.0000 0.0482*** 0.0000 0.0114*** 0.0000 0.0279*** 0.0000 
VIX 0.0006*** 0.0000 0.0013*** 0.0000 0.0033*** 0.0000 0.0113*** 0.0000 0.0022*** 0.0000 0.0040*** 0.0000 
5-year swap -0.0147*** 0.0000 -0.0357*** 0.0000 -0.0655*** 0.0000 -0.2794*** 0.0000 -0.0487*** 0.0000 -0.0970*** 0.0000 
Gamma 0.0009*** 0.0003 0.0010*** 0.0000 0.0032*** 0.0000 0.0326*** 0.0000 0.0022*** 0.0000 0.0076*** 0.0000 
Crisis 0.0005** 0.0132 0.0005*** 0.0088 0.0011*** 0.0001 0.0127*** 0.0000 0.0007*** 0.0000 0.0021*** 0.0000 
Leverage*Crisis -0.0013 0.2750 0.0004 0.5169 0.0009* 0.0990 -0.0115*** 0.0000 0.0013*** 0.0011 -0.0043*** 0.0000 
VIX*Crisis 0.0004*** 0.0003 0.0008*** 0.0000 -0.0001 0.3709 0.0004 0.7672 0.0002** 0.0341 -0.0007*** 0.0004 
5-year swap*Crisis -0.0091*** 0.0006 -0.0031 0.2467 0.0046 0.2049 0.0626** 0.0240 -0.0003 0.9017 0.0164*** 0.0002 
Gamma*Crisis 0.0024** 0.0373 0.0029*** 0.0085 0.0045*** 0.0021 -0.0180 0.1094 0.0034*** 0.0001 -0.0040** 0.0269 
AdjR2 0.0365 
 
0.0673 
 
0.0806 
 
0.0385 
 
0.0721 
 
0.0513 
 
Note: Coefficients and associated partial F-test statistics for the regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ? ?൅ ߜ ?ܥ ൅ߜ ? ?ݎ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?92/ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?/(9 ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ? ?ܥ ൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept,  ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ? represents the change in CDS 
spread, leverage ratio, risk-free rate, volatility and liquidity, respectively. C is a dummy variable for crisis, with C=1 for sample dates during the 
crisis, and C=0 otherwise. Explanatory variables in the first column are the change in the leverage ratio, VIX, 5-year swap rate, ߛ, crisis dummy, 
its interaction with the leverage ratio, VIX, 5-year swap rate and ߛ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQW% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
The last row reports the adjusted R2. 
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Table 18. Pooling Regression with Credit Rating as a Dummy Variable and 
Alternative Risk-free Rate Proxy 
 
Crisis period Normal period 
 
Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) 
Constant 0.0113 
 
-0.0017 
 
Leverage 0.0326*** 0.0000 0.0273*** 0.0000 
VIX 0.0107*** 0.0000 0.0101*** 0.0000 
5-year swap -0.2037*** 0.0000 -0.1828*** 0.0000 
Gamma 0.0027*** 0.0013 0.0129*** 0.0000 
AA -0.0106*** 0.0000 0.0017*** 0.0000 
A -0.0107 
 
0.0015 
 
BBB -0.0100 
 
0.0017 
 
Leverage*AA -0.0280*** 0.0001 -0.0244*** 0.0000 
Leverage*A -0.0089 
 
-0.0147 
 
Leverage*BBB -0.0069 
 
-0.0132 
 
VIX*AA -0.0096*** 0.0000 -0.0095*** 0.0000 
VIX*A -0.0085 
 
-0.0088 
 
VIX*BBB -0.0076 
 
-0.0069 
 
5-year swap*AA 0.1778*** 0.0000 0.1676*** 0.0000 
5-year swap*A 0.1559 
 
0.1438 
 
5-year swap*BBB 0.1513 
 
0.1115 
 
Gamma*AA -0.0003 0.3894 -0.0119*** 0.0000 
Gamma*A 0.0128 
 
-0.0115 
 
Gamma*BBB 0.0070 
 
-0.0084 
 
AdjR2 0.0448 
 
0.0682 
 
Note: Coefficients and associated partial F-test statistics for the regression   ?  ܵ?ൌߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ? ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept, ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ? represents the 
change in CDS spread, leverage ratio, risk-free rate, volatility and liquidity, 
respectively. R1, R2 and R3 indicating credit rating dummy for credit rating classes: 
R1=1 for any AA- ~ AAA rated CDS, R2=1 for any A- ~ A+ rated CDS, R3=1 for any 
BBB- ~ BBB+ rated CDS, and zero otherwise. Explanatory variables in the first 
column are the change in the leverage ratio, VIX, 5-year swap rate, ߛ, credit rating 
dummy variables, their interaction with the leverage ratio, VIX, 5-year swap rate and ߛ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\7KH
last row reports the adjusted R2. 
 
B5.4.6 Alternative volatility proxy 
 Several researches have used different proxies for volatility in firm default 
study. For example, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) use VIX data; Ericsson et al. (2009) 
XVH WKH LQGLYLGXDO ILUP¶V EWMA (exponentially weighted moving averaged) 
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KLVWRULFDO YRODWLOLW\ =KRQJ HW DO  ILQG WKDW WKH LQGLYLGXDO ILUP¶V LPSOLHG
volatility dominates historical volatility in explaining the time-series variation in CDS 
spreads. Campbell and Taksler (2003) use standard deviation of stock returns. 
Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011) find that when VIX and standard deviation of stock 
returns are used together, the firm-specific volatility is stronger and VIX loses 
significance. 
 In this section for a robustness test, I FDOFXODWHHDFKILUP¶s historical EWMA 
volatility of stock returns, and use it as a proxy for volatility for all models and report 
the results in Table 19 ~ 21. The average correlation between the EWMA volatilities 
and CDS spreads is 72.89%, compared with the 74.71% correlation between the VIX 
and CDS spreads. Again, my conclusions are robust to the choice of volatility, and I 
do not find supporting evidence that historical volatility of stock returns outperforms 
the VIX to explain CDS spreads. 
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Table 19. Multivariate OLS Regression with Alternative Volatility Proxy 
 
AA- ~ AAA A- ~ A+ BBB- ~ BBB+ Below BBB- (Non-investment) Investment All 
NumOb 1483.47 1360.48 1258.76 1209.39 1367.57 1287.38 
Panel A 
      
Coefficients 
      
Constant 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0007*** 0.0025* 0.0004** 0.0010*** 
 
(7.7384) (4.5945) (3.6695) (1.7558) (4.3034) (2.5314) 
Leverage 0.0084*** 0.0205*** 0.0208*** 0.0808*** 0.0196*** 0.0358*** 
 
(5.0973) (10.3966) (10.6694) (4.4714) (14.9114) (6.9533) 
EWMA vol 0.0003*** 0.0009*** 0.0006*** 0.0025** 0.0007*** 0.0012*** 
 
(3.4867) (3.7308) (2.9513) (2.0125) (4.8029) (3.3846) 
10-year yield -0.0258*** -0.0516*** -0.0900*** -0.2626*** -0.0703*** -0.1212*** 
 
(-8.4714) (-7.6728) (-13.4764) (-3.8649) (-14.9075) (-6.3772) 
Gamma 0.0023** 0.0062*** 0.0203*** 0.0595** 0.0136*** 0.0257*** 
 
(1.9590) (3.0168) (2.3899) (2.1050) (2.8746) (3.0955) 
AdjR2 0.0250 0.0590 0.0717 0.0618 0.0630 0.0627 
Panel B: controlling variables 
      
Coefficients 
      
Constant 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0006*** 0.0026* 0.0004*** 0.0010*** 
 
(6.8972) (4.6597) (3.3829) (1.7321) (4.0384) (2.4506) 
Leverage 0.0023 0.0119*** 0.0143*** 0.0582*** 0.0124*** 0.0245*** 
 
(0.6323) (4.9878) (7.9159) (4.9388) (9.0208) (6.9888) 
EWMA vol 0.0004*** 0.0009*** 0.0007*** 0.0024** 0.0008*** 0.0012*** 
 
(3.4764) (3.9634) (3.3979) (2.0097) (5.2742) (3.5656) 
10-year yield -0.0917*** -0.1651*** -0.1629*** -0.2275 -0.1577*** -0.1762* 
 
(-4.9464) (-4.1404) (-4.2295) (-0.6291) (-6.1414) (-1.8170) 
Jump -0.0176* -0.1008*** -0.0761*** -0.5237*** -0.0803*** -0.1976*** 
 
(-1.5015) (-5.2945) (-2.9086) (-2.4083) (-5.0255) (-3.3089) 
Gamma 0.0021* 0.0056*** 0.0205*** 0.0555** 0.0134*** 0.0246*** 
 
(1.8634) (2.8419) (2.3643) (1.9523) (2.7904) (2.9390) 
S&P 500 return -0.0008*** -0.0016*** -0.0037*** -0.0187*** -0.0027*** -0.0069*** 
 
(-2.2880) (-3.9736) (-8.5132) (-2.7972) (-9.1276) (-3.7890) 
10-year yield square 0.0089*** 0.0158*** 0.0119*** 0.0147 0.0131*** 0.0135 
 
(3.8659) (3.4673) (2.4676) (0.3663) (4.1909) (1.2523) 
Yield spread 0.0173*** 0.0224*** 0.0476*** 0.0702*** 0.0357*** 0.0448* 
 
(2.2845) (3.8572) (8.1060) (5.8127) (8.8551) (1.5919) 
AdjR2 0.0385 0.0730 0.0878 0.0761 0.0782 0.0776 
Note: NumOb represents the average number of observations. Panel A reports the 
coefficients and summary statistics for the regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/ ?൅ ߝ ?, and panel B is for regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ? ?൅ ߚ ? ?VORSH ?൅ ߚ ? ?6	3 ?൅ߚ ? ?MXPS ?൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept, ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ?, ݎ ? ?, VORSH ?,  ?6	3 ?, MXPS ? represents the change in CDS spread, leverage ratio, risk-free rate, 
volatility and liquidity, the difference between the long-term (10-year) and short-term 
(2-year) risk-free rate; the return of the S&P 500 and the proxy for jumps in firm 
value, respectively, at t. Explanatory variables in the first column of panel A are the 
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change in the leverage ratio, EWMA volatility, 10-year treasury yield, andߛ; and in 
panel B are the change in the leverage ratio, EWMA volatility, 10-year treasury yield, 
MXPSRI LVVXLQJ ILUP¶VYDOXHߛ, S&P 500 index return, square of 10-year yield and 
spread between 10-year and 2-year yield.  The reported coefficients are averages 
using all entities in a given rating class. The t-statistics in brackets are computed 
based on the method in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)³´³´³´UHSUHVHQW
5% and 1% significance level, respectively. The last row of each panel reports the 
adjusted R2.  
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Table 20. Pooling Regression with Crisis as a Dummy Variable and Alternative Volatility Proxy 
 
AA- ~ AAA 
 
A- ~ A+ 
 
BBB- ~ BBB+ 
 
Below BBB- (Non-investment) 
 
Investment 
 
All 
 
 
Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) 
Constant 0.0000 
 
-0.0001 
 
0.0000 
 
-0.0019 
 
0.0000 
 
-0.0003 
 
Leverage 0.0047*** 0.0000 0.0117*** 0.0000 0.0159*** 0.0000 0.0556*** 0.0000 0.0140*** 0.0000 0.0315*** 0.0000 
EWMA vol 0.0003*** 0.0058 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001 0.1659 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 
10-year yield -0.0160*** 0.0000 -0.0337*** 0.0000 -0.0723*** 0.0000 -0.2920*** 0.0000 -0.0516*** 0.0000 -0.1026*** 0.0000 
Gamma 0.0012*** 0.0001 0.0017*** 0.0000 0.0047*** 0.0000 0.0383*** 0.0000 0.0032*** 0.0000 0.0096*** 0.0000 
Crisis 0.0005** 0.0196 0.0005** 0.0136 0.0010*** 0.0002 0.0126*** 0.0000 0.0007*** 0.0000 0.0021*** 0.0000 
Leverage*Crisis 0.0034*** 0.0019 0.0041*** 0.0000 0.0031*** 0.0000 -0.0062** 0.0181 0.0038*** 0.0000 -0.0024*** 0.0001 
EWMA vol*Crisis -0.0002 0.1356 0.0003*** 0.0008 0.0002* 0.0573 0.0004 0.5184 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0008*** 0.0000 
10-year yield*Crisis -0.0105*** 0.0004 -0.0137*** 0.0000 -0.0092** 0.0228 0.0060 0.8451 -0.0108*** 0.0000 0.0133*** 0.0068 
Gamma*Crisis 0.0021* 0.0661 0.0022** 0.0448 0.0020 0.1801 -0.0246** 0.0294 0.0019** 0.0272 -0.0065*** 0.0004 
AdjR2 0.0230 
 
0.0533 
 
0.0657 
 
0.0321 
 
0.0592 
 
0.0453 
 
Note: Coefficients and associated partial F-test statistics for the regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ? ?൅ ߜ ?ܥ ൅ߜ ? ?ݎ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?92/ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?/(9 ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ? ?ܥ ൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept,  ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ? represents the change in CDS 
spread, leverage ratio, risk-free rate, volatility and liquidity, respectively. C is a dummy variable for crisis, with C=1 for sample dates during the 
crisis, and C=0 otherwise. Explanatory variables in the first column are the change in the leverage ratio, EWMA volatility, 10-year treasury yield, ߛ, crisis dummy, its interaction with the leverage ratio, EWMA volatility, 10-year treasury yield and ߛ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQG
1% significance level, respectively. The last row reports the adjusted R2. 
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Table 21. Pooling Regression with Credit Rating as a Dummy Variable and 
Alternative Volatility Proxy 
 
Crisis period Normal period 
 
Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) 
Constant 0.0113 
 
-0.0017 
 
Leverage 0.0447*** 0.0000 0.0342*** 0.0000 
EWMA vol -0.0002*** 0.0007 0.0000 0.1521 
10-year yield -0.2460*** 0.0000 -0.1927*** 0.0000 
Gamma 0.0029*** 0.0054 0.0158*** 0.0000 
AA -0.0106*** 0.0000 0.0016*** 0.0000 
A -0.0108 
 
0.0015 
 
BBB -0.0100 
 
0.0017 
 
Leverage*AA -0.0332*** 0.0000 -0.0297*** 0.0000 
Leverage*A -0.0155 
 
-0.0197 
 
Leverage*BBB -0.0139 
 
-0.0169 
 
EWMA vol*AA 0.0009*** 0.0000 0.0002 0.5777 
EWMA vol*A 0.0023 
 
0.0001 
 
EWMA vol*BBB 0.0014 
 
0.0002 
 
10-year yield*AA 0.2112*** 0.0000 0.1771*** 0.0000 
10-year yield*A 0.1831 
 
0.1573 
 
10-year yield*BBB 0.1604 
 
0.1136 
 
Gamma*AA -0.0006 0.4779 -0.0145*** 0.0000 
Gamma*A 0.0116 
 
-0.0137 
 
Gamma*BBB 0.0045 
 
-0.0097 
 
AdjR2 0.0377 
 
0.0526 
 
Note: Coefficients and associated partial F-test statistics for the regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ? ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept,  ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ? represents the change in CDS spread, leverage ratio, risk-free rate, 
volatility and liquidity, respectively. R1, R2 and R3 indicating credit rating 
dummy for credit rating classes: R1=1 for any AA- ~ AAA rated CDS, R2=1 
for any A- ~ A+ rated CDS, R3=1 for any BBB- ~ BBB+ rated CDS, and zero 
otherwise. Explanatory variables in the first column are the change in the 
leverage ratio, EWMA volatility, 10-year Treasury yield, ߛ , credit rating 
dummy variables, their interaction with the leverage ratio, EWMA volatility, 
10-year treasury yield and ߛ  ³´ ³´ ³´ UHSUHVHQW   DQG 
significance level, respectively. The last row reports the adjusted R2. 
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B5.4.7 Are leverage ratios serially correlated? 
Define leverage ratio as  
%RRNYDOXHRIGHEW%RRNYDOXHRISUHIHUUHGHTXLW\
0DUNHWYDOXHRIHTXLW\%RRNYDOXHRIGHEW%RRNYDOXHRISUHIHUUHGHTXLW\ 
I linearly interpolate quarterly book values of debt and preferred equity in 
order to estimate daily leverage ratios, as all other variables are at a daily 
frequency. One concern about the ratio is therefore whether it is serially 
correlated as the change of a highly auto-correlated variable might lead to a 
singular problem in regression.  
 I conjecture that this concern is not serious since, instead of linearly 
interpolating the leverage ratios, I only interpolate quarterly book values of 
debt and preferred equity, then estimate daily leverage ratio together with the 
daily market values of equity. Such approximation allows the daily change of 
leverage ratio to be varied without suffering strong serial autocorrelation. 
There are other ways to approximate the leverage ratio, for instance, estimating 
the market value of debt as the value of all corporate bonds an entity issues. 
However, not all bonds have trading data on each day. Also, the assumption 
that corporate bonds represent all debt is restricting; some entities have 
convertible bonds debt as well, which makes the mark-to-market debt value 
even more complicated and prone to error. Another way to avoid this issue is 
to run the regressions only around quarter ends. This way is not feasible in my 
study due to the data sample size limitation, my whole sample is from January 
2004 to June 2010, and many CDSs have shorter sample sizes than that. This 
means I end up with at most 26 observations for all CDSs, which generates 
unreliable regression results. 
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 To illustrate how leverage ratio evolves, I randomly select the entity 
³:DO-Mart Stores, ,QF´DVDQH[DPSOH)LJXUH plots its daily leverage ratio 
(%) and its first order difference used for regressions. Obviously, the leverage 
ratio and its change fluctuate every day. There is no longer strong serial 
autocorrelation for the change of leverage ratio. For instance, it is -0.1106 for 
WKH HQWLW\ ³:DO-0DUW 6WRUHV ,QF´ I randomly select several entities and 
calculate the autocorrelations for the changes of their leverage ratios; all values 
remain low, with majority below 0.1. The results for an Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test for the null that x has a unit root are shown in Table 22: the 
leverage difference strongly rejects the one unit root hypothesis.  
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Figure 5. Time Series Plot of Leverage Ratios of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc 
 
 
Note: time series plot of leverage ratios of a selected CDS reference entity: 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, where leverage ratio is defined as  
%RRNYDOXHRIGHEW%RRNYDOXHRISUHIHUUHGHTXLW\
0DUNHWYDOXHRIHTXLW\%RRNYDOXHRIGHEW%RRNYDOXHRISUHIHUUHGHTXLW\ 
 
 
Table 22. Unit Root Test for Leverage Ratios of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc 
  Leverage ratio Leverage ratio change 
Dickey-Fuller -3.2365* -10.5615*** 
P-value 0.08163 0.01 
Note: An Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for the null that x has a unit 
root.  
 
B5.4.8 The role of counterparty risk 
Pu et al. (2011) look at the system wide counterparty risk together with 
liquidity risk. A counterparty risk is a type of risk that a counterparty will not 
pay what it is obligated to do in a contract. For a CDS contract, a counterparty 
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risk can emerge from the failure of the protection buyer to pay CDS spreads, 
which makes it difficult for the protection seller to manage the risk and results 
in an increased cost of insuring against default. Stulz (2010) finds that 
counterparty risk has become an important factor for credit derivatives 
valuation. Pu et al. (2011) use the spread between three-month Libor and Repo 
rates as a measure of aggregate counterparty risk. In order to control for 
counterparty risk, I run the regression below: 
 ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ? ?൅ ߚ ? ?VORSH ? ൅ߚ ? ?6	3 ?൅ ߚ ? ?MXPS ?൅ ߚ ? ?FRXQWHU ?൅ ߝ ? 
where  ?FRXQWHU ? represents the change of counterparty risk. Table 23 reports 
the results. I find my liquidity measure ߛ  is strongly significant even after 
controlling for counterparty risk, which suggests that liquidity risk still 
determines the change of CDS default spreads after excluding possible 
counterparty risk premium. 
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Table 23. Multiple Regression Controlling for Counterparty Risk 
  AA- ~ AAA A- ~ A+ BBB- ~ BBB+ Below BBB- All 
NumOb 1483.47 1360.48 1258.76 1209.39 1287.38 
Coefficients 
     
Constant 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0006*** 0.0027** 0.001*** 
Leverage 0.0009 0.0117*** 0.0140*** 0.0579*** 0.024*** 
VIX 0.0011*** 0.0024*** 0.0030*** 0.0129*** 0.005*** 
10-year yield -0.0905*** -0.158*** -0.1511*** -0.2176 -0.1668** 
Jump 0.0189* -0.0044 0.0417** 0.0401 0.0273 
Gamma 0.0129*** 0.043*** 0.0544*** 0.2398*** 0.098*** 
S&P 500 return 0.0020* 0.005*** 0.0208*** 0.0542* 0.024*** 
10-year yield square 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0009* -0.0075 -0.0022 
Yield spread 0.0089*** 0.0151* 0.0106 0.0150 0.0129 
Libor Repo spread 0.0127* 0.0073 0.0322*** -0.0025 0.0150 
t-statistics 
     
Constant 6.8520 4.2313 3.4821 1.7841 2.5042 
Leverage 0.2152 4.7054 7.6637 4.8708 6.8239 
VIX 6.4961 7.8264 7.2426 2.8606 4.3096 
10-year yield -4.9706 -4.1652 -3.9676 -0.5959 -1.7059 
Jump 1.6504 -0.3353 1.9311 0.2799 0.7023 
Gamma 5.1924 8.3735 9.1955 4.3351 6.1891 
S&P 500 return 1.7069 2.3068 2.4023 1.8515 2.8167 
10-year yield square 0.5180 1.0067 -1.7705 -0.8920 -0.9834 
Yield spread 2.4244 1.7640 1.2800 0.1441 1.1786 
Libor Repo spread 1.4636 1.1679 5.3772 -0.2010 0.5430 
AdjR2 0.0444 0.0810 0.0930 0.0787 0.0829 
Note: coefficients and summary statistics for the regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ? ?൅ ߚ ? ?VORSH ?൅ ߚ ? ?6	3 ?൅ߚ ? ?MXPS ?൅ ߚ ? ?FRXQWHU ?൅ ߝ ?, where ߚ ? is an intercept,  ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ?, ݎ ? ?, VORSH ?,  ?6	3 ?, MXPS ?,  ?FRXQWHU ? represents the change in 
CDS spread, leverage ratio, risk-free rate, volatility and liquidity, the 
difference between the long-term (10-year) and short-term (2-year) risk-free 
rate, the return of the S&P 500, the proxy for jumps in firm value and the 
counterparty risk, respectively, at t. Explanatory variables in the first column 
of are the change in the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year Treasury yield, jump of 
LVVXLQJILUP¶VYDOXHߛ, S&P 500 index return, square of 10-year yield, spread 
between 10-year and 2-year yield, spread between 3-month Libor and Repo 
rate. NumOb represents the average number of observations. The reported 
coefficients are averages using all entities in a given rating class. The t-
statistics in brackets are computed based on the method in Collin-Dufresne et 
al. (2001) ³´ ³´ ³´ UHSUHVHQW   DQG  VLJQLILFDQFH OHYHO
respectively. The last row of each panel reports the adjusted R2. 
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B5.4.9 Liquidity shocks against number of quotes  
 It is useful to investigate whether my liquidity measure captures the 
characteristics of liquidity of a CDS contract. One way to gauge the latter is the 
number of quotes, which reflects how many quotes a CDS contract has had 
provided by vendors in CDS markets. Intuitively, a CDS is more liquid if there 
are more vendors willing to provide quotes and it has consequently a larger 
number of quotes. 
 Analogous to Liu (2006), I first check whether liquidity is priced in 
&'6VSUHDGVE\HVWLPDWLQJWKHOLTXLGLW\VHQVLWLYLW\ȕIRUHDFK&'6DV 
 ?  ܵ?ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ?/ ?൅ ߝ ? 
where ܵ ? is the CDS spread, / ? is the aggregate liquidity level at date t. My 
specification in the above equation implicitly assumes that CDS spread is 
mainly driven by liquidity and is, therefore, a strong assumption. Nevertheless, 
it is good for illustrative purposes. Table 24 reports the univariate regression 
results. The strongly significant coefficients for both investment-grade and 
non-investment-grade suggest that the aggregate liquidity L is priced in. 
 
Table 24. Univariate Liquidity Shock Regression 
 
AA- ~ 
AAA A- ~ A+ 
BBB- ~ 
BBB+ 
Below BBB- (Non-
investment) Investment All 
NumOb 1483.47 1360.48 1258.76 1209.39 1367.57 1287.38 
Coefficient
s       
Constant 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0008*** 0.0032** 0.0006*** 0.0013*** 
 
(7.9088) (5.3943) (4.2376) (2.1454) (5.2351) (3.0689) 
Gamma 0.0032*** 0.0112*** 0.0299*** 0.0884*** 0.0207*** 0.0386*** 
 
(2.5607) (4.3960) (3.2390) (2.9108) (4.0088) (4.2671) 
AdjR2 0.0024 0.0036 0.0040 0.0103 0.0037 0.0054 
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I WKHQUHJUHVV&'6OLTXLGLW\ȕRQWKHQXPEHURITXRWHVWRH[DPLQHWKHLU
relationship 
ߚ ?ൌ ߙ ?൅ ߙ ?ݍ ?൅ ߝ ? 
where ߚ ? and ݍ ? DUHWKHOLTXLGLW\VHQVLWLYLW\ȕDQGWKHQXPEHURITXRWHVIRUWKH
ith CDS. The significant negative coefficient for q reported in Table 25 is 
expected, suggesting that the liquidity sensitivity is smaller for the CDS with 
larger number of quotes, and vice versa. In other words, the shock of aggregate 
liquidity on the spreads of a CDS becomes less if it has a larger number of 
quotes. 
Table 25. Liquidity Sensitivity against Number of Quotes 
Constant 0.1429*** 
 
(3.4420) 
Quotes -0.0001** 
 
(-2.5720) 
AdjR2 0.0228 
 
 Furthermore, I rank all CDSs to four quantiles by the number of quotes, 
the 1st quantile group has the smallest number of quotes, and the 4th quantile 
group has the largest number of quotes. Then I HVWLPDWHWKHDYHUDJHOLTXLGLW\ȕ
IRUHDFKJURXSDQGWHVWWKHQXOOK\SRWKHVLVWKDWWKHLUOLTXLGLW\ȕLVHTXDOLQ
mean. 
Table 26. Quantile Group Based on Number of Quotes 
Quote  group Mean liquidity beta Equal mean test 
1st Quantile 0.0706 2.9664*** 
4th Quantile 0.0165 
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As shown in Table 26, the 1st Quantile group is much more sensitive to 
the aggregate liquidity shock by having an over four-times bigger liquidity 
beta than the 4th Quantile group. In addition, the equal mean test is strongly 
rejected. 
 All tests above suggest that liquidity sensitivity is larger in my sample 
for CDS contracts with lower number of quotes, suggesting the good economic 
sense of my liquidity measure. 
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Chapter B6. Conclusion 
In this study I investigate as determinants of the changes in CDS 
spreads, firm leverage, volatility, risk-free interest rate and liquidity. By 
regressing the changes in daily CDS quotes from January, 2004 to June, 2010 
on the changes in proxies of these possible determinants, I find that all four are 
statistically significant and time-varying, robust to the use of different proxies 
for liquidity under different methodologies: a dummy-variable pooling 
regression and a regime switching regression model. Among the four 
determinants, the effects of liquidity shock on CDS spreads differ significantly 
across rating groups when the CDS market is tranquil but when it is turbulent 
the effects become similar, regardless of credit rating. In other words, the 
impact of the liquidity determinant on the movement of the CDS spread for 
³VDIH´VHFXULWLHVLVDVVWURQJDVWKDWIRU³GDQJHURXV´VHFXULWLHVGXULQJYRODWLOH
periods. 
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Appendix B.A: HDPLOWRQ¶V Markov Two-regime 
Switching Model Estimation 
Since +DPLOWRQ¶VMarkov regime switching model is standard, 
in this section I briefly review the estimation method of a two-regime model - 
for detail refer to Hamilton (1989) and Hamilton (1994). Assuming a state 
variable st determines which regime it is at time t, and the probability of a 
transition or a stay in the same regime at time t+1 is only decided by the state 
at time t. Let the Markov chain be represented by a vector ߱ with ith element 
being one if ݏ ?ൌ ݅  and zero otherwise. Since the Markov chain is 
unobservable, we can only assign a probability of being in each regime. 
Denote the Markov switching probability as matrix p with elements: 
݌ ? ?ൌ 3UREሺݏ ?ൌ  ?ȁݏ ? ? ?ൌ  ?ሻ ݌ ? ?ൌ 3UREሺݏ ?ൌ  ?ȁݏ ? ? ?ൌ  ?ሻ 
So the conditional expectation of ߱ ? ? ? given all information up to t is 
calculated as 
Ƞሺ߱ ? ? ?ȁ߱ ?ሻ ൌ ݌߱ ?. 
Suppose the Markov regime switching regression equation is 
ݕ ?ൌ ߚ ?ݔ ?൅ ߝ ?ǡ ? 
Under the Gaussian assumption of ߝ ?ǡ ?, the conditional densities is 
݂ሺݕ ?ȁݏ ? ? ?ǡ ݔ ?ǡ ܫ ? ? ?Ǣ ߠሻ ൌ  ? ? ?ߨߪ ?ሼെ ሺݕ ?െ ߚ ?ݔ ?ሻ ? ?ߪ ? ? ሽ 
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where ߠ ൌ ሺ݌ǡ ߚ ?ǡ ߪ ?ሻ is a parameter set to be estimated, ܫ ? ? ? is an information 
set up to time t-1. Multiplying the conditional densities by the conditional 
expectation of ߱ ? yields the joint density ݂ሺݕ ?ǡ ݏ ?ǡ ݏ ? ? ?ȁݔ ?ǡ ܫ ? ? ?Ǣ ߠሻ ൌ ݂ሺݕ ?ȁݏ ? ? ?ǡ ݔ ?ǡ ܫ ? ? ?Ǣ ߠሻ ൈ 3UREሺݏ ?ǡ ݏ ? ? ?ሻ 
Finally we can apply a maximum log likelihood method to estimate ߠ under 
the constraint that probabilities sum to one. 
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Appendix B.B: Tables 
Appendix Table 27. Multiple OLS and Dummy-variable Pooling Regression 
for BBB- ~ BBB+ Rated CDS 
  Difference Level 
Panel A 
  
Coefficients 
  
Constant 0.0006*** 0.6368*** 
  (3.8679) (3.2440) 
Leverage 0.0146*** 0.0323*** 
  (8.0600) (7.5722) 
VIX 0.0036*** 0.0271*** 
  (10.0231) (9.1773) 
10-year yield -0.0705*** -0.2842*** 
  (-12.4987) (-8.0528) 
Gamma 0.0138*** 0.1818** 
  (2.3062) (1.7832) 
AdjR2 0.0836 0.7639 
Panel B Coefficients Pr(>F) 
Constant 0.0000 
 
Leverage 0.0126*** 0.0000 
VIX 0.0031*** 0.0000 
10-year yield -0.0579*** 0.0000 
Gamma -0.0006* 0.0904 
Crisis 0.0013*** 0.0000 
Leverage*Crisis 0.0008 0.1304 
VIX*Crisis -0.0002 0.3431 
10-year yield*Crisis -0.0033 0.4239 
Gamma*Crisis 0.0032** 0.0333 
AdjR2 0.0772   
Note: Panel A reports the results for the multiple OLS regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/ ?൅ ߝ ?, where ߚ ? is an intercept,  ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ? represents the change in CDS spread, leverage ratio, 
risk-free rate, volatility anGOLTXLGLW\UHVSHFWLYHO\&ROXPQ³GLIIHUHQFH´LVIRU
WKH FKDQJH RI &'6 VSUHDGV DQG FROXPQ ³OHYHO´ LV IRU WKH &'6 VSUHDGV
Explanatory variables in the first column of panel A are the change in the 
leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year treasury yield, and ߛ. The associated t-statistics 
are shown in brackets. Panel B presents the results for the pooling regression  ?  ܵ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ? ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ? ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ? ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ? ?൅ ߜ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?ݎ ?ܥ ൅ߜ ? ?92/ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?/(9 ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?ܮ ?ܥ ൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept,  ?  ܵ?,  ?/(9 ?,  ?ݎ ?,  ?92/ ?,  ?/ ? represents the change in CDS spread, leverage ratio, 
risk-free rate, volatility and liquidity, respectively. C is a dummy variable for 
crisis, with C=1 for sample dates during the crisis, and C=0 otherwise.. 
Explanatory variables in the first column are the change in the leverage ratio, 
VIX, 10-year treasury yield, ߛ, crisis dummy, its interaction with the leverage 
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ratio, VIX, 10-year treasury yield and ߛ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQW
and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 28. Multiple OLS Regression for CDS Spreads Level  
 
AA- ~ AAA A- ~ A+ BBB- ~ BBB+ Below BBB- (Non-investment) Investment All 
NumOb 1484.47 1361.48 1259.76 1210.39 1367.57 1287.38 
Panel A 
      
Coefficients 
      
Constant 0.5611*** 0.5492*** 0.7124*** -2.3793 0.6392*** -0.1591 
 
(13.8977) (4.1347) (4.0191) (-1.0203) (5.8998) (-0.2549) 
Leverage 0.0109** 0.0222*** 0.0330*** 0.1715*** 0.0272*** 0.0653*** 
 
(2.1460) (4.9310) (7.4613) (3.8171) (9.0460) (5.1450) 
VIX 0.0094*** 0.0170*** 0.0266*** 0.1100*** 0.0216*** 0.0450*** 
 
(10.3009) (9.6091) (9.1374) (6.2432) (12.2110) (8.2893) 
10-year yield -0.1515*** -0.2172*** -0.3018*** -0.8300*** -0.2577*** -0.4091*** 
 
(-20.7386) (-9.7149) (-10.0382) (-5.2263) (-13.7700) (-8.7273) 
Gamma 0.0054* 0.0033 0.2196** 0.4463*** 0.1213** 0.2073*** 
 
(1.6890) (0.4339) (1.8082) (2.8171) (1.8225) (3.1928) 
AdjR2 0.8857 0.8175 0.7637 0.7937 0.7939 0.7939 
Panel B: controlling variables 
      
Coefficients 
      
Constant 0.7050*** 0.9236*** 1.2435*** 1.4807 1.0795*** 1.1856*** 
 
(15.9350) (8.1394) (6.1626) (1.0117) (9.1232) (3.0039) 
Leverage 0.0149*** 0.0287*** 0.0345*** 0.1572*** 0.0307*** 0.0642*** 
 
(3.5974) (6.0774) (7.9699) (4.3628) (10.3134) (6.1902) 
VIX 0.0113*** 0.0193*** 0.0312*** 0.1348*** 0.0251*** 0.0541*** 
 
(11.9827) (9.5321) (9.8128) (5.7655) (12.8373) (7.6853) 
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10-year yield -0.1598*** -0.2471*** -0.3367*** -1.0050*** -0.2886*** -0.4781*** 
 
(-14.1471) (-10.5430) (-9.0330) (-4.7196) (-12.8425) (-7.7327) 
Jump 0.5410*** 1.1767*** 1.6182*** 6.5196*** 1.3637*** 2.7272*** 
 
(7.0404) (6.1857) (5.8875) (3.8601) (8.1659) (5.6410) 
Gamma 0.0032 -0.0074 0.2134** 0.5152*** 0.1138** 0.2200*** 
 
(0.9699) (-1.3076) (1.7582) (2.7386) (1.7111) (3.1211) 
S&P 500 return -0.0014*** -0.0013* -0.0032*** 0.0245** -0.0023*** 0.0048* 
 
(-3.2132) (-1.3467) (-2.3892) (1.9907) (-2.8742) (1.4112) 
10-year yield square -0.0088*** -0.0182*** -0.0308*** -0.2025*** -0.0243*** -0.0714*** 
 
(-5.3582) (-8.4272) (-6.6620) (-6.0817) (-8.9936) (-6.9313) 
Yield spread -0.0197*** -0.0896*** -0.0706*** -0.6448*** -0.0734*** -0.2245*** 
 
(-2.5260) (-6.1100) (-5.0571) (-46.7730) (-7.6102) (-3.4756) 
AdjR2 0.9016 0.8488 0.8017 0.8282 0.8276 0.8277 
Note: NumOb represents the average number of observations. Panel A reports the coefficients and summary statistics for the regression ܵ ?ൌߚ ?൅ ߚ ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ?/ ?൅ ߝ ?, and panel B is for regression ܵ ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ?/ ?൅ ߚ ?ݎ ? ?൅ ߚ ?VORSH ?൅ߚ ?6	3 ?൅ ߚ ?MXPS ?൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept,ܵ ?, /(9 ?, ݎ ?, 92/ ?, / ?, ݎ ? ?, VORSH ?,  ?6	3 ?, MXPS ? represents the CDS spread, leverage ratio, 
risk-free rate, volatility and liquidity, the difference between the long-term (10-year) and short-term (2-year) risk-free rate; the return of the S&P 
500 and the proxy for jumps in firm value, respectively, at t. Explanatory variables in the first column of panel A are the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-
year treasury yield, andߛ; and in panel B are the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year Treasury yiHOGMXPSRILVVXLQJILUP¶VYDOXHߛ, S&P 500 index 
return, square of 10-year yield and spread between 10-year and 2-year yield.  The reported coefficients are averages using all entities in a given 
rating class. The t-statistics shown in brackets are computed based on the method in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)³´³´³´UHSUHVHQW
10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. The last row of each panel reports the adjusted R2.  
Part B                                                                                                                             Appendix 
98 
 
Appendix Table 29. Pooling Regression for CDS Spreads Level with Crisis as a Dummy Variable 
 
AA- ~ AAA 
 
A- ~ A+ 
 
BBB- ~ BBB+ 
 
Below BBB- (Non-investment) Investment 
 
All 
 
 
Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) 
Constant 0.4268 
 
0.4862 
 
0.2297 
 
1.1789 
 
0.260380983 
 
-0.6331 
 
Leverage 0.0072*** 0.0000 0.0098*** 0.0000 0.0214*** 0.0000 0.0909*** 0.0000 0.0196*** 0.0000 0.0759*** 0.0000 
VIX 0.0068*** 0.0000 0.0115*** 0.0000 0.0195*** 0.0000 0.0775*** 0.0000 0.0137*** 0.0000 0.0288*** 0.0000 
10-year yield -0.1008*** 0.0000 -0.1200*** 0.0000 -0.0923*** 0.0000 -0.7022*** 0.0000 -0.0916*** 0.0000 -0.1443*** 0.0000 
Gamma 0.0124*** 0.0000 0.0259*** 0.0000 0.0302*** 0.0000 0.1628*** 0.0000 0.0267*** 0.0000 0.0317** 0.0465 
Crisis 0.3749*** 0.0000 0.7974*** 0.0000 1.1920*** 0.0000 -0.7968*** 0.0000 1.0308*** 0.0000 1.4947*** 0.0000 
Leverage*Crisis 0.0043*** 0.0000 0.0156*** 0.0000 0.0237*** 0.0000 0.0889*** 0.0000 0.0216*** 0.0000 0.0497*** 0.0000 
VIX*Crisis 0.0002 0.3996 0.0017*** 0.0006 -0.0039*** 0.0000 -0.0176*** 0.0002 -0.0011** 0.0117 -0.0221*** 0.0000 
10-year yield*Crisis -0.0946*** 0.0000 -0.2532*** 0.0000 -0.3503*** 0.0000 -0.5723*** 0.0000 -0.3101*** 0.0000 -0.5011*** 0.0000 
Gamma*Crisis 0.0053*** 0.0000 -0.0226*** 0.0000 -0.0503*** 0.0000 -0.0406** 0.0270 -0.0388** 0.0000 -0.0813*** 0.0000 
AdjR2 0.8509 
 
0.5390 
 
0.4843 
 
0.5312 
 
0.5157 
 
0.5401 
 
Note: Coefficients and associated partial F-test statistics for the regression ܵ ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?൅ ߜ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ?ݎ ?ܥ ൅ߜ ?92/ ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ?/(9 ?ܥ ൅ ߜ ? ?ܥ ൅ ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept,ܵ ?, /(9 ?, ݎ ?, 92/ ?, / ? represents the CDS spread, leverage ratio, risk-free rate, 
volatility and liquidity, respectively. C is a dummy variable for crisis, with C=1 for sample dates during the crisis, and C=0 otherwise. 
Explanatory variables in the first column are the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year treasury yield, ߛ, crisis dummy, its interaction with the leverage 
ratio, VIX, 10-year Treasury yield and ߛ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\7KHODVWURZUHSRUWVWKH
adjusted R2. 
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Appendix Table 30. Pooling Regression for CDS Spreads Level with Credit 
Rating as a Dummy Variable  
  
Crisis period   Normal period   
  
Coefficients Pr(>F) Coefficients Pr(>F) 
Constant 0.7728 
 
0.8684 
 
Leverage 0.1765*** 0.0000 0.0655*** 0.0000 
VIX 0.0541*** 0.0000 0.0872*** 0.0000 
10-year yield -1.3012*** 0.0000 -0.4722*** 0.0000 
Gamma 0.1280*** 0.0000 0.1374*** 0.0000 
AA 0.1665*** 0.0000 -0.4447*** 0.0000 
A 0.2084 
 
-0.4371 
 
BBB 0.7882 
 
-0.8205 
 
Leverage*AA -0.1644*** 0.0000 -0.0585*** 0.0000 
Leverage*A -0.1348 
 
-0.0544 
 
Leverage*BBB -0.1156 
 
-0.0413 
 
VIX*AA -0.0468*** 0.0000 -0.0805*** 0.0000 
VIX*A -0.0422 
 
-0.0754 
 
VIX*BBB -0.0392 
 
-0.0661 
 
10-year yield*AA 1.0697*** 0.0000 0.3731*** 0.0000 
10-year yield*A 0.9217 
 
0.3586 
 
10-year yield*BBB 0.7142 
 
0.4001 
 
Gamma*AA -0.1137*** 0.0000 -0.1247*** 0.0000 
Gamma*A -0.1018 
 
-0.1093 
 
Gamma*BBB -0.1527 
 
-0.1007 
 
AdjR2 0.6443   0.7210   
Note: Coefficients and associated partial F-test statistics for the regression ܵ ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ?ݎ ?൅ ߚ ?92/ ?൅ ߚ ?/(9 ?൅ ߚ ? ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?ݎ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?92/ ?ܴ ?൅ߜ ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ?/(9 ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ ߜ ? ? ?ܴ ?൅ߝ ?. Where ߚ ? is an intercept,ܵ ?, /(9 ?, ݎ ?, 92/ ?, / ? represents the CDS spread, 
leverage ratio, risk-free rate, volatility and liquidity, respectively. R1, R2 and R3 
indicating credit rating dummy for credit rating classes: R1=1 for any AA- ~ 
AAA rated CDS, R2=1 for any A- ~ A+ rated CDS, R3=1 for any BBB- ~ 
BBB+ rated CDS, and zero otherwise. Explanatory variables in the first 
column are the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year Treasury yield, ߛ, credit rating 
dummy variables, their interaction with the leverage ratio, VIX, 10-year 
treasury yield and ߛ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFH
level, respectively. The last row reports the adjusted R2. 
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Appendix B.C: Figures 
Appendix Figure 6. Time Series Liquidity Measure for BBB- ~ BBB+ Rated 
CDS 
 
Note: Aggregate ߛ liquidity measure constructed with all BBB- ~ BBB+ rated 
CDS spreads. 
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Abstract C 
I value sovereign CDS (credit default swap) spreads with observable 
macroeconomic variables and a latent variable under a multifactor affine 
framework, which allows macro variables to affect the dynamics of the term 
structure of sovereign credit risk by imposing no-arbitrage assumptions. 
Studying sovereign CDS spreads of 22 countries, I find that two macro factors 
(inflation and real output) are able to explain on average 23.06% of the 
variation of spreads, while the US financial variables explain 46.62% of the 
latent factor that cannot be captured by macro factors, consistent with the view 
WKDW VRYHUHLJQ PDUNHWV DUH LPSDFWHG E\ VSLOORYHUV IURP WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶
economy.  I further find that incorporating macro factors in a sovereign CDS 
term structure model improves the out-of-sample performance. 
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Chapter C1. Introduction 
 Given the increasing size and volatility of the sovereign debt market, 
H[SODLQLQJDVRYHUHLJQFRXQWU\¶VFUHGLWGHIDXOW WHUPVWUXFWXUHLV LPSRUWDQWIRr 
both credit derivative pricing and investment decisions. Recent rapid widening 
RI VRYHUHLJQ&'6VSUHDGV DFFRPSDQ\LQJ WKHGRZQJUDGHRIPDQ\FRXQWULHV¶
sovereign credit ratings, increases concern about the determinants of CDS 
spreads and their valuation. This chapter contributes to the literature by 
proposing a no-arbitrage pricing model for a full term structure of sovereign 
CDSs, with risk factors including inflation and real output extracted directly 
from macroeconomic variables, and applying the model to an extensive data 
set of 22 countries. My model gives several advantages over regression-based 
empirical approaches. First, it allows analysis of the entire term structure of 
sovereign credit spreads. Second, pricing macroeconomic variables in the 
model makes possible a direct comparison of the shocks of macroeconomic 
variables on sovereign CDSs with different maturities. Third, it is subject to 
no-arbitrage restrictions and retains tractability by employing a multifactor 
affine structure. Therefore, the contributions of the chapter are both 
methodological and empirical. 
I study sovereign credit risk by using a monthly data set of sovereign 
CDS contracts of 22 developed and emerging countries from January 2004 to 
Sep 2010. A CDS is a contract in which the buyer of protection makes a series 
of payments (often referred to as CDS spreads) to the protection seller and, in 
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exchange, receives a payoff if a default event 20  occurs. Sovereign CDS 
contracts with fixed maturity points between 1 and 10 years are actively traded.  
The availability of the full term structure of sovereign CDS spreads allows me 
to infer default information for different expiration dates21.  
  Literature on sovereign credit risk is categorized under two 
methodologies: regression and no-arbitrage models.  A model of the first type 
runs a regression of credit default spreads of a certain maturity (usually five 
years) on several macroeconomic or financial variables and examines the 
significance and magnitudes of those variables in explaining the spreads (see, 
for example, Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010, Longstaff et al., 2011). A model of 
the second type uses latent factor(s) to value CDS contracts in a risk-neutral 
world and explains credit default term structure movements based on a no-
arbitrage argument (see, for example, Duffie, et al., 2003, Houweling and 
Vorst, 2005, Pan and Singleton 2008).  Regression models yield results that 
depend on the choices of the explanatory variables as well as on choice of 
maturity and, furthermore, there is no obvious way of generating coefficient 
                                                          
20
 A default event such as failure to pay, restructuring or rescheduling of debt, 
credit event repudiation, moratorium and acceleration. 
21
 Pan and Singleton (2008) note that, unlike the corporate CDS market where 
a large majority of trading is on 5-year contracts, the sovereign CDS market 
has a much more uniform trading volume across maturities. Longstaff et al. 
(2011) note that the liquidity and bid-ask spreads of sovereign CDS contracts 
with different maturities are reasonably similar and so the CDS term structure 
is unlikely to be affected by differential liquidity across maturities. 
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estimates for maturities other than the given year applied in the regression. In 
contrast, no-arbitrage models assume the existence of unobservable latent 
factors that drive the dynamics of default and are, therefore, able to capture all 
maturities within one system.  However, interpretations of the latent factors are 
then less intuitive. Although there are studies to interpret the meanings of those 
extracted latent factors, latent-factor models do not price macroeconomic 
variables directly. For instance, Pan and Singleton (2008) capture most of the 
variation in the term structure of sovereign CDS spreads with a single latent 
factor model, and then in a following regression find the associated risk 
premiums co-vary with several economic and financial measures. 
In this study I combine the approaches, adopting a no-arbitrage pricing 
model for sovereign CDS contracts with both macroeconomic and latent 
variables. Together with latent variables that contribute to the unexplained 
spreads variation by macroeconomic variables, I value CDS contracts under a 
multifactor affine framework. This reduced-form setting allows me to conduct 
a no-arbitrage analysis on macroeconomic determinants of the term structure 
of sovereign default spreads. I incorporate the observed macroeconomic 
variables into the pricing kernel of CDS spreads. There are many 
macroeconomic variables available with each containing an aspect of the 
economy; it is, therefore, unrealistic to include all of them in one model. To be 
parsimonious, I extract two fundamental macro risk factors using a Kalman 
filter technique to represent the macroeconomy of a country: inflation and real 
output. For comparison, Ang and Piazzesi (2003) find inflation and economic 
growth factors strongly impact Treasury bond prices and the dynamics of the 
yield curve, Wu and Zhang (2008) link inflation and real output factors to the 
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US Treasury yields and corporate bond spreads, finding evidence that both 
factors have strong effects on the treasury yield and corporate bond spread 
term structures. A similar Kalman filter factor extraction technique is applied 
by Aruoba and Diebold (2010) to monitor US macroeconomic activity in real-
time. 
 My analysis across 22 countries reveals considerable differences. The 
macroeconomic factors can explain as much as 46.3% of the CDS spreads 
variation for Japan but as little as 1.8% for Poland. The macro factors have 
long-lasting effects on the CDS spreads, on average, they explain 21.03%, 
22.18%, 23.12%, 24.32% and 24.65% of the variation of 1-, 2-, 3-, 5- and 10-
year CDS spreads. Looking for spillover effects from the United States to other 
regions of the World, I regress the latent factor on three US variables: the 
CBOE VIX option volatility index, the yield spread between the Moody's 30-
year US Baa corporate bond and the 6-month US Treasury bill, and the S&P 
500 return. I find these three variables together are able to explain as much as 
72.9% of the variation of the latent series for Israel but as little as 12.7% for 
Greece. The spillover effect is stronger in stress periods than in normal periods. 
Furthermore, I show that a model with macroeconomic and latent variables 
outperforms a model with only latent variables. I conduct an out-of-sample 
analysis in order to relieve the possible over-fitting concern caused by an 
addition of parameters. On average the model with additional macro factors 
does a better job by generating a smaller out-of-sample RMSE (root mean 
square error) than the latent-only model for 14 out of 22 countries, with an 
averaged cross-country 109 bps RMSE for the former model against 120 bps 
RMSE for the later. The improvement is more pronounced in normal 
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circumstances before the crisis, suggesting that macro factors become less 
significant in explaining sovereign credit spreads after the financial crisis. 
 The chapter is organized as follows. Chapter C2 briefly reviews the 
literature on determinants of sovereign CDS spread. Chapter C3 presents the 
pricing models. Chapter C4 reports the data. The empirical results and 
discussion are presented in Chapter C5, followed by the conclusion in Chapter 
C6. 
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Chapter C2. Determinants of Sovereign CDS Spread 
Before presenting the pricing model, I review the literature on the 
determinants of sovereign CDS spreads. Evidence in the literature on the 
magnitude of determinants is mixed. Several empirical studies focus on 
domestic inflation or real output as determinants of sovereign credit spreads; 
for H[DPSOH0LQVKRZVWKDWDFRXQWU\¶VPDFURHFRQRPLFIXQGDPHQWDOV
including domestic inflation rate determine the yield spread in emerging 
markets; Eichengreen and Mody (2000) find that a few fundamental 
macroeconomic indicators, including inflation, explain a fraction of spreads on 
emerging-market debt; Block and Vaaler (2004), together with Mora (2006) 
and Hill et al. (2010), find that inflation and real output are significant 
determinants of credit rating level: rating agencies tend to accord higher ratings 
to countries with lower inflation, resulting in smaller sovereign spreads; 
Weigel and Gemmill (2006), investigating the creditworthiness of Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, find that country-specific variables explain the 
variance of yield spreads; Remolona et al. (2008) use a dynamic sovereign 
CDS panel data model and find that country-specific fundamentals including 
inflation and real output related variables drive sovereign risk. Aizenman et al. 
(2013) find macroeconomic factors, especially the inflation factor, are 
statistically significant and economically important determinants of market-
based sovereign risk, after an analysis on sixty countries. 
Besides inflation and real output related variables, there are studies 
finding other determinants contributing to the movement of sovereign credit 
spreads. Edwards (1984) finds a close relationship between foreign borrowing 
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DQG D FRXQWU\¶V GHIDXOW ULVN %HUJ DQG 6DFKV  FRQFOXGH WKDW WKH WUDGH
regime and the degree of income inequality are significant predictors of 
sovereign default probability; Boehmer and Megginson (1990) find that 
individual country-specific debt provisions impact debt prices; Duffie et al. 
(2003) study Russian yield spreads and find evidence that they respond to 
political events, foreign currency reserves and oil price; Zhang (2008) finds 
that Argentine sovereign risk is affected by the overall strength of the 
Argentine economy; Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010) investigate the effects of 
macroeconomic fundamentals on emerging market sovereign credit spreads 
and find the volatility of terms of trade has a significant effect.  
Several influential papers on global factors other than the above 
mentioned domestic determinants include Arora and Cerisola (2001), Mauro et 
al. (2002), Geyer et al. (2004), Gande and Parsley (2005), Weigel and Gemmill 
(2006), Dailami et al. (2008), Pan and Singleton (2008), Longstaff et al. (2011), 
Mink and Haan (2013) and Grammatikos and Vermeulen (2012). In particular, 
Pan and Singleton (2008) apply a single latent factor model on a full term 
structure of CDS spreads with maturities of 1, 2, 3, 5 and 10 years for Mexico, 
Turkey and Korea. They find the credit spreads for these three countries are 
strongly related to the US VIX index. Longstaff et al. (2011) use five-year 
CDS data for 26 countries and find sovereign credit spreads are driven more by 
86PDFURHFRQRPLFIDFWRUVWKDQE\DFRXQWU\¶VORFDOPDUNHW 
  In sum, I conclude from the current literature review that inflation and 
real output of a country are two key determinants of its sovereign credit 
spreads, while other factors may also have mixed impacts on its sovereign 
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credit risk. In addition, evidence shows that common global factors mainly 
from U.S. market have shown stronger spillover effects recently than years ago.  
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Chapter C3. Pricing Sovereign CDS Contracts 
In regard to the roles of inflation, real output and other factors in 
determining sovereign CDS spreads reviewed in section 2, in this section I 
propose a no-arbitrage pricing model for sovereign CDS contracts. I first 
extract two macro factors to represent the aggregate macroeconomy, namely, 
inflation and real output. Then I develop a no-arbitrage pricing model together 
with latent factors for the term structure of CDS spreads. Here, latent factors 
represent those factors that cannot be captured by the two macro factors which 
have been investigated in literature. 
C3.1 Macroeconomic variables 
I extract the two macro factors from eight macroeconomic series, 
including four inflation-related series and four output-related series. The four 
inflation-related series are the consumer price index (CPI), the producer price 
index (PPI), the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator and the 
gross domestic production (GDP) deflator. The CPI is a measure of the 
average change over time in the prices paid by urban consumers for a market 
basket of consumer goods and services. The PPI measures average changes in 
prices received by domestic producers for their output. The PCE deflator is an 
indicator of the average increase in prices for all domestic personal 
consumption. The GDP deflator measures the price changes of all officially 
recognized final goods and services produced within a country. 
The four output-related series include the industrial production index 
(IPI), unemployment rate, the real PCE and the real GDP. The IPI measures 
real production output, which includes manufacturing, mining, and utilities. 
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Unemployment rate is an influential statistic and economic indicator meant to 
represent the prevalence of unemployment in the economy over the previous 
month, and is directly linked to output. In contrast with PCE and GDP, the real 
PCE and the real GDP are inflation-adjusted.  
 The PCE, GDP, real PCE and real GDP are at a quarterly frequency 
whereas all other series are available at a monthly frequency. I first convert the 
all four inflation (real output) related series into year-over-year percentage 
changes, then demean and standardize before extracting the inflation (real 
output) factor. For series with a quarterly frequency, the Kalman filter 
estimation method in the next section readily accommodates missing data. 
  
C3.2 Factors extraction 
Assuming a sufficient pricing model has n pricing factors: 2 macros 
and n-2 latent factors (n>2). Let X א ܴ ? be a vector of Markov process for the 
n factors, the dynamics process of X under the physical measure P is as follows: 
݀ܺ ?ൌ െ݇ܺ ?݀ݐ ൅ ݀  ܹ?                                                  (1) 
where  ܹ? is an independent standard Brownian motion vector, k is a n×n 
matrix with elements reflecting the dependence of ܺ ? on its previous value ܺ ? ? ?. Constrain the k matrix to be  
ۏێێێ
ۍ ݀ܺ ?ǡ ?݀ܺ ?ǡ ?ڮ݀ܺ ? ? ?ǡ ?݀ܺ ?ǡ ?ےۑۑ
ۑې ൌ െ ۏێێ
ێۍ݇ ? ?  ? ǥ  ?  ?݇ ? ?݇ ? ?  ? ǥ  ? ?  ? ڰ  ?  ? ? ǥ  ?  ݇? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ǥ  ?  ?  ݇?ǡ ?ےۑۑ
ۑې ۏێێێ
ۍ ܺ ?ǡ ?ܺ ?ǡ ?ڮܺ ? ? ?ǡ ?ܺ ?ǡ ?ےۑۑۑ
ې ݀ݐ ൅ ۏێێ
ێۍ ݀  ܹ?ǡ ?݀  ܹ?ǡ ?ڮ݀  ܹ? ? ?ǡ ?݀  ܹ?ǡ ?ےۑۑ
ۑې
      (2) 
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with ܺ ?ǡ ?ǡ ܺ ?ǡ ? being inflation and real output. Allow the inflation and real 
output factors to be correlated by setting a non-zero element ݇ ? ?, and all latent 
factors to be independent with the two macro factors by restricting other off-
diagonal elements to be zero. Thus, WRGD\¶V YDOXH RI WKH LQIODWLRQ factor 
depends only on its past value, value of the real output factor depends on the 
past value of the inflation factor and of itself, and value of the latent factors 
UHVSRQGV WR LWV RZQ SDVW YDOXH RQO\ 8VLQJ ,WR¶V /HPPD WKH VROXWLRQ RI
equation (2) has the form: 
ܺ ?ൌ ሺെ݇ ?ݐሻ  ܺ? ? ? ?൅ ׬ ሺെ݇ሺݐ െ ݏሻሻ݀  ܹ? ? ? ? ? ?             (3) 
where   is for matrix exponential,  ?ݐ ൌ  ?Ȁ ? ? denotes the monthly 
discrete time interval. 
Given the dynamic process in equation (1) and the independence 
assumption between the two macro factors and the latent factors, I can extract 
the macro factors Xm from the eight macroeconomic series  ܻ?ǡ ?, whereas in 
equation (1) and (2), ݀ܺ ?ǡ ?ൌ െ݇ ?ǡ ?ܺ ?ǡ ?݀ݐ ൅ ݀  ܹ?ǡ ?, ݉ ൌ  ?ǡ ? for inflation 
and real output factors. Impose a linear structure that: 
 ܻ?ൌ ܺ ?ǡ ?൅ ɂ ?                                                       (4) 
H is a 8×2 factor loading matrix to be estimated, ɂ ?ǡ ? is the error term 
uncorrelated with ܺ ?ǡ ?. To improve identification, constrain the inflation factor 
to have non-zero loadings only on the four inflation-related series; the real 
output factor to have non-zero loadings only on the four output related series. 
 Treating the dynamic process of ܺ ?ǡ ? and equation (4) as the state and 
measurement equations, and assuming ɂ ?ǡ ? is normally distributed, I can apply 
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the classic Kalman filter and maximum log likelihood method to estimate 
parameters for matrix ݇ ?ǡ ? and H, and to extract the two factor series, where 
the log-likelihood function is: ݈ ?ൌ െ  ݊?ሺ ?ߨሻ െ  ? ?ሺȁሺ߸ ?ෞሻȁሻ െ  ? ?ߝ ?ǡ ?7 ሺ߸ ?ෞሻ ? ?ɂ ?ǡ ? 
where n is the number of observations, ߸ ?ෞ is the time-(t-1) forecasts of time-t 
values of the measurement series, ሺ߸ ?ෞሻ  is the covariance matrix of the 
forecasts. For details, please refer to Aruoba and Diebold (2010). 
 
C3.3 No-arbitrage pricing model 
To value CDS spreads under the equivalent martingale measure Q, I 
allow the dynamics for the n factors as22 
݀ܺ ?ൌ ݇ ?ሺߠ ?െ ܺ ?ሻ݀ݐ ൅ ݀  ܹ? ?                                             (5) 
The different terms ߠ ?and ݇ ? between the equation (1) and (5) incorporate the 
market price of risk associated with  ܹ? ?, an independent standard Brownian 
motion vector under measure Q. For parsimony and consistence with the 
dependence structure under the physical measure in equation (2), I restrain ݇ ? 
to be the following matrix 
                                                          
22
 It is equivalent to assume the market price of risk as ɀ ?൅ ɀ ? ?, with  ?Ʌ ?ൌ െɀ ? and  ?ൌ  ൅ ɀ ?. 
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ۏێێ
ێێۍ݇ ? ?
 ?  ? ǥ  ?  ?݇ ? ? ? ݇ ? ? ?  ? ǥ  ? ?  ? ڰ  ?  ? ? ǥ  ?  ݇? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?  ? ? ǥ  ?  ?  ݇?ǡ ? ? ےۑۑ
ۑۑې
. 
The solution of equation (5) becomes: 
ܺ ?ൌ െන ሺݐ െ ݏሻߛ ?݀ݏ ? ? ? ? ? ൅ ሺെ݇ ? ?ݐሻ ܺ ? ? ? ? ൅׬ ሺെ݇ ?ሺݐ െ ݏሻሻ݀  ܹ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                                  (6) 
where ߛ ?ൌ െ݇ ?ߠ ?. 
 Let ߸ represent the CDS spread that is paid continuously, the present 
value of the premium leg of a CDS can be written under the Q measure as ܲሺ߸ǡ  ?ǡ ሻܶ ൌ Ƞ ?ቂԅ׬  ቀെ׬ ሺݎ ?൅ ߣ ?ሻ݀ݏ ? ? ቁ݀ݐ ? ? ቃ                     (7) 
where r is the risk-free rate and ߣ is the credit spread. Similarly, if a credit 
event occurs then the protection seller pays the buyer par value and, in return, 
receives a bond issued by the same reference entity23.  The present value of the 
protection leg of a CDS under the Q measure is ܴܲሺݓǡ  ?ǡ ሻܶ ൌ Ƞ ?ቂݓ ׬ ߣ ? ? ?  ቀെ׬ ሺݎ ?൅ ߣ ?ሻ ? ? ݀ݏቁ ݀ݐቃ              (8) 
with w being the loss rate of the par value in the event of default24. Equating 
the values of both legs returns the CDS spread 
                                                          
23
 Or, in the cash settlement case, the protection seller pays the buyer the cash 
difference between par value and the market price of the bond.  
24
 As in Pan and Singleton (2008), Longstaff et al (2011), I assume that the loss 
rate w is 0.75 throughout the whole study. 
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߸ ൌ  ?్ቂ ?׬ ఒ೟೅బ  ? ? ?ቀ ?׬ ሺ ?ೞ ?ఒೞሻ೟బ  ? ?ቁ ? ?ቃ ?్ቂ׬  ? ? ?ቀ ?׬ ሺ ?ೞ ?ఒೞሻ ? ?೟బ ቁ ? ?೅బ ቃ                                (9) 
 Without loss of generality, assume that the risk-free rate is independent 
from default spread, such that I do not need to specify the risk-neutral 
dynamics of the risk-free rate in order to solve equation (9). The independence 
assumption is made in many papers; for example by Longstaff et al. (2005), 
Pan and Singleton (2008). Let the value of a risk-free zero-coupon bond with 
maturity T be given by ܦሺܶሻ ൌ Ƞ ?ቂ ቀെ׬ ݎ ? ? ? ݀ݐቁቃ                                  (10) 
Equation (10) can be recast as  
߸ ൌ  ?్ቂ ?׬ ఒ೟೅బ  ? ? ?ቀ ?׬ ఒೞ೟బ  ? ?ቁ ?ሺ ?ሻ ? ?ቃ ?్ቂ׬  ? ? ?ቀ ?׬ ఒೞ ? ?೟బ ቁ ?ሺ ?ሻ ? ?೅బ ቃ                                  (11) 
Let the instantaneous credit spread for each country be an affine 
function of the pricing factors ߣሺܺ ?ሻ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ7ܺ ?                                                                   (12) 
Given the dynamic process in equation (5) and the affine structure in equation 
(12), standard results in Duffie et al. (2000) make it straightforward to derive 
closed-form solutions.  Appendix C.B shows the value of the denominator is  
׬ ൫ܽ&'6 ൅ ܾ&'67ܺ ?൯ܦሺݐሻ݀ݐ ? ?                                            (13) 
with  ܽ ? ? ?ǡ ܾ ? ? ? being solutions to the following ODEs: ܽ ? ? ?ᇱ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ ? ? ?7ߛ ?െ  ? ?ܾ  ? ? ?7ܾ ? ? ?                                        (14) ܾ ? ? ?ᇱ ൌ ܾ ൅ ሺ݇ ?ሻ7ܾ ? ? ? 
subject to the boundary conditions ܽ ? ? ?ൌ ܾ ? ? ?ൌ  ? at T, and ܾ ? ? ?7 denotes 
the transpose of matrix ܾ ? ? ?. 
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 The value of the nominator is  ݓ׬ ሺܽ ? ?൅ ܾ ? ?7ܺ ?ሻ ൈ ሺܽ ൅ ܣ ? ?൅ ܤ ? ?7ܺ ?ሻܦሺݐሻ݀ݐ ? ?                     (15) 
with  ܽ ? ?ǡ ܾ ? ? being solutions to the following ODEs: ܽ ? ?ᇱ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ ? ?7ߛ ?െ  ? ?ܾ  ? ?7ܾ ? ?                                           (16) ܾ ? ?ᇱ ൌ ܾ ൅ ሺ݇ ?ሻ7ܾ ? ? 
subject to the boundary conditions ܽ ? ?ൌ ܾ ? ?ൌ  ? at T .  ܣ ? ?, ܤ ? ? satisfy the 
ODEs ܣ ? ?ᇱ ൌ ܤ ? ?7ߛ ?െ ܾ ? ?7ܤ ? ?                                                 (17) ܤ ? ?ᇱ ൌ ሺ݇ ?ሻ7ܤ ? ? 
subject to the boundary conditions ܣ ? ?ൌ  ? and ܤ ? ?ൌ ܾat T, ܾ ? ? is the same 
as in equation (16). 
 
Part C                                                                                          Chapter C4. Data Description 
118 
 
Chapter C4. Data Description 
 I obtain mid-market sovereign CDS spreads with maturities 1, 2, 3, 5 
and 10 years from Datastream. In order to be included in the sample, a 
sovereign CDS must have available trading data starting no later than August 
2004. In addition, its country must have sufficient inflation and real output-
related macro data from either Datastream or the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis to extract the two macro factors. This screening allows 22 countries into 
my sample25, covering the period from January 2004 to September 2010. All 
sovereign CDS spreads are US dollar denominated. I proxy 1-, 2- 3-, 5- and 
10-year risk-free rates with same maturity Treasury yields collected from the 
Federal Reserve Bank. 
 Table 31 presents summary statistics for monthly spreads in bps (basis 
points) for five-year sovereign CDSs. Both mean and standard deviation (SD) 
values differ considerably across countries; for example, Japan has the smallest 
mean spread at 24.59 bps and SD at 27.93 bps, contrasted with the largest 
mean spread at 707.30 bps and SD at 659.24 bps for Venezuela. Although 
*UHHFH¶VPHDQ VSUHDG LV WKHth largest in my sample, its SD at 215.67 bps 
and maximum spread at 926.14 bps are both the 2nd largest, next only to 
Venezuela. The number of observations is similar for all countries. 
                                                          
25
 The filtering process excludes those countries including Portugal, Spain and 
the United States into our sample. Giving the importance of their sovereign 
credit risk in financial market, the list of countries in this thesis restricts a 
comprehensive study and adding those countries into analysis will be a further 
research topic. 
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 The smallest Japanese CDS spreads and the largest Venezuelan spreads 
are noteworthy. Japanese sovereign CDS spread is smallest despite of its high 
public debt. Shino and Takahashi (2010) investigate the relationship between 
CDS spreads and fiscal risk variables. They find that although CDS spreads 
reflect the changes of public debt amounts, the degree of interrelation varies by 
countries. By comparing 26 countries for which both sovereign CDS 
outstanding data and government debt data are available, Shino and Takahashi 
(2010) show that Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom hold only 
around 5% of sovereign CDSs, although they have almost two-thirds of the 
total public debt. TherefoUH LQYHVWRUV KROGLQJ WKHVH WKUHH FRXQWULHV¶
government bonds seem not to hedge against the default risk by purchasing 
their sovereign CDSs. Regressing sovereign CDS spreads on fiscal risk related 
variables, Shino and Takahashi (2010) find the R2 is generally high and the 
coefficients are statistically significant for those continental European 
countries, while the R2 is extremely low and the coefficients are not significant 
IRU-DSDQ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP7KHUHIRUHLQ LQYHVWRUV¶
opinion, the default risk is low for Japan although it has high public debt, it is 
less necessary to hedge against the default risk of Japan, which results in a 
small sovereign CDS spreads. The impact of trading behaviour on sovereign 
CDS spreads is a future research topic. 
 $ UHSRUW SXEOLVKHG E\ &0$  WKH ZRUOG¶V OHDGLQJ VRXUFH RI
LQGHSHQGHQW 27&PDUNHW GDWD VKRZV WKDW 9HQH]XHOD LV WKH ZRUOG¶V ULVNLHVW
sovereign, with a 48.5% cumulative probability of default within the next five 
years. Longstaff et al. (2011) find exchange rate is a determinant of sovereign 
credit risk; Pan and Singleton (2008) argue that the behaviour of the South 
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American CDS spreads was largely dominated by the political turmoil. The 
impact of exchange rate and political factors on sovereign CDS spreads of 
those South American countries is an interesting topic for future research. 
 Figure 7 illustrates the movement of CDS spreads for the five countries 
with the largest standard deviations. Appendix Figure 12 plots the CDS 
spreads of all countries in my sample. CDS spreads are relatively low and 
stable before the beginning of 2007, become volatile after the end of 2007 and 
reach their maximum around 2009, except those for Greece, which continue to 
increase till the end of the sample period.  
Table 31. Descriptive Statistics for Sovereign CDS Spreads (bp) 
Country Mean SD Min Median Max N 
Austria 31.3667 48.5494 1.5000 3.0000 235.0000 81 
Brazil 215.4651 153.7080 62.6000 137.7450 900.2000 77 
Chile 58.7144 58.2634 7.8000 32.5000 254.2200 81 
Colombia 208.1625 104.9738 77.0000 164.0200 490.0000 76 
Croatia 121.8660 120.2530 15.2000 65.0000 516.0000 81 
Greece 119.6072 215.6703 5.0000 14.5000 926.1400 79 
Hungary 124.9575 142.8755 10.2000 36.9500 563.2800 80 
Israel 72.3153 57.6273 16.5000 40.0000 275.0000 75 
Italy 48.7690 59.7642 5.6000 12.2000 229.5900 81 
Japan 24.5949 27.9272 3.0000 7.5000 96.9100 81 
Korea 84.1569 91.1881 14.7000 48.7000 437.5000 81 
Malaysia 70.6619 64.5694 13.0000 37.2000 296.6700 77 
Mexico 118.6622 83.0364 29.0000 102.7000 458.2300 81 
Peru 186.0531 105.6336 62.5000 144.8375 576.6000 78 
Philippines 270.7456 129.4990 99.2000 222.3000 515.0000 81 
Poland 67.0856 76.9443 8.0000 26.0000 362.5000 81 
Romania 165.2057 168.5659 17.5000 78.8500 720.5300 76 
Russia 171.9436 169.3233 38.5000 124.1000 764.5800 76 
Slovak 39.5456 45.7632 4.2000 15.8000 215.0000 81 
South Africa 124.0585 97.9769 24.2000 96.2000 465.0000 81 
Thailand 80.6556 64.4620 27.0000 44.2000 300.0000 81 
Venezuela 707.3048 659.2428 123.0000 448.2500 3229.3000 76 
Note: Summary statistics for monthly spreads in basis points (bp) for five-year 
sovereign CDS from January 2004 to September 2010. The column head is for 
country name, mean, standard deviation, minimum, median, maximum and the 
number of observations, respectively. 
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Figure 7. Time Series Plot of Five Sovereign CDS Spreads (bps) 
 
Note: Plot of sovereign CDS spreads for five countries with the largest 
standard deviation spreads.  
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Chapter C5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 In this section I report the two extracted macro factors discussed in 
section C3.2 and discuss the relevance of these factors for sovereign CDS 
spreads. I then investigate the issue of the number of latent factors sufficient 
for CDS spreads valuation via a principal component analysis (PCA). I 
investigate the effectiveness of macro factors in explaining sovereign credit 
spreads of each country, selecting Greece as a case study to illustrate my 
pricing model. 
 
C5.1 Extracted macro factors 
 Table 32 reports the parameter estimates under a physical measure and 
the values of the t-statistics on time series dynamics of the two macro factors ݀ܺ ?ǡ ?ൌ െ݇ ?ǡ ?ܺ ?ǡ ?݀ݐ ൅ ݀  ܹ?ǡ ?, where ݇ ?ǡ ?, ݉ ൌ  ?ǡ ?, controls the dynamics 
of the macro factors. k11 determines the mean-reverting speed of inflation and 
the impact magnitude of the lagged value of the inflation factor on its 
conditional mean. k21 reflects the relationship between the past value of 
inflation and the change of real output and, together with k22, it decides the 
dynamics of the real output factor. A negative k21 value indicates a positive 
respond of real output to inflation. 
 Given the parameter estimates, I can extract updated values of the two 
macro factors from the eight observed macroeconomic series. Figure 8 plots 
the extracted inflation and real output factors for five countries with the largest 
standard deviations of spreads. Appendix Figure 13 shows the macro factors 
for all countries. Generally, inflation is high at the beginning of 2004, it 
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remains low from the beginning of 2005 to the middle of 2007, increases at the 
beginning of 2008, and drops dramatically at the end of 2008, doubtless related 
to the financial crisis, but recovers gradually in 2010.  Real output is relatively 
high and stable before 2008, plummets at the middle of 2008 and recovers 
mostly in 2010, with the exception of Greece. Greek output continues to 
decrease until the end of the sample period, reflecting the worsening economy 
and the rising CDS spreads in Figure 7. 
Table 32. Time-series Dynamics Estimation of the Two Macro Factors 
  Estimate     t-statistics     
  k11 k21 k22 k11 k21 k22 
Austria 0.7324* 1.2865** 0.1234 1.6740 2.3049 0.7270 
Brazil 0.5006 1.1312*** 0.7383 1.5509 2.8191 1.4919 
Chile 0.6899* -1.2456** 0.9714* 1.7056 -2.1209 1.9831 
Colombia 0.2210 0.1724 1.2355 1.0002 0.5203 1.5651 
Croatia 0.5430 -2.7163*** 0.5091** 1.1667 -3.8572 2.6180 
Greece 0.7421* -0.8719* 0.1742 1.7744 -1.8310 0.8900 
Hungary 0.6695 0.0204 0.5932 1.6224 0.0435 1.4908 
Israel 0.8509* -1.2042 0.8484* 1.7902 -1.6577 1.9668 
Italy 0.4432 0.6466 0.2054 1.4539 1.5698 0.7608 
Japan 0.4572 1.2732*** 0.1900 1.5423 3.4195 0.8390 
Korea 0.6295* 1.5029*** 1.0796** 1.7060 3.1554 2.0106 
Malaysia 0.6812* 0.4222 0.5957 1.7212 0.6488 0.8369 
Mexico 0.7460 1.3052** 0.5483 1.6133 2.4148 1.5431 
Peru 0.4651 1.0981** 0.2556 1.5336 2.3744 0.7659 
Philippines 0.5260 0.2382 1.4999* 1.5630 0.5728 1.8138 
Poland 0.8700* -0.3183 0.0933 1.8290 -0.6327 0.8942 
Romania 0.3066 -0.8543* 0.4348* 1.0574 -1.8513 1.7970 
Russia 0.6687 0.5401 0.2429 1.6006 0.9859 0.8211 
Slovak 0.3572 -1.6968*** 1.1063*** 1.3601 -2.8119 2.7375 
South Africa 0.4231 1.1426** 0.1910 1.3906 2.4811 0.8279 
Thailand 0.8938* 0.4739 0.9625 1.8705 0.7729 1.4195 
Venezuela 0.2294 0.1691 0.1592 1.0491 0.5294 0.8271 
Note: Parameter estimates and the values of the t-statistics on time series 
dynamics of the two macro factors,  ?ǡ ?ൌ െ ?ǡ ? ൅  ?ǡ ?, where k 
PDWUL[LVGHILQHGDVLQHTXDWLRQXQGHUSK\VLFDOPHDVXUH³´³´³´
represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Figure 8. Time Series Plot of Extracted Macro Factors 
  
   
 
Note: Plots of the extracted inflation and real output factors for five countries 
with the largest standard deviation spreads. Plots from the top left to the 
bottom right are for country Brazil, Greece, Romania, Russia and Venezuela, 
respectively. Y axis is the standardized value. 
 
C5.2 Number of latent factors 
 I have not so far determined the number of latent factors for CDS 
spread valuation, except the n-2 latent factors definition in section C3.2.  To 
determine the number, I run an ordinary least square (OLS) regression of CDS 
spreads of each maturity on the inflation and real output factor, then conduct a 
standard principal component analysis (PCA) on the regression residuals for 
each country.  PCA uses an orthogonal transformation to convert a set of 
observations (regression residuals of each maturity) of possibly correlated 
variables into a set of values of linearly uncorrelated variables, the principal 
components.  It can be used to identify the number of common factors by 
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analyzLQJWKHSHUFHQWDJHRIHDFKFRPSRQHQW¶VDELOLW\WRH[SODLQWKHYDULDQFHRI
the whole set of observations26. 
 Table 33 presents the results of an OLS regression of CDS spreads on 
the inflation and real output factors, &'6 ?ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ?,QIODWLRQ ?൅ ߚ ?2XWSXW ?൅ߝ ?.  P-value is the averaged p-value for the F-statistics with null hypothesis that ߚ ?ൌ ߚ ?ൌ  ?. AdjR2 is the averaged adjusted R2 across maturity 1, 2, 3, 5, and 
10 years.  PC1 is the percentage that the first principal component can explain 
of the variance of ߝ ?. The p-values all smaller than 0.01 suggests that my 
extracted inflation and real output factors are strongly significant in explaining 
sovereign CDS spreads. On average, the simple OLS regression is able to 
explain 36.67% of the variation of CDS spreads across all countries and all 
maturities. Both results indicate the high relevance of the macro factors to 
CDS spreads. 
 The first PC alone is able to explain on average 96.65% of the variance 
of the regression residuals that cannot be explained by the two macro factors, 
suggesting that one latent factor is sufficient. Therefore equation (2) becomes 
቎݀ܺ ?ǡ ?݀ܺ ?ǡ ?݀ܺ ?ǡ ?቏ ൌ െ ൥݇ ? ?  ?  ?݇ ? ?݇ ? ?  ? ?  ?  ݇? ?൩ ቎ܺ ?ǡ ?ܺ ?ǡ ?ܺ ?ǡ ?቏ ݀ݐ ൅ ቎݀  ܹ?ǡ ?݀  ܹ?ǡ ?݀  ܹ?ǡ ?቏                                (18). 
 
 
                                                          
26
 Recall that the PCA analysis on regression residuals is only a method of 
approximating the number of latent factors; the real question is how to find the 
number of factors in a no-arbitrage framework. 
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Table 33. Regression results of CDS spreads on two macro factors 
Country P-value AdjR2 PC 1 N 
Austria 0.0000 0.5334 0.9837 81 
Brazil 0.0028 0.1276 0.9333 77 
Chile 0.0002 0.1769 0.9708 81 
Colombia 0.0007 0.1793 0.9034 76 
Croatia 0.0000 0.6761 0.9707 81 
Greece 0.0000 0.6910 0.9775 79 
Hungary 0.0000 0.5202 0.9758 80 
Israel 0.0000 0.3821 0.9770 75 
Italy 0.0089 0.0955 0.9898 81 
Japan 0.0000 0.3469 0.9670 81 
Korea 0.0000 0.4127 0.9945 81 
Malaysia 0.0000 0.4068 0.9808 77 
Mexico 0.0000 0.5243 0.9664 81 
Peru 0.0000 0.3141 0.8904 78 
Philippines 0.0011 0.1616 0.9223 81 
Poland 0.0000 0.2693 0.9876 81 
Romania 0.0000 0.3179 0.9918 76 
Russia 0.0000 0.4195 0.9755 76 
Slovak 0.0020 0.1613 0.9862 81 
South Africa 0.0000 0.5915 0.9358 81 
Thailand 0.0000 0.2981 0.9886 81 
Venezuela 0.0000 0.4605 0.9949 76 
Note: Results of an OLS regression of CDS spreads on the inflation and real 
output factors, &'6 ?ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ ?,QIODWLRQ ?൅ ߚ ?2XWSXW ?൅ ߝ ?. P-value is the 
averaged p-value for the F-statistics with null hypothesis that ߚ ?ൌ ߚ ?ൌ  ?, 
AdjR2 is the averaged adjusted R2 across maturity 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10 years. PC 1 
is the percentage that the first principal component can explain the variance of ߝ ?. N is the number of observations. 
 
C5.3 The Greek case study 
 Before applying the model to the whole set of countries in the sample, 
it is useful to illustrate via a case study of Greek sovereign CDSs, sampling 
from March 2004 to September 2010. Greece has suffered since the breakout 
of the crisis and, as noted earlier, both the maximum value and standard 
deviation of Greek sovereign CDS spreads are the second largest among all 
countries. Worse, unlike those of other countries reaching their peaks at the 
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beginning of 2009, Greek CDS spreads continue to increase to the end of my 
sample period.  
 Table 34 reports the factor loadings matrix H and associated t-statistics 
for equation (4)  ܻ?ǡ ?ൌ ܺ ?ǡ ?൅ ɂ ?ǡ ?. All eight macroeconomic variables are 
significant in extracting the inflation and real output factors, suggesting their 
indispensable roles in reflecting the Greek economy. The coefficient signs for 
all four inflation-related series are positive; the only negative sign is for 
unemployment because of the inverse relationship between the unemployment 
and real output.  
 Table 35 presents estimates for the market prices of risk for equation (5) ݀ܺ ?ൌ ݇ ?ሺߠ ?െ ܺ ?ሻ݀ݐ ൅ ݀  ܹ? ? via the extended Kalman filter technique and 
maximum likelihood estimation method outlined in Appendix C.A. Table 36 
shows results for the instantaneous credit spread function for equation (12) ߣሺܺ ?ሻ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ7ܺ ?. The intercept, Į measures the long-run mean instantaneous 
spread for Greece, which is estimated at 1.20%. The loading coefficient, b, 
measures the contemporaneous response of the instantaneous spread to unit 
shocks on the three factors. All loading estimates are strongly significant, 
suggesting again the necessity to price them all in. The coefficient for inflation 
is positive and is negative for real output, as expected, indicating higher 
inflation or lower real output increases the short-term Greek sovereign CDS 
spread, and vice versa.  
 Based on the above estimation, I value the Greek sovereign CDS 
spreads of all maturities in one system as in equation (11).  Figure 9 plots the 
PRGHOSULFLQJHUURUVIRU&'6¶VZLWK-, 5- and 10-year maturities, measured by 
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the market observed spreads minus the model-implied spreads. The errors are 
relatively small before the end of 2009 and increase dramatically after that due 
to the rising volatility of CDS spreads. The averaged RMSE is shown in Table 
37 as 80.12 bps. 
  In order to examine the variance explained by macro factors, I 
calculate the model-implied CDS spreads (Macro spreads) without a latent 
factor by restricting the elements in the k matrix and the loading coefficient in 
equation (12) for the latent factor to zero. Given the independence structure 
between the macro and latent factors, the variance explained by macro factors 
can be estimated approximately as var(Macro)/var(Full), where Macro is the 
model-implied Macro spreads and Full is the model-implied spreads including 
both the macro and latent factors, and var(x) is the variance of x.  Table 38 
reports the results for Greece: macro factors can explain as much as 39.68%, 
39.58%, 39.39%, 38.66% and 35.34% of the variation of CDS spreads with 1-, 
2-, 3-, 5- and 10-year maturity, respectively. 
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Table 34. Macro Factor Loadings for Macroeconomic Variables for Greece 
  Inflation Real output 
Loading 
  
CPI 0.9461*** 0.0000 
PPI 1.1179*** 0.0000 
PCE 0.7242*** 0.0000 
GDP 0.4370** 0.0000 
IP 0.0000 0.4344*** 
Unemploy 0.0000 -0.6684*** 
Real.PCE 0.0000 0.5879*** 
Real.GDP 0.0000 0.5330*** 
t-statistics 
  
CPI 9.2375 - 
PPI 12.2142 - 
PCE 4.0855 - 
GDP 2.1319 - 
IP - 5.6267 
Unemploy - -3.2248 
Real.PCE - 3.4924 
Real.GDP - 5.5182 
Note: Factor loadings matrix H and associated t-statistics for macro factors 
extraction,  ܻ?ൌ ܺ ?ǡ ?൅ ɂ ?, where the macroeconomic variables in the first 
column are CPI, PPI, PCE, GDP, IP, Unemployment, Real PCE and Real GDP. 
³´³´³´UHSUHVHQW, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
Table 35. Market Prices of Risk for Greece 
  k     7KHWD%? 
Estimates         
Inflation 0.0304*** 0.0000 0.0000 -77.9451*** 
Real output -0.1004*** 0.1120*** 0.0000 -83.6446*** 
Latent 0.0000 0.0000 0.1151*** 1.1992 
t-statistics 
    
Inflation 5.3290 - - -63.8879 
Real output -7.7592 13.5788 - -146.0296 
Latent - - 11.5362 1.1458 
Note: K and %? matrix estimates for Greece, ݀ܺ ?ൌ ݇ ?ሺߠ ?െ ܺ ?ሻ݀ݐ ൅ ݀  ܹ? ?. ³´³´³´represent 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 36. Instantaneous Credit Spread for Greece 
  Estimates t-statistic 
,QWHUFHSWĮ 0.0120*** 7.0774 
Inflation 0.0114*** 5.4957 
Real output -0.0163*** -13.0276 
Latent 0.0399*** 9.5387 
Note: The intercept and factor loadings for the instantaneous credit spread 
function for Greece, ߣሺܺ ?ሻ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ7ܺ ? ³´ ³´ ³´ UHSUHVHQW  
and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
Table 37. RMSE (bps) for All Sovereign CDSs 
RMSE Full Macro N 
Austria 16.2094 31.8107 81 
Brazil 67.7352 131.2934 77 
Chile 22.3083 51.3730 81 
Colombia 52.7619 95.9567 76 
Croatia 40.0969 77.5258 81 
Greece 80.1207 143.1907 79 
Hungary 46.0783 104.2985 80 
Israel 20.0843 43.4350 75 
Italy 19.7450 52.2359 81 
Japan 13.8120 20.4967 81 
Korea 37.5229 75.1299 81 
Malaysia 22.6547 46.3978 77 
Mexico 33.7528 64.1293 81 
Peru 50.5007 93.1204 78 
Philippines 54.0045 117.8085 81 
Poland 25.0907 68.1885 81 
Romania 59.6792 148.2858 76 
Russia 72.0526 155.0629 76 
Slovak 16.4553 38.5889 81 
South Africa 37.7203 83.3780 81 
Thailand 22.3233 51.3963 81 
Venezuela 268.4027 600.8925 76 
Note: Averaged RMSE (root mean squared error) in bps for the sovereign CDS 
spreads pricing error across all maturities, where pricing errors are measured 
by the market observed spreads minus the model-implied spreads. Full is for 
the model with all three pricing factors, and Macro is for the model without the 
latent factors. N is the number of observations. 
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Table 38. Variance Explained by Macro Factors 
  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 5 Year 10 Average N 
Austria 0.2464 0.2474 0.2482 0.2496 0.2520 0.2487 81 
Brazil 0.0962 0.1252 0.1546 0.2094 0.2941 0.1759 77 
Chile 0.0804 0.0786 0.0769 0.0737 0.0670 0.0753 81 
Colombia 0.2330 0.3221 0.3870 0.4540 0.4456 0.3683 76 
Croatia 0.3657 0.3678 0.3695 0.3719 0.3672 0.3684 81 
Greece 0.3968 0.3958 0.3939 0.3866 0.3534 0.3853 79 
Hungary 0.2861 0.2821 0.2781 0.2702 0.2484 0.2730 80 
Israel 0.1778 0.1732 0.1690 0.1617 0.1480 0.1659 75 
Italy 0.0596 0.0579 0.0563 0.0534 0.0470 0.0548 81 
Japan 0.3315 0.4003 0.4550 0.5274 0.5997 0.4628 81 
Korea 0.2460 0.2475 0.2480 0.2453 0.2186 0.2411 81 
Malaysia 0.2674 0.2709 0.2720 0.2690 0.2451 0.2649 77 
Mexico 0.2846 0.2989 0.3125 0.3344 0.3548 0.3170 81 
Peru 0.1456 0.1578 0.1722 0.2044 0.2745 0.1909 78 
Philippines 0.0949 0.1336 0.1752 0.2538 0.3734 0.2061 81 
Poland 0.0415 0.0228 0.0146 0.0082 0.0041 0.0182 81 
Romania 0.1834 0.1790 0.1725 0.1569 0.1174 0.1619 76 
Russia 0.2079 0.2040 0.1994 0.1882 0.1565 0.1912 76 
Slovak 0.0992 0.1288 0.1506 0.1765 0.1917 0.1494 81 
South Africa 0.3356 0.3416 0.3473 0.3573 0.3717 0.3507 81 
Thailand 0.1828 0.1734 0.1652 0.1522 0.1340 0.1615 81 
Venezuela 0.2650 0.2714 0.2696 0.2456 0.1585 0.2420 76 
Note: Variance explained by the two macro factors: inflation and real output, 
defined as var(Macro)/var(Full), where Macro and Full are explained in 
context. N is the number of observations. 
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Figure 9. Time Series Plot of Model Pricing Errors (bps) for Greece  
 
Note: Plot of model pricing errors of Greek sovereign CDS spreads with 1-, 5- 
and 10-year maturities. Pricing errors are defined as the difference between 
model implied spreads and market observed spreads. 
 
C5.4 Countries analysis 
 Having illustrated the model with Greece, I now extend the analysis to 
all countries in my sample.  
C5.4.1 Model estimation 
 Appendix Table 41 reports the factor loadings matrix H and associated 
t-statistics for macro factors extraction  ܻ?ǡ ?ൌ ܺ ?ǡ ?൅ ɂ ?ǡ ?. Similar to the 
case for Greece, nearly all macroeconomic variables are significant for the 
extraction of both inflation and real output factors. Appendix Table 42 shows 
WKHYDOXHVRIWKHNPDWUL[DQGڧXQGHUWKHULVN-neutral measure. Comparing the 
k matrix under the physical measure shown in Table 32 in chapter C5.1, the 
GLIIHUHQFH RI NPDWUL[ WRJHWKHUZLWK WKH VWURQJO\ VLJQLILFDQWڧ in Appendix 
Table 42, suggests substantial market risk premiums related to uncertainty 
about future credit events.  
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Instantaneous credit spread gauges the default risk of a very short 
future moment of each sovereign country. Appendix Table 43 lists the 
intercept and factor loadings for the instantaneous credit spread function, ߣሺܺ ?ሻ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ7ܺ ?. Since it measures the long-run mean instantaneous spread, 
the intercept, ĮGLUHFWO\UHIOHFWVWKHH[SHFWHGVKRUW-term default spread of each 
country. The bottom plot of Figure 10 further illustrates the instantaneous CDS 
spread, which varies dramatically across countries; Japan has the smallest 
instantaneous spread at 9.42 bps while Venezuela has the largest at 618.10 bps, 
almost 66 times higher. The loading coefficient, b, measures the 
contemporaneous response of the instantaneous spread to unit shocks on the 
three factors. Generally the response is positive for the inflation factor and is 
negative for the real output factor, consistent with the literature that a higher 
inflation rate (lower real output) leads to a larger sovereign credit spread; see, 
for example, Block and Vaaler (2004), Mora (2006) and Hill, et al. (2010).  
C5.4.2 Model fit 
Table 37 presents the results for the RMSE, a measure of model 
performance. Not surprisingly, my model generates the largest RMSE for 
Venezuela, at 268.40 bps, and the smallest for Japan, at only 13.81 bps. Due to 
space limitation, I plot only the 5-year CDS pricing errors in Appendix Figure 
14; the errors are generally small before the financial crisis and increase 
afterwards. Comparing with the spreads statistics in Table 31, the pricing 
errors are relatively small from a percentage perspective. Using the restricted 
model with only the macro factors increases the RMSE dramatically; for 
example, it is 59.68 for Romanian CDS spreads for the full model and jumps to 
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148.29 bps for the model without a latent factor, suggesting the insufficiency 
of a model with only macro factors for CDS spread valuation.  
An important feature of a good pricing model is its ability to explain 
the level of sovereign CDS spreads. We run a regression as an empirical 
investigation 
ܥܦܵ ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ൌ ߚ ?ǡ ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ?ܥܦܵ ?ǡ ? ?൅ ߝ ?ǡ ? 
Where ܥܦܵ ?ǡ ? ? ? ? is the observed CDS spread for country i at time t, and ܥܦܵ ?ǡ ? ? 
is the CDS spread estimated by model. If a model is correctly specified and 
adequately reflects the level of CDS spreads of country i, the above regression 
will generate a zero constant ߚ ?ǡ ? and a unit coefficient ߚ ?ǡ ?. Appendix Table 44 
provides the coefficient estimates of the regression for each country. First, the 
constant term ߚ ? remains insignificant for all countries; second, the slope 
estimate ߚ ? is strongly significant at 1% level, the null hypothesis that ߚ ?ൌ  ? 
is only rejected at 5% level for Croatia and Russia; third, the regression yields 
an average adjusted R2 of 83.41%, with the highest value of 90.41% for Greece 
and the lowest value of 64.48% for Colombia. In summary, Appendix Table 44 
suggests that our model successfully replicates the sovereign CDS spread level. 
C5.4.3 Macro factors variance explanation 
 Table 38 reports the variance explained by the two macro factors. The 
percentage that macro factors can explain varies greatly across countries - on 
average, they explain 23.06% of the variation of the term structure of 
sovereign CDS spreads, with the largest percentage for Japan at 46.28%, while 
they can barely explain the variation of Polish credit spreads. Across the term 
structure, the macro factors can, on average, explain 21.03%, 22.18%, 23.12%, 
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24.32% and 24.65% of the variation of 1-, 2-, 3-, 5- and 10-year CDS spreads. 
The increasing explanatory power suggests that the impacts of the macro 
factors are long-lasting and are even larger for sovereign CDS with a longer 
maturity. The average explanatory power, 23.06%, is much lower than the 85% 
found by Ang and Piazzesi (2003) for US Treasury yields; indeed, 85% is 
much larger than the largest percentage 46.28% for Japan, but this is not 
surprising because macro factors have more direct influence on Treasury yields 
than on CDS spreads since CDS spreads incorporate other impacting factors 
that cannot be captured by macro variables (Duffie et al. 2003)27. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 I cannot compare directly with the explanatory power of the two macro 
factors on US sovereign CDS spreads because US is not a country in my 
sample. The earliest US sovereign CDS spread I can obtain is December 2007, 
the short sample periods restrict my analysis.   
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Figure 10. Instantaneous CDS Spread (bps) and Variance Explained by Macro 
Factors 
 
 
Note: The top plot shows the long-run mean instantaneous spread (bps) and the 
bottom plot shows the variance explained by the two macro factors for each 
country. 
 
C5.5 Spillover effect from the US 
 Researchers have found a strong spillover effect from the United States 
to other regions of the World, reflecting to the leading role of the United States 
market. For example, Pan and Singleton (2008) provide evidence that credit 
risk in Mexican, Korean and Turkish sovereign markets is influenced by real 
economic growth in the United States, by conducting a regression analysis of 
the correlations between sovereign credit risk premiums and three US financial 
and economic variables. Longstaff et al. (2011) find that sovereign credit 
spreads are even more related to the US market than they are to local markets. 
Gande and Parsley (2005) examine cross-border debt market linkages by 
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concentrating on the transmission of news events, and present asymmetric 
spillover evidence. I investigate this effect by examining the percentage of the 
extracted latent series that the US market variables are able to explain, since, 
by definition, the latent factor is independent of the two domestic macro 
factors and reflects the possible global determinants and local determinants 
other than the two macro factors. I regress the latent series ܺ ?ǡ ? on several 
variables representing the US financial market, specifically, the CBOE VIX 
option volatility index, the yield spread between the Moody's 30-year US Baa 
corporate bond and the 6-month US Treasury bill, and the S&P 500 return. ܺ ?ǡ ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ?9,; ?൅ ߚ ?<LHOG6SUHDG ?൅ ߚ ?63 ?൅ ߝ ? . The first two 
variables are similar to those in Pan and Singleton (2008). The VIX is a 
measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options and is sometimes 
referred to as the fear index of the US financial market. The yield spread is a 
measure of expected default premium reflecting the US macroeconomic and 
financial market development. The S&P 500 return is often viewed as a 
measure of the overall business climate of the US economy; for instance, 
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) investigate it as a determinant of credit spread 
changes. 
 Table 39 reports the regression results. The VIX is the most significant 
among the three explanatory variables; it is significant at the 10% level for 21 
out of 22 countries28 VXJJHVWLQJ D VWURQJ VSLOORYHU RI µIHDU¶ IURP WKH 86
                                                          
28
 The signs of estimates are not important because I do not constrain the 
correlation sign between latent variable and default premium when I extract the 
latent series, which can be either positively or negatively linked. 
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market. The yield spread and S&P 500 return are significant for about half of 
my sample countries. All three variables together are able to explain on 
average 46.62% of the variation of the latent series, with a maximum 72.88% 
for Israel and a minimum 12.66% for Greece, which is not surprising 
considering that the poor performance of the Greek market is largely caused by 
its internal problems within the Euro zone.  
In the literature it is found that the spillover effect is stronger during the 
financial crisis. For example, Longstaff et al. (2011) use data from 2000 to 
2010 and conclude that sovereign credit spreads are more related to the US 
market than they are to local measures; Fender et al. (2010) divide their data 
into two subsamples by the beginning of financial crisis and provide particular 
evidence that spreads are more strongly influenced by spillover effects during 
periods of market stress times. I run a 36-month rolling regression for each 
country and estimate the averaged adjusted R2 in order to investigate the 
fluctuations of spillover effect, a higher adjusted R2 suggests a stronger 
spillover effect from the US market. Figure 11 plots the results, the adjusted R2 
increases steadily and reaches its peak in 2009, when the CDS market is in 
most stress as depicted in Figure 7. 
In summary, I find the US financial and economic variables explain a 
large portion of the latent series, suggesting a spillover effect from the US to 
other countries, the effect becomes stronger during stress periods. 
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Table 39. Spillover Effect from United States 
  Estimates     t-statistics     Adjusted R2 N 
  VIX Yield.diff S&P 500 VIX Yield.diff S&P 500   81 
Austria 0.0340*** 0.0412 0.0497*** 3.3679 0.9888 3.1531 0.3825 77 
Brazil 0.0315** -0.2022*** 0.0151 2.5843 -4.0066 0.8247 0.1651 81 
Chile 0.0592 0.0201 0.0426 5.8455 0.4798 2.6976 0.5980 76 
Colombia 0.0170*** -0.2393 -0.0119*** 1.6434 -5.6341 -0.7788 0.4609 81 
Croatia -0.0388*** -0.0226 -0.0340** -3.8770 -0.5481 -2.1819 0.4041 79 
Greece 0.0331*** -0.0630 0.0239 3.1081 -1.4285 1.4659 0.1266 80 
Hungary -0.0367*** -0.1084** -0.0566*** -3.0374 -2.1684 -3.0105 0.4717 75 
Israel 0.0203** 0.1703*** 0.0023 2.4130 4.9004 0.1910 0.7288 81 
Italy 0.0312** 0.1205** 0.0316 2.2438 2.1015 1.4562 0.3788 81 
Japan -0.0251*** -0.0412 -0.0157 -3.0414 -1.2087 -1.2188 0.3843 81 
Korea 0.0301*** 0.0969*** 0.0343*** 4.2529 3.3237 3.1089 0.6568 77 
Malaysia -0.0126* -0.1529*** 0.0118 -1.7095 -4.9925 1.0615 0.6776 81 
Mexico -0.0284*** -0.0418 -0.0281** -3.7031 -1.3221 -2.3511 0.4581 78 
Peru -0.0233** 0.1871*** -0.0082 -2.1821 4.2474 -0.5096 0.2130 81 
Philippines -0.0613*** 0.3615*** -0.0366* -4.4708 6.3941 -1.7132 0.3309 81 
Poland -0.0711*** -0.0823* -0.0933*** -6.6238 -1.8588 -5.5716 0.7104 76 
Romania 0.0455*** 0.1188** 0.0223 3.7304 2.3668 1.2375 0.6352 76 
Russia -0.0360*** -0.0392 -0.0053 -2.9628 -0.7847 -0.2936 0.4209 81 
Slovak 0.0672*** -0.0263 0.0496*** 6.7256 -0.6373 3.1829 0.5954 81 
South Africa 0.0193* 0.0620 0.0108 1.8117 1.4118 0.6514 0.2521 81 
Thailand 0.0307*** 0.1344*** 0.0174 4.1151 4.3634 1.4955 0.7170 76 
Venezuela 0.0642*** -0.0506 0.0634*** 5.4028 -1.0342 3.6177 0.4881 N 
Note: Spillover effect from the United States market to other markets, three 
variables representing the US financial market are the VIX index (VIX), the 
spread between the Moody's 30-year US Baa corporate bond and the 6-month 
US Treasury bill rate (Yield.diff), and the S&P 500 return (S&P 500). 
Adjusted R2 reports the adjusted R square value. N is the number of 
observations. ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHO
respectively. 
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Figure 11. Averaged Adjusted R2 of a Rolling Regression on Spillover Effect 
 
Note: A 36-month rolling regression to investigate the fluctuations of spillover 
effect from the United States market to other markets, ܺ ?ǡ ?ൌ ߚ ?൅ ߚ ?9,; ?൅ߚ ?<LHOG6SUHDG ?൅ ߚ ?63 ?൅ ߝ ?, three variables representing the US 
financial market are the VIX index (VIX), the spread between the Moody's 30-
year US Baa corporate bond and the 6-month US Treasury bill rate 
(YieldSpread), and the S&P 500 return (SP500). The values in the plot are 
averaged adjust R2 of all countries. 
 
C5.6 Out-of-sample performance 
  A model with multiple variables may suffer over-fitting and may 
underperform a parsimonious candidate model. To determine if this is the case 
for my model, I conduct an out-of-sample analysis on a model with both macro 
factors and a latent variable (Full), against a model with a latent variable only 
(Latent)29. I test the performance of each year in my sample in order to capture 
better the ability of models under different market situations due to the 
financial crisis. I first fit parameters by using all data other than the given year 
and then use the fitted parameters to value the CDS spreads in that year. For 
example, to compare model out-of-sample performance for year 2004, I use 
                                                          
29
 A model with a latent variable only has the same structure as described 
earlier in the chapter, except that all parameters for the macro factors are 
restricted to zero. 
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data from January 2005 to September 2010 for parameter estimation and 
compute the model spreads for year 2004 with the estimated parameter set.  
Out-of-sample RMSE is reported in Table 40 as a comparison criterion. 
Lower RMSE denotes better performance and is highlighted in bold. On 
average, the full model does a better job by generating a smaller RMSE than 
the latent model for 14 out of 22 countries, with an averaged cross-country 109 
bps RMSE for the former model against 120 bps RMSE for the later. The full 
model tends to perform much better when the market is less volatile; 
specifically, it has a smaller out-of-sample RMSE for 15, 17, 20, and 17 
countries for years 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively, while the number 
decreases to 11, 13 and 8 for year 2008, 2009 and 2010, which may be 
explained by the following aspects: first, both inflation and real output values 
change suddenly after the breakout of crisis, as depicted in Figure 8. 
Consequently, the estimated parameters with data other than that year do not 
reflect well the unexpected change and perform relatively worse when pricing 
the CDS spreads for that year. Second, macro factors are less significant as 
determinants of sovereign spreads after the financial crisis, as a result, a model 
with the macro factors does not perform as better as it did. Fender et al. (2010) 
discover strong evidence that macroeconomic variables exert a significant 
impact on spreads only before the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the full model 
merely underperforms the latent model for the year 2010. Overall, I conclude 
that the performance of a model with only a latent factor can be improved by 
including macro factors. The improvement is more pronounced in normal 
circumstances before the crisis.  
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Table 40. Out-of-sample RMSE (in bps) 
  2004   2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   All   N 
  Full Latent Full Latent Full Latent Full Latent Full Latent Full Latent Full Latent Full Latent 81 
Austria 5.8523 10.0056 50.7721 56.1145 8.7584 17.4438 35.1792 42.8995 54.8483 71.1519 85.3201 123.9174 95.4541 87.1065 48.0264 58.3770 77 
Brazil 383.4767 407.6121 96.9262 97.1354 176.4993 188.9657 250.6406 256.5285 315.5121 160.0280 107.8787 144.8445 217.3438 114.5995 221.1825 195.6734 81 
Chile 48.2240 48.2870 8.2618 10.7467 7.9366 18.2724 15.7842 16.2138 47.1612 169.4642 171.9759 190.9701 17.0012 18.3682 45.1921 67.4746 76 
Colombia 145.1516 162.0097 111.0365 112.2484 198.5489 176.4764 249.2505 216.3821 234.6671 171.9788 125.8350 178.0857 38.1510 57.6915 157.5201 153.5532 81 
Croatia 37.0283 88.9855 67.4133 104.6854 81.5219 129.6887 23.5909 99.4871 194.1496 212.9960 207.6923 284.6530 184.6152 218.5487 113.7159 162.7206 79 
Greece 13.0087 163.2111 21.1165 100.5402 103.2998 127.7642 28.4361 109.0479 42.8648 61.0090 52.9074 220.5697 662.4246 589.9964 132.0083 196.0198 80 
Hungary 106.1308 145.4113 190.4678 190.8454 103.1498 139.1322 97.7781 112.7286 68.7606 217.1347 231.2866 154.0241 421.9974 371.5923 174.2244 190.1241 75 
Israel 45.3470 8.1528 54.5960 72.2819 88.4575 95.0824 15.4286 11.8958 93.4080 111.2634 111.3147 62.2809 12.6241 17.6222 60.1680 54.0828 81 
Italy 11.4703 72.1479 58.8980 5.1189 4.8547 5.0116 5.4673 5.9989 32.7305 71.9789 30.2187 101.1773 59.2563 54.8236 28.9851 45.1796 81 
Japan 6.6620 9.0240 28.0462 30.1392 25.5173 29.9082 9.0363 11.3581 13.4370 12.6563 25.5167 37.8084 38.1371 34.0039 20.9075 23.5569 81 
Korea 13.2005 15.0589 19.8098 18.1732 14.4543 74.1760 20.1893 26.3855 167.2408 208.7580 63.7254 89.3666 141.5557 51.3177 62.8823 69.0337 77 
Malaysia 13.4392 35.8693 67.6922 69.6008 71.0793 79.4404 88.2820 18.2612 44.9650 38.8590 34.3463 59.2292 79.4301 26.3824 57.0334 46.8060 81 
Mexico 57.7088 49.4862 43.1099 56.8240 20.0686 87.4232 91.5370 38.7144 143.6631 77.6085 153.2396 87.4419 118.9984 61.7156 89.7608 65.6020 78 
Peru 247.8267 102.7735 103.2771 41.6707 40.0105 48.8051 42.3301 45.4653 102.7942 95.7804 132.1906 175.7297 53.7341 65.9535 103.1662 82.3112 81 
Philippines 82.6321 78.4307 77.7026 95.8387 27.6073 68.1602 42.0201 52.0809 123.2573 202.7259 98.8940 94.8488 127.3058 74.0118 82.7742 95.1567 81 
Poland 96.2403 97.7945 99.0883 96.2993 54.7520 80.1345 55.3787 87.0220 40.6053 35.1906 76.2666 42.7492 36.4345 26.4192 65.5380 66.5156 76 
Romania 91.8344 100.0800 23.5645 83.3114 30.0767 53.6316 100.5876 169.6364 124.2904 108.7969 128.2659 116.7378 242.5758 102.1720 105.8850 104.9095 76 
Russia 142.2402 89.5144 133.3085 142.3989 188.8322 202.6091 86.2599 86.4636 543.8823 550.7824 548.4838 142.4729 140.8632 60.3013 254.8386 182.0775 81 
Slovak 59.6015 55.9320 6.7563 10.1515 5.1339 12.6987 40.7106 49.5303 30.3628 26.1546 133.4495 129.7588 32.2677 46.9798 44.0403 47.3151 81 
South Africa 48.3211 50.4608 14.9280 60.1563 20.3784 49.6846 35.4199 29.0278 187.0598 118.2676 202.9697 271.0796 29.4181 25.0122 76.9279 86.2413 81 
Thailand 12.2231 11.8810 17.3200 15.0327 89.2587 17.5689 68.3197 71.1420 133.9969 173.3900 95.8376 157.5485 14.3865 37.6288 61.6204 69.1703 76 
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Venezuela 54.0924 441.6404 66.0059 395.6508 91.3838 520.6481 85.7242 401.0429 1468.0892 1392.4334 739.9702 335.2766 288.1489 541.3459 399.0592 575.4340 N 
Note: Out-of-sample performance of a model with both macro factors and a latent variable (Full), against that of a model with a latent variable 
only (Latent). RMSE (root mean squared error) is reported as a comparison measure. I first fit parameters by using all data other than the given 
\HDUDQGWKHQXVHWKHILWWHGSDUDPHWHUVWRYDOXHWKH&'6VSUHDGVLQWKDW\HDU&ROXPQ³$OO´UHSRUWVWKHDYHUDJHRIHDFK\HDU¶V506(/RZHU
RMSE denotes better performance and is highlighted in bold. N is the number of observations. 
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Chapter C6. Conclusion 
 This chapter values sovereign CDS spreads with observable 
macroeconomic variables and a latent variable under a multifactor affine 
framework, which allows macro variables to affect the dynamics of the term 
structure of sovereign credit risk by imposing no-arbitrage assumptions. 
Studying sovereign CDS spreads of 22 countries, I find that two macro factors 
(inflation and real output) are able to explain, on average, 23.06% of the 
variation of spreads, while the US financial variables explain 46.62% of the 
latent factor that cannot be captured by macro factors, consistent with the view 
that sovereign markets are impacted by spillovers from the United States 
economy to other regions of the world. Furthermore, I find that incorporating 
macro factors in a sovereign CDS term structure model improves the out-of-
sample performance. 
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Appendix C.A Extended Kalman Filter 
 In this appendix I describe the extended Kalman filter technique and 
maximum log-likelihood method for the estimation of CDS pricing related 
parameters. Let ߸ ?ൌ ሺ߸ ? ?ǡ ǥ ǡ߸ ? ?ሻ be the CDS spreads with maturity t1 to tn, 
and Xt be the three factors that drive the CDS spreads. We then have the 
following measurement and transition equations: 
߸ ?ൌ ܨሺܺ ?ሻ ൅ ߝ ?ǡ Ƞሾߝ ?ߝ ?7ሿ ൌ ȭ                                                  (A1) ܺ ?ൌ ߤ ൅ Ȟܺ ? ? ?൅ ߭ ?ǡ Ƞሾ߭ ?߭ ?7ሿ ൌ ȳ 
where F(.) maps the factors into CDS spreads as in equation (11), ȭ and ȳ are 
matrices for the variances of the errors of CDS yields and three factors, 
respectively.  ߤ and Ȟ are defined as in equation (6):  
ߤ ൌ െ׬ ሺെ݇ ?ሺݐ െ ݏሻሻߛ ?݀ݏ ? ? ? ? ?                                               (A2) Ȟ ൌ ሺെ݇ ? ?ݐሻ 
ȳ ൌ න ሺെ݇ ?ሺݐ െ ݏሻሻሺെ݇ ?ሺݐ െ ݏሻሻ ?݀ ݏ ? ? ? ? ?  
We can then apply typical Kalman filter method to estimate the parameters by 
Step 1: forecasting the measurement equation ߸ ?ෞ  in (A1) given initial values; 
Step 2: updating the inference about the factors incorporating the prediction 
error ߳ ?ൌ ߸ ?ෞ െ߸ ?; 
Step 3: forecasting the factors of the next time period conditioning on the 
updated values of the previous period; 
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Step 4: calculating the log-likelihood function by assuming ȭ in equation (A1) 
is Gaussian and maximizing the log-likelihood: ݈ ?ൌ െ  ? ?ሺ ?ߨሻ െ  ? ?ሺȁሺ߸ ?ෞሻȁሻ െ  ? ?߳  ?7ሺ߸ ?ෞሻ ? ?߳ ?                            (A3) 
where n is the number of observations. 
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Appendix C.B Sovereign CDS Valuation 
In this appendix I derive the valuation formula for sovereign CDS 
spread for equation (11).  Begin with a stochastic differential equation for ܺ ? 
as 
݀ܺ ?ൌ ߤሺܺ ?ሻ݀ݐ ൅ ߪሺܺ ?ሻ݀  ܹ?                                                  (B1) 
Here  ܹ? is a vector of standard Brownian motion, ߤሺܺ ?ሻ and ߪሺܺ ?ሻ are the 
drift and diffusion terms defined as 
ߤሺܺ ?ሻ ൌ ܭ ?൅ ܭ ?ܺ  ?ǡ ሺߪሺܺ ?ሻߪሺܺ ?ሻ ?ሻ ? ?ൌ ሺܪ ?ሻ ? ?൅ ሺܪ ?ሻ ? ?ܺ ? 
where ܭ ?ǡ ܭ ?ǡ ܪ ? and ܪ ? are coefficients. Duffie et al. (2000) prove under 
technical regularity conditions that the solution for the conditional expectation 
of an asset F 
 ܨሺܺ ?ǡ ݐǡ ܶሻ ൌ ܧሾሺെ׬ ܴሺܺ ?ሻ݀ݏ ? ? ሻሿ                                          (B2) 
is given by 
 ܨሺܺ ?ǡ ݐǡ ܶሻ ൌ ሺߙ ൅ ߚܺ ?ሻ                                              (B3) 
where ܴሺܺ ?ሻ ൌ ߩ ?൅ ߩ ?ܺ  ?, ǡ ߩ ? and ߩ ? are coefficients determining the payoff 
structure.  ߚ and ߙ satisfy the ordinary differential equations (ODEs) 
   ߚᇱ ൌ ߩ ?െ ܭ ? ?ߚ െ  ? ?ߚ ?ܪ ?ߚ                                    (B4) 
ߙᇱ ൌ ߩ ?െ ܭ ?ߚ െ  ? ?ߚ ?ܪ ?ߚ 
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subject to boundary conditions ߚ ൌ ߙ ൌ  ? . Standard linear transformation 
leads to our equation (14) when ݀ܺ ?ൌ ݇ ?ሺߠ ?െ ܺ ?ሻ݀ݐ ൅ ݀  ܹ? ?.  
 The derivation for equation (16) is more involved.  Suppose  
 ܨሺݒǡ ܺ ?ǡ ݐǡ ܶሻ ൌ ܧሾݒܺ ?ሺെ׬ ܴሺܺ ?ሻ݀ݏ ? ? ሻሿ                                  (B5) ݒ is another coefficient in the payoff structure. Duffie et al. (2000) show that 
this type of extended transform has a solution 
 ܨሺݒǡ ܺ ?ǡ ݐǡ ܶሻ ൌ ܨሺܺ ?ǡ ݐǡ ܶሻሺܣ ൅ ܤܺ ?ሻ                                          (B6) 
where ܨሺܺ ?ǡ ݐǡ ܶሻ is as in equation (B3), and where B and A satisfy the ODEs 
  ܤᇱ ൌ െܭ ? ?ܤ െ ߚ ?ܪ ?ܤ                                         (B7) ܣᇱ ൌ െܭ ?ߚ െ ߚ ?ܪ ?ܤ ߚ is calculated as in equation (B4), with the boundary conditions ܤ ൌ ݒǡ ܣ ൌ ?. Equation (16) is then derived by linear transformation. 
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Appendix C.C Tables 
Appendix Table 41. Macro Factor Loadings for Macroeconomic Variables 
  Austria   Brazil   Chile   Colombia   Croatia   Greece   
  Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output 
Loading 
            
CPI 0.9756*** 
 
0.5009*** 
 
0.4151*** 
 
0.7452*** 
 
0.154239 
 
0.9461*** 
 
PPI 1.1899*** 
 
0.8864*** 
 
1.0864*** 
 
0.5023*** 
 
NA 
 
1.1179*** 
 
PCE 0.5346** 
 
NA 
 
0.7857*** 
 
0.3405** 
 
0.8995*** 
 
0.7242*** 
 
GDP 0.7169*** 
 
0.1669 
 
0.6331*** 
 
NA 
 
0.8976*** 
 
0.4370** 
 
IP 
 
0.8417*** 
 
1.2263*** 
 
0.3861*** 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
0.4344*** 
Unemploy 
 
-0.5081*** 
 
-0.6461* 
 
-0.9336 
 
-1.2939 
 
-0.3845*** 
 
-0.6684*** 
Real.PCE 
 
0.4761** 
 
0.9095 
 
0.6460*** 
 
NA 
 
0.2555*** 
 
0.5879*** 
Real.GDP 
 
0.7838*** 
 
1.2716*** 
 
0.9205*** 
 
NA 
 
0.2779*** 
 
0.5330*** 
t-statistics 
            
CPI 8.8976 
 
5.3835 
 
3.4964 
 
12.0911 
 
1.3228 
 
9.2375 
 
PPI 12.3134 
 
12.1360 
 
12.1196 
 
6.6607 
   
12.2142 
 
PCE 2.5198 
   
5.1378 
 
2.5422 
 
5.8510 
 
4.0855 
 
GDP 3.6734 
 
0.9970 
 
3.6600 
   
5.8447 
 
2.1319 
 
IP 
 
8.2843 
 
8.1864 
 
3.8778 
     
5.6267 
Unemploy 
 
-3.5887 
 
-1.9492 
 
-0.8419 
 
-1.0151 
 
-11.5824 
 
-3.2248 
Real.PCE 
 
2.5601 
 
0.3873 
 
4.8294 
   
5.9745 
 
3.4924 
Real.GDP   8.2698   7.1789   12.6999       5.0193   5.5182 
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Appendix Table 41. Macro Factor Loadings for Macroeconomic Variables (continued) 
  Hungary   Israel   Italy   Japan   Korea   Malaysia   
  Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output 
Loading 
            
CPI 1.1224*** 
 
0.2292 
 
0.6868*** 
 
0.7433*** 
 
0.9162*** 
 
0.5491*** 
 
PPI 0.3639*** 
 
1.2313*** 
 
0.8747*** 
 
0.8386*** 
 
1.0126*** 
 
1.0543*** 
 
PCE 0.4767** 
 
0.7119*** 
 
0.7265*** 
 
0.3863*** 
 
-0.0953 
 
0.7549*** 
 
GDP 0.027458 
 
NA 
 
0.6206*** 
 
0.3313** 
 
0.1004284 
 
0.8386*** 
 
IP 
 
0.9990*** 
 
0.5162*** 
 
0.9381*** 
 
0.9225*** 
 
1.3084*** 
 
1.2498*** 
Unemploy 
 
-0.5963*** 
 
-0.7515*** 
 
-0.5070*** 
 
-0.4929*** 
 
-0.2977** 
 
-0.2315 
Real.PCE 
 
0.7563 
 
0.3880*** 
 
0.8428 
 
0.6969** 
 
1.0106 
 
0.9359 
Real.GDP 
 
0.8542*** 
 
0.9813*** 
 
0.9192*** 
 
0.8234*** 
 
1.3179*** 
 
1.2596*** 
t-statistics 
            
CPI 12.1987 
 
1.6159 
 
8.4208 
 
10.1330 
 
10.4684 
 
4.8946 
 
PPI 2.9763 
 
11.8900 
 
12.4765 
 
12.5126 
 
12.4031 
 
12.0703 
 
PCE 2.5100 
 
3.3679 
 
6.5438 
 
2.6817 
 
-0.4944 
 
4.6874 
 
GDP 0.1329 
   
4.8152 
 
2.2421 
 
0.5200 
 
5.7005 
 
IP 
 
8.0187 
 
6.7325 
 
8.8362 
 
12.3347 
 
7.0652 
 
6.4410 
Unemploy 
 
-2.7234 
 
-3.4018 
 
-3.3382 
 
-3.6575 
 
-2.4704 
 
-1.3914 
Real.PCE 
 
1.4221 
 
2.6638 
 
1.1557 
 
2.1527 
 
0.0495 
 
0.2598 
Real.GDP   6.2385   12.1682   8.3814   9.3144   6.9704   6.0330 
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Appendix Table 41. Macro Factor Loadings for Macroeconomic Variables (continued) 
  Mexico   Peru   Philippines Poland   Romania   Russia   
  Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output 
Loading 
            
CPI 0.5788*** 
 
0.6652*** 
 
0.9426*** 
 
0.4610** 
 
-0.0759 
 
0.2230* 
 
PPI 1.2649*** 
 
0.8425*** 
 
0.5169*** 
 
1.2700*** 
 
0.9196*** 
 
1.1145*** 
 
PCE 0.4168* 
 
0.4721*** 
 
0.1227 
 
0.5322 
 
0.6665*** 
 
0.8710*** 
 
GDP 0.3148 
 
NA 
 
0.4768*** 
 
0.0191 
 
0.6902*** 
 
0.9055*** 
 
IP 
 
0.9535*** 
 
1.0308*** 
 
1.6997*** 
 
0.1027** 
 
0.1380** 
 
0.7929*** 
Unemploy 
 
-0.7725* 
 
-0.0988 
 
-0.4124 
 
-0.4253*** 
 
-0.5213*** 
 
-0.8645 
Real.PCE 
 
0.9302 
 
NA 
 
0.4018 
 
0.2822*** 
 
0.4175*** 
 
0.6317** 
Real.GDP 
 
0.9492*** 
 
NA 
 
1.0810*** 
 
0.3140*** 
 
0.4572*** 
 
0.7532*** 
t-statistics 
            
CPI 4.3280 
 
8.3382 
 
12.3582 
 
2.6139 
 
-0.7190 
 
1.7619 
 
PPI 12.3190 
 
12.2453 
 
5.3316 
 
2.9236 
 
12.0277 
 
11.9377 
 
PCE 1.8494 
 
3.3982 
 
0.6986 
 
1.6137 
 
4.6721 
 
5.5508 
 
GDP 1.3644 
   
3.0544 
 
1.4332 
 
5.0097 
 
5.9697 
 
IP 
 
9.0788 
 
5.1326 
 
6.6655 
 
2.2035 
 
2.3507 
 
8.8044 
Unemploy 
 
-1.9055 
 
-0.7532 
 
-1.1102 
 
-10.7760 
 
-7.9013 
 
-1.3639 
Real.PCE 
 
0.6053 
   
1.1443 
 
5.5832 
 
5.4289 
 
2.3453 
Real.GDP   8.8990       3.7498   5.3000   7.7284   7.3599 
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Appendix Table 41. Macro Factor Loadings for Macroeconomic Variables (continued) 
  Slovak   South Africa Thailand   Venezuela 
  Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output Inflation Real output 
Loading 
        
CPI 0.4647*** 
 
0.4869*** 
 
1.2710*** 
 
0.5717*** 
 
PPI 0.7726*** 
 
0.8816*** 
 
1.1296*** 
 
0.7112*** 
 
PCE 0.6326*** 
 
0.3675** 
 
0.7413*** 
 
0.0018 
 
GDP 0.3774*** 
 
0.6174*** 
 
0.4462* 
 
0.1626** 
 
IP 
 
0.0237 
 
0.6832*** 
 
1.4426*** 
 
0.4958*** 
Unemploy 
 
-0.5262*** 
 
-0.7391*** 
 
-1.0071 
 
-0.5420*** 
Real.PCE 
 
0.4464*** 
 
0.7624 
 
1.1340 
 
0.5772*** 
Real.GDP 
 
0.3425*** 
 
0.8295*** 
 
1.4568*** 
 
0.5972*** 
t-statistics 
        
CPI 5.9152 
 
5.3698 
 
12.2781 
 
4.7253 
 
PPI 12.5347 
 
12.4361 
 
10.0100 
 
4.1306 
 
PCE 7.0665 
 
2.4586 
 
3.3337 
 
1.3272 
 
GDP 3.0106 
 
5.0927 
 
1.8167 
 
2.1186 
 
IP 
 
0.4050 
 
4.7565 
 
8.2991 
 
4.7537 
Unemploy 
 
-7.9645 
 
-5.1668 
 
-0.0430 
 
-3.1333 
Real.PCE 
 
5.7307 
 
1.4102 
 
0.6221 
 
2.7342 
Real.GDP   4.2409   12.7122   8.4000   5.0861 
Notes: Factor loadings matrix H and associated t-statistics for macro factors extraction,  ܻ?ൌ ܺ ?ǡ ?൅ ɂ ?, where the macroeconomic variables in 
WKH ILUVW FROXPQ DUH &3, 33, 3&( *'3 ,3 8QHPSOR\PHQW 5HDO 3&( DQG 5HDO *'3 ³´ ³´ ³´ UHSUHVHQW   DQG 
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significance level, respectively. There are few countries that I cannot get enough data for the macroeconomic variable, in that case, I estimate 
PDFURIDFWRUVZLWKRXWWKDWYDULDEOHDQGGHQRWHLWVORDGLQJDV³1$´ 
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Appendix Table 42. Market Prices of Risk 
  Austria       Brazil       Chile       
  k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? 
Estimates 
            
Inflation 0.7092*** 0.0000 0.0000 22.6381*** 0.0905*** 0.0000 0.0000 -8.5432*** 0.0954*** 0.0000 0.0000 -36.1672*** 
Real output 0.2192*** 0.0000 0.0000 12.3049*** 0.6625*** 0.0026 0.0000 3.5516*** -0.0520*** 0.0009 0.0000 23.6183*** 
Latent 0.0000 0.0000 0.0023*** 41.7649*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 -2.4801*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -44.5689*** 
t-statistics 
            
Inflation 32.8297 - - 15.5773 3.9811 - - -174.3028 34.1852 - - -14.2977 
Real output 37.3586 0.0177 - 41.0805 15.7150 0.5148 - 104.7901 -33.4906 0.3807 - 14.9980 
Latent - - 11.7493 68.1507 - - 0.7156 -63.0472 - - 0.7406 -28.2696 
  Colombia       Croatia       Greece       
  k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? 
Estimates 
            
Inflation 0.0762*** 0.0000 0.0000 11.5274*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 68.1455*** 0.0304*** 0.0000 0.0000 -77.9451*** 
Real output 0.6915*** 0.4804*** 0.0000 -21.6594*** 0.1066*** 0.0000 0.0000 -147.6720*** -0.1004*** 0.1120*** 0.0000 -83.6446*** 
Latent 0.0000 0.0000 0.0043*** -4.0356*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0057 7.2432*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.1151*** 1.1992 
t-statistics 
            
Inflation 5.4905 - - 14.0024 0.0166 - - 10.8784 5.3290 - - -63.8879 
Real output 8.5538 9.6098 - -18.1075 3.7958 0.0362 - -141.9177 -7.7592 13.5788 - -146.0296 
Latent - - 0.7160 -14.3876 - - 0.9197 11.4261 - - 11.5362 1.1458 
 
 
Part C                                                                                                                             Appendix 
155 
 
Appendix Table 42. Market Prices of Risk (continued) 
  Hungary       Israel       Italy       
  k     7KHWD%? k     Theta %? k     7KHWD%? 
Estimates 
            
Inflation 0.0187 0.0000 0.0000 -0.9130*** 0.1467*** 0.0000 0.0000 -17.2837*** 0.0295** 0.0000 0.0000 -20.9218*** 
Real output 0.0325 0.0375*** 0.0000 -4.3591*** 0.0271 0.0000 0.0000 -8.4117*** -1.7496*** 0.9736*** 0.0000 2.0538*** 
Latent 0.0000 0.0000 0.0230*** -5.5626*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 2.5691*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 30.3279*** 
t-statistics 
            
Inflation 0.1884 - - -18.5614 4.9329 - - -276.8776 2.5908 - - -78.0847 
Real output 1.5353 3.9253 - -44.5957 1.5055 0.0021 - -150.4726 -24.1576 14.6142 - 10.2861 
Latent - - 5.7721 -84.3862 - - 0.7096 42.7027 - - 1.0310 33.8596 
  Japan       Korea       Malaysia       
  k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? 
Estimates 
            
Inflation 0.0077*** 0.0000 0.0000 -29.1813*** 0.2883*** 0.0000 0.0000 4.2908*** 0.3814*** 0.0000 0.0000 1.0385*** 
Real output -1.0264*** 0.4089*** 0.0000 -77.3751*** 0.1935*** 0.0634*** 0.0000 -11.7840*** -0.0570*** 0.0510*** 0.0000 -8.2868*** 
Latent 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013 -5.4849*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.9608*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 3.4484*** 
t-statistics 
            
Inflation 3.2376 - - -25.6739 18.5575 - - 46.2129 4.9761 - - 59.4769 
Real output -10.3373 9.7931 - -27.7066 10.7081 15.4455 - -58.4401 -3.7781 17.4037 - -32.0366 
Latent - - 0.7069 -9.9911 - - 0.7929 22.4295 - - 0.7074 69.4484 
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Appendix Table 42. Market Prices of Risk (continued) 
  Mexico       Peru       Philippines     
  k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? 
Estimates 
            
Inflation 0.3059*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.2284*** 0.0067 0.0000 0.0000 -9.4428*** 0.0061 0.0000 0.0000 -3.6472*** 
Real output 0.4065*** 0.0078*** 0.0000 -129.1018*** 0.1706*** 0.0571 0.0000 -6.5680*** 0.4665*** 0.1217*** 0.0000 -8.3986*** 
Latent 0.0000 0.0000 0.0019 1.9994*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0014 0.9032*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 1.2031*** 
t-statistics 
            
Inflation 21.5832 - - 12.6564 0.1513 - - -99.8328 0.1502 - - -25.0616 
Real output 19.4723 28.3584 - -312.4229 2.9358 1.0692 - -42.9336 5.1253 3.3385 - -39.6486 
Latent - - 0.7399 30.2964 - - 0.7076 4.5878 - - 0.7190 7.1298 
  Poland       Romania       Russia       
  k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? 
Estimates 
            
Inflation 0.1894*** 0.0000 0.0000 13.9816*** 1.0012*** 0.0000 0.0000 -7.5132*** 0.0220*** 0.0000 0.0000 28.9354*** 
Real output 0.7257*** 0.9990*** 0.0000 -10.7242*** -0.2695** 0.0856*** 0.0000 -14.6602*** 0.1229*** 0.0903*** 0.0000 -44.4702*** 
Latent 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.3499*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0073*** 4.7345*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.1274*** -0.5337** 
t-statistics 
            
Inflation 5.9099 - - 241.4094 18.5551 - - -182.5703 3.0567 - - 17.0217 
Real output 6.1718 28.6601 - -126.0252 -2.3960 7.9899 - -196.7815 7.4240 8.3436 - -20.0951 
Latent - - 0.7170 7.1851 - - 2.6631 93.2027 - - 8.3560 -2.4024 
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Appendix Table 42. Market Prices of Risk (continued) 
  Slovak       South Africa     Thailand       
  k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? k     7KHWD%? 
Estimates 
            
Inflation 0.5870*** 0.0000 0.0000 1.1211*** 0.0725*** 0.0000 0.0000 30.9947*** 0.0963*** 0.0000 0.0000 -5.7710*** 
Real output -0.6929*** 0.0186*** 0.0000 -52.2557*** 0.0033 0.0000 0.0000 4.5242*** 0.1081 0.0002*** 0.0000 0.2359*** 
Latent 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005*** 2.4054*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0411*** -2.9576 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005*** -2.3600*** 
t-statistics 
            
Inflation 26.5397 - - 17.4264 3.3861 - - 181.9872 4.0914 - - -32.4977 
Real output -18.4738 13.4963 - -40.0525 0.3399 0.0026 - 22.1983 16.3341 0.0111 - 8.9468 
Latent - - 0.7097 36.3605 - - 2.9384 -13.1176 - - 0.7087 -87.4794 
  Venezuela     
        
  k     7KHWD%? 
        
Estimates 
            
Inflation 0.2772*** 0.0000 0.0000 14.2634*** 
        
Real output 0.4128*** 0.2169*** 0.0000 -15.6805*** 
        
Latent 0.0000 0.0000 0.1141*** 0.8497*** 
        
t-statistics 
            
Inflation 9.0182 - - 41.3954 
        
Real output 13.0091 8.3148 - -81.6072 
        
Latent - - 14.8467 20.7598 
        
Notes:  K and %? matrix estimates for Greece, ݀ܺ ?ൌ ݇ ?ሺߠ ?െ ܺ ?ሻ݀ݐ ൅ ݀  ܹ? ?. ³´³´³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHO
respectively. 
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Appendix Table 43. Instantaneous Credit Spread 
  Austria   Brazil   Chile   Colombia   Croatia   Greece   
  Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic 
,QWHUFHSWĮ 0.0021*** 7.5770 0.0086*** 8.3887 0.0029*** 5.7299 0.0082*** 10.5562 0.0082*** 11.0758 0.0120*** 7.0774 
Inflation 0.0010** 2.1785 0.0029*** 3.2155 -0.0014* -1.8220 0.0020*** 3.4491 -0.0109*** -9.6757 0.0114*** 5.4957 
Real output -0.0029*** -8.9683 -0.0029** -2.1676 -0.0011 -1.6432 -0.0046*** -3.4687 0.0007 1.5307 -0.0163*** -13.0276 
Latent 0.0068*** 13.5851 -0.0233*** -13.3964 0.0090*** 18.7503 -0.0160*** -12.2868 -0.0155*** -18.4512 0.0399*** 9.5387 
  Hungary   Israel   Italy   Japan   Korea   Malaysia   
  Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic 
,QWHUFHSWĮ 0.0095*** 8.3180 0.0038*** 9.1105 0.0032*** 5.8381 0.0009*** 7.4841 0.0060*** 7.8446 0.0039*** 9.2712 
Inflation -0.0032** -2.4110 -0.0010 -1.3650 -0.0015** -2.0961 -0.0004*** -3.7050 0.0014* 1.8403 0.0007 0.9765 
Real output -0.0103*** -8.3415 -0.0019*** -4.0830 0.0000 0.0228 -0.0008*** -6.1563 -0.0081*** -7.7523 -0.0058*** -6.3534 
Latent -0.0179*** -19.2857 0.0084*** 16.3589 0.0078*** 13.0759 -0.0038*** -12.7213 0.0170*** 23.0232 -0.0091*** -13.9976 
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Appendix Table 43. Instantaneous Credit Spread (continued) 
  Mexico   Peru   Philippines Poland   Romania   Russia   
  Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic 
,QWHUFHSWĮ 0.0059*** 9.7098 0.0075*** 11.0367 0.0133*** 12.5651 0.0042*** 6.1541 0.0126*** 7.5951 0.0135*** 6.7284 
Inflation 0.0010 1.3486 0.0030*** 4.7818 0.0031*** 2.9211 0.0002 0.2366 0.0001 0.0697 -0.0026 -0.8129 
Real output -0.0054*** -8.9637 -0.0053*** -5.8938 -0.0056*** -2.7813 -0.0014*** -4.8582 -0.0054*** -5.0371 -0.0113*** -4.5644 
Latent -0.0155*** -20.3808 0.0187*** 12.5052 0.0181*** 14.8152 -0.0098*** -26.1297 0.0225*** 8.5366 -0.0345*** -13.3642 
  Slovak   South Africa Thailand   Venezuela   
    
  Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic Estimates t-statistic 
    
,QWHUFHSWĮ 0.0024*** 6.0327 0.0067*** 9.3763 0.0046*** 9.1491 0.0618*** 9.8255 
    
Inflation 0.0005 0.7711 0.0038*** 5.3796 -0.0010 -1.3901 0.0147*** 2.8755 
    
Real output -0.0010** -2.3650 -0.0071*** -10.5517 -0.0046*** -5.2114 -0.0248*** -5.6847 
    
Latent 0.0069*** 14.5057 0.0152*** 13.1150 0.0095*** 12.4681 0.1146*** 23.0707 
    
Notes: The intercept and factor loadings for the instantaneous credit spread function, ߣሺܺ ?ሻ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܾ7ܺ ?³´³´³´UHSUHVHQW
and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 44. Spread level test 
  ȕ0 ȕ1 ȕ1=1 AdjR2 
Austria 0.0001 1.0254*** 0.5401 0.8575 
Brazil -0.0009 0.9887*** -0.1771 0.7608 
Chile 0.0004 0.9333*** -1.3730 0.8233 
Colombia -0.0010 1.0627*** 0.6866 0.6448 
Croatia 0.0011 0.9172*** -2.0789 0.8703 
Greece 0.0004 0.9886*** -0.3107 0.9041 
Hungary 0.0007 0.9463*** -1.4269 0.8899 
Israel 0.0001 1.0010*** 0.0228 0.8681 
Italy -0.0001 1.0779*** 1.5766 0.8573 
Japan -0.0001 1.1075*** 1.1926 0.6548 
Korea 0.0006 0.9206*** -1.7940 0.8453 
Malaysia -0.0003 1.0763*** 1.4004 0.8385 
Mexico 0.0010 0.9268*** -1.6378 0.8446 
Peru -0.0002 1.0030*** 0.0536 0.8111 
Philippines -0.0006 1.0047*** 0.1085 0.8709 
Poland -0.0002 1.0261*** 0.6553 0.8937 
Romania 0.0011 0.9343*** -1.7022 0.8876 
Russia 0.0014 0.8969*** -2.4972 0.8641 
Slovakia 0.0003 0.9635*** -0.7218 0.8213 
South Africa 0.0007 0.9488*** -1.0646 0.8306 
Thailand -0.0002 1.0419*** 0.8353 0.8451 
Venezuela 0.0030 0.9417*** -1.3586 0.8667 
Note: The table provides the coefficient estimates of the regression ܥܦܵ ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ൌߚ ?ǡ ?൅ ߚ ?ǡ ?ܥܦܵ ?ǡ ? ?൅ ߝ ?ǡ ?, where ܥܦܵ ?ǡ ? ? ? ? is the observed CDS spread for country 
i at time t, and ܥܦܵ ?ǡ ? ? is the CDS spread estimated by our model. Column ߚ ?ൌ  ? reports the t-statistics of the null hypothesis that the slope estimate ߚ ? 
equals to one. The last column shows the adjusted R2 RIUHJUHVVLRQ³´³´
³´UHSUHVHQWDQGVLJQLILFDQFHOHYHOUHVSHFWLYHO\ 
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Appendix C.D Figures 
Appendix Figure 12. Time Series Plot of All Sovereign CDS Spreads (bps) 
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Notes: Plot of sovereign CDS spreads for all countries in my sample. Y axis is 
sovereign CDS spreads in bps. 
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Appendix Figure 13. Time Series Plot of Extracted Macro Factors 
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Notes: Plots of the extracted inflation (in line) and real output (in dot) factors 
for all countries. Plots from the top left to the bottom right are for country 
Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak, 
South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela, respectively. Y axis is the standardized 
value. 
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Appendix Figure 14. Time Series Plot of Model Pricing Errors (bps) 
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Notes: Plot of model pricing errors of 5-year sovereign CDS. Pricing errors are 
defined as the difference between model implied spreads and market observed 
spreads. Y axis is pricing errors in bps. 
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 Motivated by 1) the increasing default loss rate after the beginning of 
the financial crisis in 2007 and 2) the insufficiency of existing models of 
default to explain default spreads, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature 
by finding the determinants of corporate and sovereign CDS spreads using 
recent data covering both before and after the financial crisis from 2004 to 
2010.  
 Three pricing factors affecting the valuation of CDS are interest rate, 
credit spread and liquidity spread. In Part A I review several models on those 
pricing factors, the dynamics researchers typically assume for those factors, 
and the inter-connection among them. Three main branches of CDS valuation 
are reduced form model, structural form model and CAPM framework. In 
addition, corporate and sovereign CDS contracts have different risk profiles, 
for example, liquidity spreads with different maturity vary significantly for a 
corporate CDS but less so for a sovereign CDS because, in contrast with the 
corporate markets where a majority of the trading volume is concentrated on 
the 5-year CDS, the sovereign market has a more uniform trading volume 
across maturities.  
Regarding to the difference, Part B investigates the relationship 
between the changes in corporate CDS spreads and the determinants implied 
by structural models of default, including firm leverage, volatility, risk-free 
interest rate and liquidity. I construct a liquidity measure for CDS contracts 
and find these determinants, especially the liquidity determinant, are 
significant and time-varying, by a dummy-variable regression and a Markov 
regime switching model. 
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Part C develops and tests a model to value sovereign CDS spreads with 
observable macroeconomic variables and a latent variable under a multifactor 
affine framework, imposing no-arbitrage assumptions and allowing macro 
variables to affect the dynamics of the full term structure of sovereign credit 
risk. This reduced form model successfully replicates the spreads level and 
outperforms modelling with only a latent variable. Incorporating macro factors 
improves the out-of-sample performance, especially in normal periods. 
Studying the sovereign CDS spreads of 22 countries, I find that two country-
specific macro factors, inflation and real output, extracted via a Kalman filter, 
have long-lasting impacts and are able to explain a significant portion of the 
variation of spreads, while US financial variables explain a portion of the latent 
factor that cannot be captured by the macro factors. This spillover effect on 
sovereiJQPDUNHWV IURP WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV(?HFRQRP\ LV VWURQJHUGXULQJVWUHVV
periods. 
The implications of this thesis are following. First, for quantitative 
analysts on CDS derivative pricing, a key concern is the number of factors 
sufficient for CDS valuation. The results of this thesis suggest that besides 
factors for credit risk, one more factor to measure liquidity risk should be 
priced in a model, in order to estimate a fair CDS value; second, for risk 
analysts on CDS portfolio, a simple OLS regression may fail to capture the 
true portfolio risk, instead, a more advanced model such as a regime switching 
model should be applied for risk analysis including stress testing and scenario 
analysis, etc.; third, for traders on international markets, it is essential to take 
into account the impacts of other countries, a strong spillover from other 
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countries may easily ruin their profits if they focus only on local 
macroeconomic and financial variables. 
 However, there are several limitations of this thesis. First, I did not 
examine the performance of models under CAPM framework for CDS 
valuation, which is developing quickly and may help to solve the default 
spread puzzle: a larger-than-expected short-term default spread. Second, the 
data sample is only from 2004 to 2010. Those countries with big influences on 
credit market such as Portugal, Spain and U.S. are excluded due to data 
limitation. Adding those countries and extending data sample to 2012 may help 
us find more interesting stories and make the models more convincing. Third, I 
did not consider a more sophisticated model for sovereign CDS spreads, which 
may fail to reflect the reality well. For example, I assume a constant volatility 
through-out the sample period. However, the sovereign spreads are clearly 
much more volatile after 2007. A more technically appealing way is to allow 
for the potential of regime-switching or stochastic volatility in an affine credit 
model, or to allow for the impacts of trading behaviour on CDS spreads.  
 To overcome the above mentioned limitations, my future research work 
will compare the performance of reduced form models, structural form models 
and models under CAPM framework with a longer data sample size and a 
more flexible valuation model by including an exogenous financial market 
volatility analogous to Wu and Zhang (2008), or replacing a constant volatility 
with a stochastic volatility following Jacobs and Li (2008).       
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